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The European Commission Project
Regarding Competition in Professional
Services
Laurel S. Terry*
Lawyer regulation has been under assault. Antitrust officials around
the world have taken aim at the regulatory systems of the legal profession.
This includes European antitrust officials, who have concluded that some
lawyer regulators are affected by the "weight of tradition," "fail to see how
things can be done differently," and do not regulate in the public interest.
2
The European proposals are nothing short of breath-taking and
include, inter alia, suggested changes to lawyer qualification rules, such as
education and training requirements, reduction or elimination of the lawyer
monopoly, and changes to the business structure rules to permit
multidisciplinary practice or even publicly traded law firms.3 These
proposals are part of the European Union Professional Services
* Harvey A. Feldman Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State
Dickinson School of Law. Professor Terry would particularly like to extend her thanks to
Professor Dr. Martin Henssler, Dr. Matthias Kilian, Jonathan Goldsmith, Ron Aronovsky,
and others who provided useful comments and information for this article.
Within the last decade, antitrust officials around the world have launched inquiries into
the regulation of the legal profession. Such efforts have taken place in Asia, Australia,
Europe, North America, and elsewhere but are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g.,
COMPETITION BUREAU CANADA, SELF-REGULATED PROFESSIONS--BALANCING COMPETITION
AND REGULATION (2007), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/02523e.html [hereinafter CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT]; Int'l Inst. of Law
Ass'n Chief Executives, The Implementation of the Reform of the Legal Profession-Case
Studies in Change (Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www.iilace.org/pdf/2006NYC-
Program.pdf (meeting notes on file with author).
2 Communication from the Commission: Professional Services-Scope for More Reform:
Follow-Up to the Report on Competition in Professional Services, at 10, COM (2005) 405
final (Sept. 5, 2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0405:FIN:EN:PDF [hereinafter Follow-Up Report]. In
Europe and elsewhere in the world, antitrust law is known as "competition law" and the
officials are competition officials, rather than antitrust officials. The terms will be used
interchangeably in this article.
3id.
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"Competition" Initiative (EU Initiative), which has examined and made
recommendations concerning five professions in twenty-five countries.4
While the antitrust officials' examinations of lawyer regulations are
probably long overdue, there are risks associated with the scope and breadth
of the current inquiry and its broad-brush approach.
The economic (and often technical) arguments offered by the EU
Competition authorities have launched a wave of dramatic reforms in EU
Member States, many of which appear unstoppable. Although most U.S.
(and perhaps EU) lawyers would agree that some of these lawyer regulation
reforms are appropriate and long overdue (e.g., lifting advertising bans and
restrictive fee schedules), many of the proposed reforms are much more
controversial and central to the concept of lawyer training and regulation.
Because of the breadth and scope of the EU Initiative, however, and its call
to EU Member States to conduct further studies, the EU Initiative did not
conduct an in-depth country and context-specific study of individual lawyer
rules, their justifications, and a rigorous examination of the potential costs
and benefits of reforms. For example, the EU Initiative did not attempt to
rigorously examine whether or how the suggested changes would affect the
administration of justice or rule of law (and how one might measure this).
Moreover, because of its broad-brush nature, the EU Initiative provided a
rather cursory antitrust analysis of specific service sectors it studied, with
relatively little attention paid to elements such as identifying and analyzing
the legal markets in different countries.
One goal of this article is to help EU Member States' policy-makers
and citizens understand the broad-brush nature of the EU Initiative and
remember that it was a call for further investigation by EU Member States.
This article provides a detailed case study of the EU Initiative so that as
many individuals as possible in the European Union can understand the
issues at stake and participate in rigorous discussions about the
justifications for, and costs and benefits of, particular lawyer regulation
rules in particular countries.
Although one goal of this article is to empower European stakeholders
and policy-makers, it is not this article's only goal. The EU Initiative is
certainly important because of the profound effect it has had and will
continue to have on the regulation of the legal profession in Europe. There
is an additional reason, however, why it is important. In a globalized world,
regulatory changes that happen in one country are increasingly likely to be
reproduced in some fashion in other countries. 5  Thus, the European
4 Id.
5 See Laurel S. Terry, Carole Silver, Ellyn Rosen, Carol Needham, Robert E. Lutz, &
Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Transnational Legal Practice: 2006-07 Year-in-Review, 42 INT'L L. 833
(2008) (discussing globalization and legal services); Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics: The
Coming ofAge of Global and Comparative Perspectives, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv.
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Union's legal profession antitrust initiatives are important because they
have the potential to migrate and change the nature of the lawyer regulation
debate in the United States. Other countries, including Canada, have
launched similar inquiries. For this reason, it is useful for U.S. lawyers to
be familiar with the EU Initiative. In my view, there is an important role to
be served by a detailed case study that shows how and when the EU
Initiative evolved so that U.S. lawyers can be better prepared to respond
should a similar development "jump the pond" to the United States. This is
particularly important in light of the EU Initiative's "tidal wave"
momentum, which has been cited in OECD and EU studies and by
countries such as Canada.7
Section I of this article provides the background and contextual
information that is necessary to understand the EU Initiative. This
background section includes information about prior antitrust initiatives
directed toward the legal profession, EU antitrust law and its enforcement
mechanisms, the European Union's Lisbon Strategy, which has been cited
as support for the EU Initiative, EU regulation of legal practice, and the
European Court of Justice cases that provided part of the impetus for this
initiative. Section II of this article introduces the European Commission's
Professional Services Stocktaking Exercise (Stocktaking Exercise), which
was directed towards five categories of professional services, including
legal services. Section III analyzes the two Commission reports that
463 (2005) (discussing migration of lawyer regulatory developments).
6 CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 1. See also Paul D. Paton, Between a
Rock and a Hard Place: The Future of Self-Regulation-Canada Between the United States
and the English/Australian Experience, 2008 J. PROF. L. 87.
7 See, e.g., Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],
Competitive Restrictions in Legal Professions, at 18, n. 5, DAF/COMP(2007)39 (Jan. 28,
2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/38/40080343.pdf [hereinafter OECD
Legal Professions] (citing the EU reports); CANADIAN COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 1, at
v ("Research by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
confirms the worrisome state of Canada's professional services sector."); CANADIAN
COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (citing OECD and Australian studies); Barbara
Baarsma, Flora Felso, & Kieja Janssen, Regulation of the Legal Profession and Access to
Law, An Economic Analysis, SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH, (2008) at 48, available at
http://www.seo.nl/binaries /publicaties/rapporten/2008/2008 l.pdf (citing EU Reports);
Christoph Schmid, Gabriel S. Lee, Steffen Sebastian, Marcel Fink, & lain Paterson,
Preliminary Findings From the Ongoing Study on "Conveyancing Services Regulation in
Europe," at p. 4, n.2 (Dec. 11, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm
/competition/sectors/professionalservices/conferences/20061230/09 zerp.pdf (citing EU
Reports); OECD, Indicators of Regulatory Conditions in the Professional Services,
(spreadsheet) at 'read me' tab, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/60
/35818437.xls [hereinafter OECD Regulatory Indicators] ("These indicators are calculated
using the methodology developed in the [IHS] study for the European Commission and
effectively extend the time and country coverage of this work.").
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resulted from the Stocktaking Exercise.8 Section IV reviews some of the
stakeholder reactions to the EU Initiative. Section V concludes by
discussing the implications of these developments.
I. INTRODUCTION TO AND CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION PROJECT REGARDING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
A. Prior U.S., OECD, Australian, and U.K. Initiatives
As a starting point, it is useful to understand that the EU Initiative did
not arise in a vacuum but followed in the wake of a number of similar
discussions that took place within the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and elsewhere. 9 Because the
European Union is a member of the OECD, it participated in, and was
aware of, these discussions. European commentator Daniel Vdzquez Albert
has summarized the OECD's efforts with respect to professional services:
In 1985, the OECD's Committee on Competition Law and Policy
presented a Report titled Competition Policy and the Professions.
This report concluded that in the majority of countries professions
were not subject to competition rules and, in consequence,
recommended to the States to eliminate existing restrictions
regarding access, price, advertising and association structure, with
the aim that "exceptions of competition laws not go beyond what is
necessary and only serve to reach public interest aims." Regarding
access, it recommended that access systems be objective and
equitable, and that policies be created that would afford foreign
professionals the right to provide their services in both temporary
and permanent fashion. With regard to advertising, it suggested the
adoption of measurements to assure that consumers be afforded
sufficient information to choose between different professionals. In
reference to fees, it recommended that the mandatory tariff fixations
8 See Follow-Up Report, supra note 2; Communication from the Commission: Report on
Competition in Professional Services, at 5, COM(2004) 83 final (Feb. 9, 2004), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0083en01.pdf [hereinafter
Commission Report].
9 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was established
by fourteen countries in 1960 and has since grown to thirty of the most-developed countries
in the world. See OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, http://www.oecd.org
/document/58/0,2340,en 2649 201185_1889402__ 1 l,00.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2008). The OECD brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy
and the market economy from around the world to support sustainable economic growth,
boost employment, raise living standards, maintain financial stability, assist other countries'
economic development, and contribute to growth in world trade. It also shares expertise and
exchanges views with more than 100 other countries. See OECD, About OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1 1 1,00.html (last visited
Oct. 31, 2008).
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be submitted to review to avoid diversion from the price setting
freedom principle. In relation to professional corporations, it
emphasized that the use of new business structures to provide
professional services could allow for a greater efficiency. In the
latest years, the OECD has insisted on the need to reduce restrictions
to the rendering of professional services, as the Conferences and
Round Tables celebrated on this issue in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999
demonstrate. As a consequence of these Conferences and Round
Tables, the Committee on Competition Law and Policy has
elaborated diverse Reports, among which stand out the following
two: Report on Regulatory Reform: Chapter 3, Regulatory Reform
and Professional Business Services, of 1997; and Competition in
Professional Services, of 2000.10
The OECD 2000 Report entitled "Competition in Professional
Services" to which Professor Vdzquez Albert refers consisted of the
published proceedings from the 1999 OECD Roundtable on Professional
Services.11  This 214 page report included an executive summary, a
background note prepared by the OECD Secretariat, contributions from
thirteen countries, and a section that memorialized the discussions. 12 Many
of the contributions came from antitrust (competition) authorities in OECD
Member States and it is not clear whether any lawyer regulators were
invited or present.13 The Executive Summary of this Roundtable observed
that concerns had been expressed about the regulation of professional
services.14  For example, the U.S. delegate to the OECD Roundtable
10 Daniel Vdzquez Albert, Competition Law and Professional Practice, 11 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 555, 568 nn. 8-10 and accompanying text (2004-2005) (footnotes omitted).
1 OECD, Competition in Professional Services, DAFFE/CLP(2000)2, at 2 (Feb. 22,
2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/1920231.pdf [hereinafter OECD
2000 Roundtable] ("This document comprises proceedings in the original languages of a
Roundtable on Competition in Professional Services, which was held by the Working Party
No. 2 of the Committee on Competition Law and Policy in June 1999.").
12 Id. at 5.
13 See generally id.
14 Id. at 7:
Concerns have been raised that these structural and behavioural regulations restrict
competition more than is appropriate or necessary, raising the price and limiting
innovation in the provision of professional services. In addition, where a
professional association is delegated certain regulatory powers, such as the power
to discipline its members, concerns have arisen that professional associations may
use these powers as a tool to restrict entry, fix prices and enforce anti-competitive
co-operation between its members. In some cases, studies have found that
restricting entry to the most highly qualified providers may lower service quality
overall as consumers forego professional services or seek to provide the services
for themselves.
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commented that one shouldn't allow regulation of quality of service to be
promulgated as a disguise for economic regulation and one should also be
very careful to avoid a paternalistic excess of quality regulation. 5 OECD
members have continued to show interest in professional services
regulation: in 2008, the OECD issued a report that focused on the legal
profession and identified antitrust issues raised by various kinds of lawyer
regulations.' 6  This OECD report noted that traditionally the legal
professions are heavily regulated; that regulation appears to serve mainly
the private interests of the profession rather than broader consumer
interests; and that professional bodies may capture public authorities or
attain the right to regulate themselves.17  It further concluded that the
benefits of self-regulation, which allows for quality standards to be set by
informed professionals, may be outweighed by the harm from potential
anti-competitive restrictions. It therefore called on OECD members to
identify and remove those lawyer regulation restrictions that are
unnecessary or disproportionate to achieve the public interest; it encouraged
its members to consider the differences between informed and uninformed
buyers and to focus in particular on issues related to independent regulatory
authority for legal services, entry restrictions, exclusive rights, and
advertising and price restrictions.' 9
The trend towards deregulation of the legal profession, which was
endorsed in the OECD Roundtable Sessions and subsequent OECD reports,
reportedly began in the United States in the 1960s with the Chicago
school. 20 The U.S. cases applying antitrust law to the legal profession are21
well-known and include Goldfarb v. State Bar of Virginia, which struck
down a voluntary bar association's recommended minimum fee schedule,
15 See, e.g., OECD 2000 Roundtable, supra note 11, at 202. This delegate also said:
[P]rofessional service markets are just like markets for any other goods and
services, and the market responds very well to normal incentives to provide the
right level and right mix of price and quality. In the areas in which any kind of
empirical study of the effect on the removal of regulation on quality has been
undertaken, price in market has gone down, with no indication that the level of
quality of services has decreased. In terms of a market failure for information of
quality, this can be accomplished without the need for government regulation.
Id.
16 OECD Legal Professions, supra note 7, at 287-94.
17 Id. at 9.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 10.
20 Albert, supra note 10, at 76 (noting that the United States "is, undoubtedly, the country
where the trend to subject professional activity to free competition originated.").
21 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,2 2 which struck down a lawyer
disciplinary rule that prohibited lawyers from advertising. Professor Tom
Morgan, who is one of the early and leading U.S. commentators on U.S.
legal ethics and lawyer regulation issues, has written an excellent article
that summarizes the application of U.S. antitrust law to the legal profession.
His article reviews cases in which antitrust allegations against the legal
profession or bar associations were upheld, as well as cases in which
antitrust allegations were raised, but no violations were found.2 3 Because
these decisions have been widely cited in the OECD and elsewhere, they
are an important part of the factual context of the EU Initiative.
In addition to these U.S. antitrust cases and the OECD initiatives, there
were important developments in Australia and the United Kingdom that are
part of the backdrop of the EU Initiative. The Australian competition
initiative began in 1994 and included the legal profession within its
reforms:
On 25 February 1994 the Council of Australian Governments in
Hobart determined that it wished to assist in bringing about a more
competitive and integrated national market, and more efficient and
effective arrangements for the delivery of services in the areas of
shared responsibility between Governments. Those objectives
related to all spheres of Government, corporate, professional and
personal activities. That Council's decision adopted the principles of
competition policy, articulated in the Hilmer Report. That report
made wide-ranging recommendations, including the application of
competition principles to Commonwealth and State Government
agencies and authorities, the creation of a new Australian
Competition Commission, and a micro-economic reform agenda to
ensure the general application of competition policy principles,
including in relation to the legal profession. Specifically in relation
to the legal profession, it sought to have developed detailed
proposals for further reform of the legal profession: with the
objective of removing constraints on the development of a national
market in legal services and developing other efficiency enhancing
reforms. 24
In 1994, in response to these developments, the Law Council of
22 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
23 Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact Of Antitrust Law On The Legal Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 415 (1998). See also John E. Lopatka, Antitrust and Professional Rules:
A Framework for Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 301, 375-79 (1991) (discussing the FTC's
California Dental Association decision and the application of antitrust principles to
professionals other than lawyers).
24 LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., BLUEPRINT FOR THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
A NATIONAL MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES 3 (July 1994), available at
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/policy/1960506451 .html.
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Australia prepared a report entitled "Blueprint for the Structure of the Legal
Profession;" this report set forth a plan to develop the national market for
legal services that the Australian Competition Commission had called for to
reduce barriers and facilitate national practice.25 After this report (and
several additional reports, including a 1998 report by the Australian
Attorney General),26 numerous changes were made to Australian lawyer
regulations.2 7 In 2001, the Law Council of Australia proposed additional
reforms to facilitate national practice, which were approved by the
appropriate government entities.2 In 2002, the Australian attorneys general
launched a further set of reforms to develop model laws on a number of
items related to the legal profession. 29 These reforms, known as the Model
25 Id.
26 In April 1995, the Council of Australian Governments, which includes the
commonwealth, state, and territory governments, signed the Competition Principles
Agreement (CPA), which was one of three agreements to give effect to National
Competition Policy. See PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY: ITS EVOLUTION AND OPERATION (June 3, 2003), available at http://www.aph.gov.au
/library/intguide/econ/ncpsebrief.htm. In August 1998, the Attorney General's Office in the
state of New South Wales released a comprehensive issues paper that focused on the
National Competition Policy Review and the Legal Profession Act 1987. See NAT'L
COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT (Austl.: New S. Wales),
available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/report%5Clpd-reports.nsf/pages/ncp-index
[hereinafter NSW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW]. In December 1998, the
Attorney General's office released a report that supplemented the issues paper. This report
(and reports in other Australian states and territories) led to changes in Australia's lawyer
regulations. See Steve A. Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices-A
New Era in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN S.
INT'L L. REV. 671 (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=673021 (explaining that NSW's MDP rules were changed as a result of this
report).
27 By 2001, all but two Australian states and territories had adopted the legislation called
for in the Blueprint. See LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., SUBMISSION TO THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL TOWARDS NATIONAL PRACTICE BY THE LAW COUNCIL
OF AUSTRALIA, at 1 (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/natpractice
/NationalPractice.pdf; see also NSW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW, supra note
26.
28 See, e.g., LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., FEDERAL PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS LEGISLATION,
available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/policy/1960581107.html ("On 5 December 1998
the Law Council agreed to support the development of federal professional standards
legislation to complement existing or future State and Territory professional standards
legislation, so as to extend the application of the State and Territory schemes to federal
practice and liability in federal law."). See generally LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., POLICIES AND
GUIDELINES: NATIONAL PROFESSION, available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au
/policies.html; LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., SUBMISSION To THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF
ATTORNEYS-GENERAL TOWARDS NATIONAL PRACTICE BY THE LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA
(Oct. 2001), available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/natpractice/NationalPractice.pdf
(Law Council asked for attorney general endorsement of its approach).
29 LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., NATIONAL PRACTICE: BACKGROUND, available at
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/natpractice/background.htm:
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Laws initiatives, are wide ranging and include eleven major areas, including
admission, reserved tasks (e.g. UPL), business structure, ethics and
discipline, and fees and fiduciary accounts, among other things. 30  The
changes to Australian lawyer regulation have been quite dramatic and have
led to, inter alia, the world's first publicly-traded law firms. 31 While there
may have been a number of factors that contributed to these changes,
including globalization, it is clear that the Australian antitrust initiatives
were a major impetus for these regulatory changes.32 Moreover, it is clear
that the EU competition authorities were aware of these Australian
developments because they participated in OECD sessions that included
reports about them.33
In addition to these U.S., OECD, and Australian developments, EU
competition officials were aware of the United Kingdom's antitrust review
of the legal profession and resulting reforms.34  The U.K. developments
include the 2001 report by the Office of Fair Trading,3 5 which was followed
by an important government report36 that led to the Clementi Review and37
Report, ultimately resulting in the Legal Services Bill (the Act) that was
[T]he Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) commenced a further
phase of examining the regulation of laws through the National Practice Model
Laws Project. This project coincides with the Council's National Practice Project
and is essentially about reviewing and seeking national consistency in the
standards and 'rules' applying to the regulation of lawyers.
30 LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL., NATIONAL PRACTICE-THE MOVE TOWARDS A NATIONAL
LEGAL PROFESSION, available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/natpractice/home.html.
31 See Alexia Garamfalvi, Law Firm Goes Public, LEGAL TIMES (May 22, 2007),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 179751700602; Slater & Gordon, Ltd.
Prospectus, http://www.slatergordon.com.au/docs/prospectus/Prospectus.pdf; Australian
Securities Exchange, Slater & Gordon Limited (SGH), http://www.asx.com.au
/asx/research/CompanyInfoSearchResults.jsp?searchBy=asxCode&allinfo=&asxCode=sgh
(last visited Oct. 31, 2008). To view the portions of the 2004 Legal Profession Act relating
to Incorporated Legal Services and Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships, Sections 132-182, go to
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol-act/lpa2004179/sl34.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2007).
32 See NSW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW, supra note 26, at Chapter One,
Introduction (explaining why 1995 amendments to the Trade Practices Act of 1974 led to the
1998 competition review of the legal profession).
33 See, e.g., OECD 2000 Roundtable, supra note 11, at 108-111.34 Id. at 9-10.
35 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, COMPETITION IN THE PROFESSIONS-A REPORT BY THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING, OFT 328 (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/reports/professional-bodies/oft328.pdf (U.K.).
36 U.K. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE
LEGAL SERVICES MARKET-A REPORT FOLLOWING THE CONSULTATION IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST? (2003), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/general/oftreptconc.htm.
37 DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN
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adopted in the United Kingdom in October 2007. 3  The reforms in the Act
are quite dramatic: the Act changes the regulatory structure for solicitors
and barristers in England and Wales by creating a Legal Services Board and
an Office for Legal Complaints, both of which require a majority of
members who are not lawyers. 39 The Act also allows legal services to be
provided by firms organized under new business models according to rules
to be developed by the new Legal Services Board. Depending on the rules
the Board adopts, such business models could include publicly traded law
firms.40
In summary, when the EU Competition authorities launched their
review of professional services, they did so knowing that they were
following in the wake of a number of other countries. Among other things,
they knew that almost thirty years prior, the U.S. Supreme Court had found
that with respect to the legal profession, minimum fee schedules and
advertising bans violated U.S. antitrust laws.
ENGLAND AND WALES-FINAL REPORT (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.legal-services-
review.org.uk/content/report/index.htm. See also Legal Services Review Homepage,
http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
38 U.K. Ministry of Justice, Legal Services Act 2007, available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/legalservicesbill.htm [hereinafter Legal Services Act
2007] (including links to the bill and explanatory notes, the latter of which includes links to
the Clementi Report and other important background information). See also U.K.
Department of Constitutional Affairs, The Legal Services Bill, http://www.dca.gov.uk/legist
/legalservices.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (including the draft bill and explanatory notes
and background information).
39 Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 38, § 2 and sched. 1 (Schedule 1, § 2(1) requires
lay persons to be a majority of the Legal Services Board); id., § 114 and sched. 15 (Schedule
15, § 2(1) requires lay persons to be a majority of the Office for Legal Complaints). See also
Legal Services Bill, 2006, H.L. Bill [9], Explanatory Notes, para. 33, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldbills/009/en/07009x-.htm. Under
Article 212 of the 2007 UK Legal Services Act, with minor exceptions, the Act applies only
to England and Wales. See Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 38, article 212, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2007/ukpga-20070029-en 16#pt9-pb6-11g213. Changes
related to lawyers in Northern Ireland and Scotland will be made by the Northern Ireland
Assembly and Scottish Parliament, respectively. In January 2009, the Scottish Parliament
introduced for comments its own legal profession reform bill. See Scottish Government,
Reform of the Legal Profession, News Release, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases
/2009/01/07101312.
40 Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 38, Part 5, Alternative Business Structures. For
example, art. 72(2) defines a licensable body (B) as one in which another body (A) is a
manager of B or has an interest in B and if non-authorized persons are entitled to exercise, or
control the exercise of, at least 10% of the voting rights in A. The exact terms on which law
firms can be publicly traded will be established once rules are made by the Legal Service
Board and in accordance with those rules. See UK MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LEGAL SERVICES
REFORM UPDATE SEPT. 2008, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/legal-services-
reform-update-0908.pdf.
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B. The European Union's Competition (Antitrust) Provisions, Competence
and Enforcement Mechanisms
In order to understand the EU Initiative, it is useful to have some
background information about EU competition (antitrust) law. The Treaty
Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) 41 includes nine
competition articles, which are divided into two sections.4 2  The first six
articles apply to private undertakings 43 and the last three articles apply to
aid given by Member States. 4  EC Treaty Article 10 requires Member
4 1 For those who are not European Union experts, references to the "EC" and "EU" can
be confusing. There are, in fact, three "Eurbpean Communities," not one, and the European
Union or EU is technically a different legal entity than the European Community or EC. In
this article, however, the acronyms EC and EU are used interchangeably to refer to the
European Community or EC. Three separate initiating treaties established the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom);
and the European Economic Community (EEC). Generally speaking, when the shorthand
terms "European Community" or "EC" are used, they intend to refer to the Community
originally created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Rome has been amended
several times. In 1985, after a conference that was held in Luxembourg, EC Members
agreed to amendments in a document called the Single European Act (SEA). Numerous
changes occurred, including an agreement to complete a single internal market by 1992. A
second set of major amendments was adopted on February 7, 1992 at Maastricht, the
Netherlands, in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The TEU contained significant new
agreements on economic and political integration and also created a new entity called the
"European Union." The core of the "European Union" consists of the European
Community, rather than the European Economic Community. The TEU was followed by the
1997 Amsterdam Treaty which adopted further provisions concerning economic and political
integration. These amendments have been consolidated into a single document that has been
published by the EU, although it has never been officially adopted as a separate document by
the Member States. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331 :EN:pdf [hereinafter EC Treaty]; see also
Eur-Lex, Treaties, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en /treaties/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008)
(including links to all treaties).
42 EC Treaty, supra note 41, arts. 81-89 (TITLE VI: Common Rules on Competition,
Taxation and Approximation of Laws, Chapter 1, Rules On Competition. Section 1 of
Chapter 1 of Title VI includes Articles 81-86, which are "rules applying to undertakings."
Section 2 of Chapter 1 includes Articles 87-89, which address "aids granted by states.")
43 Id. With respect to private undertakings, Article 81 identifies conduct that is
prohibited if it has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition in the EU. Article 81 makes such agreements restricting competition void, but
also includes exceptions. Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant market position. Article
83 authorizes the relevant EU bodies to develop competition directives. Article 84 explains
the role of the Member States in the absence of enforceable EU directives. Article 85 sets
forth the authority of the European Commission. And the last undertakings section, Article
86, addresses public undertakings and undertakings to which EU Member States grant
special or exclusive rights.
44 Id. arts. 87-89. In the section on "Aids from Member States," Article 87 contains a
general rule that prohibits state aid or resources that distort or threaten to distort competition,
unless such aid or resources are otherwise permitted by the EC Treaty. Article 87 also
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States to act in a manner consistent with these EC Treaty requirements.45
Both the European Commission and the EU Member States are
entitled to enforce EU competition law. The Competition Directorate,
which is known as "DG Competition," is the EU department responsible for
administering EU competition policy; its mission is "to establish and
implement a coherent competition policy for the European Union.,
46
Neelie Kroes is the current Commissioner responsible for competition
policy and has taken an active role in the debate about legal services and
EU competition policy. 47  Within DG Competition, Directorate D is
responsible for legal services.48
The authority of EU Member States to enforce EU competition law
dates from May 1, 2004, when Regulation 1/2003 became effective. 49 That
regulation directs EU Member States to apply EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82
identifies actions that shall be viewed as EC Treaty-compatible and actions that may be
viewed as EC Treaty-compatible. Article 88 explains possible enforcement procedures by
the Commission and the Council. Article 89 sets forth the qualified-majority procedure to be
used in developing regulations.
41 Id. art. 10:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure
which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
46 European Commission, Competition, http://ec.curopa.eu/comm/competition
/indexen.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
47 See, e.g., Neelie Kroes, European Comm'r for Competition, Commissioner's Opening
Speech to the EP Juri Committee, (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu
/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2005_O22_en.pdf.
48 See Directorate-General for Competition (May 1, 2008) available at http://ec.europa.eu
/dgs/competition/directory/organen.pdf; see also Interview with Jonathan Goldsmith,
CCBE Secretary General, Brussels (May 3, 2006).
49 See European Competition Network, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm /competition/ecn/faq.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter
ECN FAQ]:
The entry into force, on 1 May 2004, of Council Regulation 1/2003 on the
implementation of the rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC
developed the enforcement powers of the competition authorities of the EU
Member States (also referred to as national competition authorities or NCAs).
Regulation 1/2003 made it compulsory for national competition authorities
(NCAs) to apply Article 81 of the EC Treaty where they apply national
competition law to agreements or concerted practices which may affect trade
between EU Member States, and to apply Article 82 of the EC Treaty where they
apply national competition law to any abuse prohibited by Article 82.
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as well as their own competition law. 5 By recognizing the competence of
EU Member States to enforce EU competition law, Regulation 1/2003
greatly expanded not only the enforcement possibilities but also the
potential for conflicts among and between the EU and its Member States.
As a result, Regulation 1/2003 required EU Member States and the
European Commission to work in close cooperation. 5' In order to
implement this aspect of Regulation 1/2003, a network of European
competition authorities (ECN) was formed in 2004.52 The ECN "is a forum
for discussion and cooperation in the application and enforcement of EC
competition policy" and "is the basis for the creation and maintenance of a
common competition culture in Europe.,
53
Because the ECN provides a forum for Member State competition
authorities to discuss similar issues, it undoubtedly makes it more likely
that the competition authorities in Member States will have similar views
on similar issues.54  Indeed, in response to a survey, EU Member States
have indicated that the ECN has contributed to their own competition law
reforms.55 The ECN does not, however, have any enforcement powers
itself.56 Although much of what happens in the ECN remains confidential,
50 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi !celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numd
oc=32003R0001&model=guichett [hereinafter Regulation 1/2003]. See also id. at arts. 11-
15 (Chapter IV, Cooperation); Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the
Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities, available at http://europa.eu.int
/comm/competition/antitrust/others/js-en.pdf (which was adopted together with Regulation
1/2003).
51 See Regulation 1/2003, supra note 50, art. 11.1 ("The Commission and the competition
authorities of the Member States shall apply the Community competition rules in close
cooperation.").
52 See Commission Notice on Cooperation Within the Network of Competition
Authorities (Text with EEA relevance), O.J. (C 101) 43-53, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004XC0427(02):EN:HTML;
European Commission, Competition, European Competition Network, Overview,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm /competition/ecn/indexen.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
53 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 50, art. 1. See also ECN FAQ, supra note 49 (stating
that the purposes of the ECN include "to agree on working arrangements and cooperation
methods, in keeping with Regulation 1/2003, and to provide an efficient framework for the
obligatory and optional information mechanisms; [and] to establish a continual dialogue
between the different enforcers, to discuss and build a common competition culture
approach.").
54 ECN FAQ, supra note 49 ("In addition, the authorities meeting in the ECN can
exchange their experience and views regarding particular sectors of the economy. This is the
common competition culture enhancement role of the ECN.").
55 See ECN WORKING GROUP ON COOPERATION ISSUES, RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
ON THE REFORM OF MEMBER STATES' NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS AFTER EC REGULATION
No. 1/2003 (as of April 14, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comin/competition
/ecn/ecn convergencequest_28112007.pdf.
56 ECN FAQ, supra note 49.
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the ECN has undertaken efforts to make its work more transparent. In April
2006, the European Commission issued a press release announcin the
launch of its new ECN webpage and its greater efforts at transparency.
In summary, it is noteworthy that both the European Commission
and the EU Member States are entitled to enforce EC Treaty Articles 81 and
82 regarding competition. Further, as a result of the ECN, the competition
authorities in EU Member States regularly speak with one another and
attempt to coordinate and harmonize their policies whenever possible.
C. European Union's Lisbon Strategy
The European Commission reports that are the focus of this article
refer to the effect of existing lawyer regulations on the EU's Lisbon
Strategy.58 Thus, in order to understand these reports, one must be familiar
with the term "Lisbon Strategy."
The Lisbon Strategy was first articulated at the March 2000 meeting of
57 Press Release, Competition: European Competition Network Launches One-stop
Access Website, (Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/06/421 &format-HTML&aged=O&Ianguage=EN&guiLanguage=en:
The European Competition Network-the European Commission together with the
national competition authorities in the EU-has launched a website providing
businesses, their advisors, and citizens with information about antitrust
enforcement, annual reports and background documents about the Network. The
ECN website will inter alia provide one-stop access to news releases from all the
national competition authorities, plus the Commission.
The ECN webpage provides additional information about their confidentiality-transparency
policy:
The competition authorities cooperating within the ECN are under professional
secrecy rules and cannot disclose outside the Network any information received
pursuant to Regulation 1/2003, unless it is necessary to prove an infringement of
Articles 81 and 82 EC. They must in particular protect the business secrets and
other confidential information of companies from being unduly disclosed to
anyone outside the Network .... Nonetheless, the authorities cooperating within
the ECN have started to select ECN-related information that would not fall under
the professional secrecy rule and could thus be communicated to the outside in
order to increase transparency where possible. The first concrete result is the
regular publication of aggregate figures of new investigations in the Network and
of envisaged decisions of which the NCAs have informed the Commission
pursuant to their legal obligation. This information is available on the Commission
/ DG Competition Internet website.
ECN FAQ, supra note 49.
58 See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 8, paras. 8-10, 104; Follow-Up Report,
supra note 2, paras. 3, 24, 28.
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the European Council.59  The conclusions of that meeting were
memorialized in a seventeen page document that contained a number of
specific suggestions, as well as an often-cited agreement that the European
Union should "become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more
and better jobs and greater social cohesion., 60
The goals of the Lisbon Strategy included efforts to "strengthen
employment, economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-
based economy., 61  Since 2000, the European Council has repeatedly
endorsed and refined the Lisbon Strategy.62
The European Council has encouraged the European Commission to
take steps to implement its Lisbon Strategy. 63 The European Commission
59 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, (Mar. 23-24, 2000), available at
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-rl.en0.htm [hereinafter
Lisbon Strategy]. As it explains on its website:
The European Council is the main decision-making body of the European Union.
The ministers of the member states meet within the Council of the European
Union. Depending on the issue on the agenda, each country will be represented by
the minister responsible for that subject (foreign affairs, finance, social affairs,
transport, agriculture, etc.). The presidency of the Council is held for six months
by each member state on a rotational basis.
Council of the European Union, European Council, http://www.consilium
.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=348&lang=EN&mode=g (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
Although the European Council is the main decision-making body of the EU, there are a
number of issues for which community legislation is adopted jointly by the Parliament and
the Council using a co-decision procedure. See id.
60 Lisbon Strategy, supra note 59, para. 5.
61 Id. at introduction.
62 See, e.g., Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council paras. 1-20 (Mar. 8-9,
2007) available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec
/93135.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Presidency Conclusions]; Presidency Conclusions, Brussels
European Council, para. 39 (Mar. 25-26 2004) (revised), available at http://ue.eu.int
/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en /ec/79696.pdf; Presidency Conclusions, Stockholm
European Council (Mar. 23-24, 2001), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs
/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-rl .%20ann-rl .en 1 .html.
63 See, e.g., Report from the Commission: The Concrete Future Objectives of Education
Systems, COM (2001) 59 final (Jan. 31, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm
/education/policies/2010/doc /concrete-future-objectivesen.pdf (Commission issued a work
plan for the Lisbon Strategy entitled Report on the Concrete Future Objectives of Education
and Training Systems. This was later adopted by the Council); Communication from the
Commission: A Coherent Framework of Indicators and Benchmarks For Monitoring
Progress Towards the Lisbon Objectives in Education and Training, COM (2007) 61 final
(Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2007:0061:FIN:EN:PDF; Communication from the Commission: More Research for Europe
-Towards 3% of GDP, COM (2002) 499 final (Sept. 11, 2002) (proposing that EU Member
States spend 3% of their gross national product on education; recommendation adopted by
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relied on the Lisbon Strategy to justify its professional services-related
competition initiatives. 64  As the Commission's 2004 Report explained,
"[m]ore efficient and competitive professional services will benefit
consumers directly and, as key inputs for other businesses they will also
bring greater productivity to the economy as a whole, thus contributing to
the Lisbon agenda of making Europe the most dynamic knowledge based
economy in the world., 65 Although it is beyond the scope of this article to
address the Lisbon Strategy in detail, it is important to realize that it has
been cited repeatedly as justification for the EU Initiative.
D. The Respective Authority of the European Union and EU Member
States with Respect to the Regulation of Legal Practice
In addition to the threshold information about EU competition law, one
must also understand certain threshold information about the regulation of
the legal profession in Europe in order to place the EU Competition Report
in its proper context. Traditionally, legal practice in the European Union66
has been regulated by each EU Member State. Although this still remains
largely true, lawyer regulation in individual EU Member States has been
heavily influenced by the European Union and its directives.
The European Union has adopted two lawyer-specific directives which
cover both services and establishment. The Lawyers' Services Directive
(Directive 77/249) allows EU lawyers to provide temporary services in
another EU Member State.67 The Lawyers' Establishment Directive
Council); 2007 Presidency Conclusions, supra note 62, paras. 3, 7.
64 Commission Report, supra note 8, at 3, paras. 8-10:
The Lisbon European Council in March 2000 adopted an economic reform
programme with the aim of making the European Union the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. Professional services
have an important role to play to improve the competitiveness of the European
economy, as they are inputs for the economy and business, so their quality and
competitiveness have important spill over effects.
Follow-Up Report, supra note 2, paras. 3, 24, 28.
65 Commission Report, supra note 8, para. 104.
66 See, e.g., Case 107/83 Ordre des Avocats du Barreau de Paris v. Klopp 1984 E.C.R.
2971 para. 17 (stating that a Member State is in principle free to regulate the exercise of the
legal profession in its territory).
67 Council Directive 77/249/EEC, 1977 O.J (L. 78) 17 [hereinafter Lawyers' Services
Directive 77/249]. For a more detailed discussion of this directive, see Roger J. Goebel,
Lawyers in the European Community: Progress Towards Community-Wide Rights of
Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 556, 576-585 (1991-92). This directive was adopted
pursuant to the freedom of services that is found, inter alia, in Articles 50 and 54 of the EC
Treaty, cited supra note 41. Article 54 states that: "As long as restrictions on freedom to
provide services have not been abolished, each Member State shall apply such restrictions
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(Directive 98/5) allows EU lawyers to establish themselves permanently in
another Member State.68  Lawyers are also subject to the 1998 and 2005
Recognition directives because portions of these directives have been
incorporated by reference into Directive 98/5.69
As a result of these directives and the European case law that both
preceded and interpreted these directives, 70 EU lawyers have much more
mobility across borders than U.S. lawyers do. 7  EU lawyers can provide
temporary services in another EU Member State without any formalities
and-provided they have three years of practice of EU law-can become
established by satisfying minimal registration requirements. Although
some European bars initially resisted many of the reform efforts, EU bar
representatives are now very proud of their lawyer mobility system and
commend it to the rest of the world.72
without distinction on grounds of nationality or residence to all persons providing services
within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 49." Id.
68 Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998
to Facilitate Practice of the Profession of Lawyer on a Permanent Basis in a Member State
Other than that in Which the Qualification was Obtained, 1998 O.J. (L.77) 36. Information
about where and how this Directive has been implemented into the Member States' law is
available on the CCBE's website. See CCBE Committees & Working Groups, Committees -
Free Movement of Lawyers-Members, http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=94
&idcomite=8&L=0 (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). This directive was adopted pursuant to
Article 49 of the EC Treaty, cited supra note 41. See also EC Treaty, supra note 41, art. 3(c)
(calling for the abolition of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons and services
within the European Community); id., art. 7a (stating that the internal market is to comprise
an area without internal frontiers and constitutes one of the objectives of the Community).
69 Council Directive 89/48/EEC 1988 O.J. (L. 19) 16 [hereinafter Diplomas Directive];
Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 2005 O.J. (L.255) 22
(Text with EEA relevance). The 2005 Recognition Directive replaced Directive 89/48.
They are relevant to lawyers seeking to establish themselves in a different EU Member State
because some of their provisions have been incorporated by reference into the Lawyers
Establishment Directive, 98/5, cited supra note 68.
70 The European Court of Justice has decided over a dozen cases related to the legal
profession and the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment. In some
instances, these cases predated and provided impetus for the EU Directives; in other
instances, these cases interpreted these Directives. These cases will soon be listed on the
CCBE's webpage. See E-mail from Jonathan Goldsmith, CCBE Secretary General, to
author (Nov. 6, 2008) (on file with author).
71 See generally ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility, Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/home.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2008). One of the nine MJP-related resolutions adopted by the ABA included changes to
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 in order to create "safe harbors" for U.S. lawyers who are
licensed in one jurisdiction who want to practice in another U.S. jurisdiction. See ABA
COMM'N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201B To THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(Aug. 12, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/home.html.
72 Compare the European Court of Justice cases involving lawyers, supra note 70 (where
the bar associations resist lawyer mobility), with Chicago Public Hearing of ABA Comm'n
on Multijurisdictional Practice, at 104-121 (Aug. 3, 2001), available at
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Although the EU lawyer directives are limited to cross border practice
situations, there are several other directives that apply to EU lawyers'
domestic practice. These directives include the December 2006 Services
Directive, which is a wide-ranging directive that places limits, inter alia, on
the type of advertising and fee rules that a jurisdiction may have; 73 the E-
Commerce Directive; 74 and the Money Laundering directives. 75 In addition
to these directives, the European Union has become increasingly active in
the field of higher education, including legal education, even though it does
not have direct competency to regulate in this area.76
In summary, although lawyer regulation traditionally has been a matter
of EU Member State regulation, and much of it remains within their
province, the European Union has played a major role in shaping the
contours of contemporary European legal practice. The EU Initiative thus
follows in the wake of a number of EU-Ievel reforms to lawyer regulation.
E. The Intersection of EU Competition Law and Lawyer Regulation-The
European Court of Justice's Wouters and Arduino Cases
The first EU cases to address legal services and competition policy
were the February 2002 European Court of Justice cases known as Wouters
v. Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (NOVA) and Arduino, which were
decided on the same day.77 Wouters challenged the Dutch bar's ban on
multidisciplinary partnerships (MDPs) between lawyers and accountants
http://www.abanet.org /cpr/mjp/mjp-trans-chicago.doc (where representatives of the CCBE
and Law Society of England and Wales, in their testimony, laud the EU directives supporting
lawyer mobility).
73 Council Directive 2006/123, 2006 O.J. (L.376) 36.
74 Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L.178) I(EC).
75 See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document on the Application to the Legal
Profession of Directive 91/308/EEC on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for
the Purpose of Money Laundering, SEC (2006) 1793 (Dec. 19, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/company/docs/financial-crime/lawyers-en.pdf
(explaining the relationship of the first, second and third money laundering directives). Id. at
2-3:
Although [the Second Money Laundering Directive, which amended the first
Directive] has been formally repealed by a new directive, this new Directive (so-
called "Third Directive") builds on the previous one and does not substantially
change the nature of the obligations of the legal profession in relation to the
prevention of money laundering.
76 See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, The Bologna Process and Its Impact in Europe: It's So Much
More than Degree Changes, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 107, 121, 146-152 (2008).
77 Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten,
2002 E.C.R. 1-1577, 2002 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 681 (Feb. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Wouters];
Case C-35/99 Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1529 (Feb. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Arduino].
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and Arduino challenged Italy's minimum fee rules. Although the European
Court of Justice permitted the Dutch MDP ban and Italian fee rules to stand,
the Court's decisions set forth the circumstances under which EU Member
State lawyer regulations will be subject to antitrust principles.78
Wouters and Arduino are important not only because they were the
first cases to apply EU antitrust provisions to lawyer regulations, but also
because they continue to be cited regularly in connection with the debate
about the EU Initiative. Thus, it is useful to have additional background
information about these cases. Wouters involved two challenges to the
Netherlands Bar Association (NOVA) 79 rule that prohibited partnerships
between lawyers and auditors. At the time this case arose, NOVA had a
regulation known as SV 93, which permitted a lawyer to form a partnership
with members of another profession only if the profession was recognized
by NOVA. NOVA permitted lawyers to be partners with notaries and tax
advisors, but not with auditors.8 0  Two lawyers who worked for
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Arthur Andersen challenged this rule. They
were unsuccessful in the Netherlands courts and appealed these decisions to
the European Court of Justice.
The European Court of Justice hearing on the case was held on
December 12, 2000. 81 On July 10, 2001, Advocate General Philippe Lger
issued his opinion. 82 On February 19, 2002, the European Court of Justice
78 During the late 1990s, the multidisciplinary practice among lawyers and non-lawyers
was a much-discussed topic. For extensive information about these debates, see ABA,
Center for Professional Responsibility, Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/home.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
79 The Netherlands Bar Association is formally known as The General Council of the
Dutch Order of Attorneys (NOVA).
80 Laurel S. Terry & Clasina B. Houtman Mahoney, What If... ? The Consequences of
Court Invalidation of Lawyer-Accountant Multidisciplinary Partnership Bans, in PRIVATE
INVESTMENTS ABROAD: PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1998,
§ 7.04[1] (Matthew Bender 1999).
81 Wouters, supra note 77, at 1-1656.
82 Id. at 1-1482. There is no counterpart in the U.S. system to the Advocate General. As
one commentator has explained:
Article 166 of the EEC Treaty provides that the Advocate-General is to assist the
Court in its decision making process .... In practice, the Advocate-General
submits to the Court an opinion on what he believes the law to be on the particular
issue. These opinions are not legal authority but they do provide background on
the various issues posed and they do give insight into the Court's reasoning of its
decisions.
Gregory P. Crinion, AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities:
Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Communications in Commission Competition
Investigations, 1984 WIS. INT'L L.J. 131, 138 n. 32.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:1 (2009)
issued its ruling,8 3 in which the Court found that:
" the Netherlands rule was subject to the competition provisions
in Article 81 of the EC Treaty;
* the Netherlands MDP rule in question did not violate Article
81 [even though it had the effect of restricting competition and
was likely to affect trade between Member States];
• the Netherlands rule was not subject to the competition
provisions in Article 82 of the EC Treaty; and
* the Netherlands MDP rule did not violate the EC Treaty
provisions on freedom of establishment. 84
The Wouters opinion is significant in many respects. This opinion was
the first time that the Court had ruled that a European Bar association was
an "undertaking" within the meaning of Article 81 (1) of the EC Treaty and
thus subject to its antitrust provisions.8 5 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court explicitly rejected the argument offered by Germany, Austria, and
Portugal to the effect that the Bar "may be treated as comparable to a public
authority where the activity which it carries on constitutes a task in the
public interest forming part of the essential functions of the State" and that
83 See Wouters, supra note 77, at 1-1656.
84 Id. at 1-1696-97. The conclusion section of the ruling stated:
1. A regulation concerning partnerships between members of the Bar and other
professionals, such as the Samenwerkingsverordening 1993 (1993 regulation on
joint professional activity), adopted by a body such as the Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten (the Bar of the Netherlands), is to be treated as a decision adopted by
an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty
(now Article 81 EC).
2. A national regulation such as the 1993 Regulation adopted by a body such as the
Bar of the Netherlands does not infringe Article 85(1) of the Treaty, since that
body could reasonably have considered that that regulation, despite effects
restrictive of competition, that are inherent in it, is necessary for the proper
practice of the legal profession, as organised in the Member State concerned.
3. A body such as the Bar of the Netherlands does not constitute either an
undertaking or a group of undertakings for the purposes of Article 86 of the Treaty
(now Article 82 EC).
4. It is not contrary to Articles 52 and 59 of the Treaty (now, after amendment,
Articles 43 and 49 EC) for a national regulation such as the 1993 Regulation to
prohibit any multi-disciplinary partnerships between members of the Bar and
accountants, since that regulation could reasonably be considered to be necessary
for the proper practice of the legal profession, as organised in the country
concerned.
85 Id. at 1-1679, paras. 58-59.
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the Netherlands has "made the Bar of the Netherlands responsible for
ensuring that individuals have proper access to the law and to justice, which
is indeed one of the essential functions of the State."8 6 In finding that the
Bar was not a "public authority," the Court reasoned that the Bar of the
Netherlands was "neither fulfilling a social function based on the principle
of solidarity, unlike certain social security bodies, . . . nor exercising powers
which are typically those of a public authority .... [But instead] acts as the
regulatory body of a profession, the practice of which constitutes an
economic activity."
87
In determining whether the Dutch MDP rule violated Article 81, the
Court concluded that it had as its object or effect the restriction of trade and
that it was likely to affect trade between the Member States; the Court
permitted the MDP ban, however, because it found that the Dutch
authorities could properly have found that the restriction on trade was
"necessary.2 88  After reviewing the arguments that had been offered, the
Court concluded that the Dutch MDP rule "could therefore reasonably be
considered necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of the legal
profession, as it is organised in the Member State concerned., 89  In
elaborating upon this point, the Court stated that the Dutch Bar had been
given the authority to adopt rules to ensure the proper practice of the
profession, including rules that address "the duty to act for clients in
86 Id. at 1-1677-78, para. 53.
87 Id. at 1-1679, paras. 58-59. Although the Wouters court concluded that the
Netherlands bar and the specific rule in question were subject to the Article 81 of the EC
Treaty, it later distinguished between two different kinds of bar rules and suggested that one
set of rules would be subject to the competition rules of current Article 8 1, whereas the other
rules would not. The first situation-in which the antitrust provisions are not applicable-
occurs when a Member State:
[G]rants regulatory powers to a professional association, is careful to define the
public-interest criteria and the essential principles with which its rules must
comply and also retains its power to adopt decisions in the last resort. In that case
the rules adopted by the professional association remain State measures and are not
covered by the Treaty rules applicable to undertakings.
Id. at 1-1681, para. 68. The second situation it described is where the "rules adopted by the
professional association are attributable to it alone." Id. The Court found that in this
situation, Article 81 of the EC Treaty applies and "the association must notify those rules to
the Commission," but the Commission can issue a block exemption regulation pursuant to
Article 81(3). Id. at 1-1681, para. 69.
88 Id. at 1-1691, para. 110. After finding that the Netherlands MDP rule constituted a
restriction on trade, the Court concluded that this restriction was appreciable and that it
affected intra-community trade. Id. at 1-1687-88, para. 95 (finding that the restriction
affected intra-Community trade); Id. at *45, para. 96 (finding that the restriction in trade was
"appreciable").
89 Wouters, supra note 77, at 1-1690, para. 107.
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complete independence and in their sole interest, the duty, mentioned
above, to avoid all risk of conflict of interest and the duty to observe strict
professional secrecy." 90 The Court noted that accountants are not subject to
comparable requirements of professional conduct and that there may be
incompatibilities between the lawyer's rules and the accountant's rules. 9 It
therefore concluded that the Bar:
[W]as entitled to consider that members of the Bar might no longer
be in a position to advise and represent their clients independently
and in the observance of strict professional secrecy if they belonged
to an organisation which is also responsible for producing an account
of the financial results of the transactions in respect of which their
services were called upon and for certifying those accounts" and that
the regulation "could therefore reasonably be considered to be
necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of the legal
profession, as it is organised in the Member State concerned." 92
The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the Advocate
General had concluded that the Court did not have enough facts before it
and should remand to the Dutch Court. 93 Not surprisingly, this section of
the Wouters opinion has been extensively cited by European bars who point
to the great deference the Court gave to the Dutch Bar's conclusions
regarding necessity. 94
90 Id. at 1-1689, para. 100.
9' Id. at 1-1689-90, paras. 103-04.
92 Id. at 1-1690, paras. 105, 106.
93 Compare Wouters, supra note 77, at 1-1688-91, para. 110 (stating that bar could
"reasonably have considered that that regulation, despite the effects restrictive of
competition that are inherent in it, is necessary for the proper practice of the legal profession,
as organised in the Member State concerned") with Wouters, supra note 77, at 1-1640, paras.
200-01 ("To my mind, it is possible that the national court will conclude that the contested
Regulation is compatible with.., the Treaty, if it finds that there exist objective reasons for
authorising lawyers registered in the Netherlands to enter into multi-disciplinary partnerships
with notaries, tax advisers and patent agents, but for prohibiting them from entering into
multi-disciplinary partnerships with members of the professional category of accountants. I
therefore propose that the Court should reply to the fifth question to the effect that it is not
contrary to... the Treaty for a professional association of lawyers, such as the Association,
to adopt a binding measure prohibiting lawyers practising in the territory of the Member
State concerned from entering into multi-disciplinary partnership with members of the
professional category of accountants, if it appears that that measure is necessary in order to
safeguard lawyers' independence and professional secrecy.").
94 See, e.g., THE COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE (CCBE), CCBE,
POSITION ON MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PARTNERSHIPS (MDPs) (2005), available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument/ccbe-position on mdp 1- 18225
4536.pdf; THE COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE (CCBE), ANALYSIS OF THE
NOVA I JUDGMENT AND GUIDANCE To BARS ON PROFESSIONAL RULES FOLLOWING THE NOVA
I DECISION (2002), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument
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The Wouters opinion not only gave deference to the bars on the issue
of whether a restrictive rule was necessary, but also gave deference to the
bars on the issue of proportionality and whether the restrictive rule could
have been drawn more narrowly. Indeed, despite a recommendation to the
contrary by the Advocate General, 95 the Court appears to have completely
deferred to the Dutch Bar authorities' analysis on this proportionality point,
stating that "the Bar of the Netherlands is entitled to consider that the
objectives pursued by the 1993 Regulation cannot.., be attained by less
restrictive means."96  The concluding paragraph of this section of the
Judgment states:
[The Dutch Bar rule] does not infringe Article [81](1) of the Treaty,
since that body could reasonably have considered that that
regulation, despite the effects restrictive of competition that are
inherent in it, is necessary for the proper practice of the legal
profession, as organised in the Member State concerned. 
97
The Court ended its analysis with the "freedom of services" and "freedom
of establishment" questions, concluding that even if the services and
establishment provisions in the EC Treaty applied to the Dutch MDP ban
and even if such a ban constituted a restriction on the freedom of
movement, the restriction would be justified for the reasons set out in its
competition analysis. 98
On the same day that the European Court of Justice decided Wouters,
it also decided Arduino, which involved antitrust challenges to the
minimum and maximum fee schedules used in Italy.99 Arduino was a
criminal case brought against defendant Manuele Arduino as a result of a
traffic collision in which the other driver also sought damages. The trial
court ruled that Arduino had to pay the costs of the other driver, but the
/analysisguidance enl 1183706551 .pdf.
95 The Advocate General had concluded that the Court was "not in possession of
sufficient evidence to settle the question itself of the proportionality of the contested
Regulation." Wouters, supra note 77, at 1-1634, para. 196.
96 Id. at 1-1691, para. 108. Although the Advocate General stated that the Court did not
have enough information to decide the issue and recommending referring the question back
to the state courts, his opinion included his view that the Dutch Bar rule was "proportionate"
and that he did not find persuasive the arguments that less restrictive means were available to
protect the independence of the legal profession and lawyer secrecy. Id. at 1-1633, paras.
190, 194. This may have given the Court comfort when it issued its ruling.
97 Id. at 1-1691, para. 110 (emphasis added). In light of its competition rulings, the Court
declined to address the fifth and sixth questions that had been posed to it by the Dutch court
that concerned EC Treaty Article 90(2) and the conditions under which the state must
supervise the adoption of bar rules. Id. at 1-1693, paras. 117-118.
98 See id. at 1-1695, paras. 122-23.
99 See Arduino, supra note 77.
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Court did not use the Italian Bar fee schedule in setting these costs' 00 and
did not state the reasons why it did not apply the schedule.' The fee
schedule in question had been adopted by the Italian Bar pursuant to federal
legislation. 10 2  Italian law authorized the court to set fees above the
maximum fees and below the minimum fees provided the court gave
reasons for its decision and the case met the specified criteria. 103
On appeal, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation held that it was
unlawful for the lower court to have ignored that tariff without an
explanation, so it set aside the lower court's award of costs, and referred the
case back to the lower court on this point. 0 4 On remand, the lower court
stated that there were two conflicting lines of cases about whether the
minimum fee schedule constituted an agreement restricting competition
under the EC Treaty. 105 The lower court stayed further proceedings and
referred to the European Court of Justice two questions about the
interpretation of the competition principles now found in Article 81 of the
EC Treaty, asking whether the Italian fee schedule was covered by the EC
Treaty, and if so, whether it was covered by any of the exceptions found in
Article 8 1(3) of the EC Treaty. 106
1oo Id. at 1-1567, para. 13.
1o1 Id. at 1-1569, para. 23.
102 Article 57 of an Italian federal law required the Italian Bar to establish every two
years the criteria for determining fees for civil and criminal proceedings and for out-of-court
work. Id. at 1-1564, para. 6. The Bar in question was the Consiglio Nazionale Forense,
otherwise known as the National Council of the Bar, or CNF. CNF is governed by Articles
52 to 55 of the Royal Decree-Law. It is composed of members of the Bar elected by their
fellow members, with one representative for each appeal court district, and is established
under the auspices of the Minister for Justice. Id. para. 5. The federal law further provided
that after the Italian bar prepared a new draft fee schedule, that fee schedule had to be
approved by the Italian Minister of Justice. Id. paras. 5-6. Before adopting the fee schedule,
the Minister of Justice was required to consult with an Interministerial Committee on Prices
and the Council of State. Id. para. 6. The law further provided that the criteria should be
based on the monetary value of the dispute, the level of the court, and, in criminal matters,
the duration of the proceedings. Id. at 1-1565, para. 7. For each procedural step, or series of
steps, the law required maximum and minimum limits. Id. Actual fees in a case were
determined by a court on the basis of these criteria, having regard to the seriousness and
number of the issues dealt with. Id. para. 8. With a few exceptions, such court-award fees
had to remain within the maximum and minimum fee schedules. Id. para. 8.
103 Id. at 1-1565, para. 8. The Arduino opinion stated that "in cases of exceptional
importance, taking account of the special nature of the disputes and where the inherent value
of the service justifies it, the court may exceed the maximum limit. Conversely, where the
case is easy to deal with, the court may fix fees below the minimum limit." Id.
104 Id. at 1-1567, para. 14.
105 Id. at 1-1568, para. 15.
106 Arduino, supra note 77, at 1-1568, para. 18. The exact questions referred were:
(1) Does the decision of the CNF, approved by Ministerial Decree No 585/94,
fixing binding tariffs for the professional activity of members of the Bar, come
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The Arduino decision contains a number of statements in which the
Court explained the meaning of EU competition law. 07 Following these
sections of the opinion, the European Court of Justice applied the principles
it had enunciated to the facts of the case and concluded that the fee schedule
in question did not violate the competition provisions in the EC Treaty.
The Court cited three main reasons in support of its conclusion. It
relied on the fact that the draft fee schedule approved by the bar was not
compulsory, but required ministerial approval and could be amended.'0 8
Moreover, the Minister was required to obtain an opinion from two public
bodies before the fee schedule could be approved. 10 9 The Court also noted
that fees are to be settled by the courts, and that in certain exceptional
circumstances and by duly-reasoned decision, a court could depart from the
maximum and minimum fees. 10
After setting forth these observations, the Arduino Court concluded
that Italy had not engaged in either of the actions that would constitute a
violation of the EC Treaty."' It had not delegated responsibility to private
economic operators such that it would deprive the provisions of their
within the scope of the prohibition in Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty? If the
answer to (1) is in the affirmative: (2) Does the case none the less correspond to
one of the situations envisaged in Article 85(3) of the Treaty to which that
prohibition does not apply?
Id.
107 After reciting the facts of the case, the Arduino Court began its analysis by noting that
although Article 81 of the EC Treaty applies to "undertakings" and not to Member State
legislation or regulatory measures, national legislation would be subject to the competition
rules if it renders ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings. Id. at 1-1572,
para. 34. The Court then set forth the standards that would be used to evaluate whether
Member State legislation violates Article 81. It concluded that the EC Treaty is infringed if
a Member State either: (1) requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or
concerted practices contrary to Article 85 or reinforces their effects; or (2) divests its own
rules of the character of legislation by delegating to private economic operators
responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere. Id. para. 35. The Court
also found that even if a Member State requires a professional organization to produce a
draft fee schedule, that fact does not automatically divest the final fee schedule of the
character of legislation. Id. para. 36.
108 Id. at 1-1573, para. 41.
109 Id.
110 Id. para. 42.
... Id. The Court did, however, say that the draft fee schedule would not, itself, be
treated as legislation since the Italian national legislation did not contain either the
procedural arrangements or substantive requirements capable of ensuring, with reasonable
probability, that, when producing the draft tariff, the Italian Bar would conduct itself like an
arm of the State working in the public interest. Id. paras. 38-39. On the other hand, the
Court found that Italy had not waived its power to make decisions of last resort or to review
implementation of the tariff. Id. para. 40.
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character as legislation.' 1 2  Nor was Italy open to the criticism that it
required or encouraged the adoption of agreements, decisions, or concerted
practices contrary to Article 81 of the EC Treaty or reinforced their
effects.11 3 Accordingly, the Arduino Court concluded that the EC Treaty
did not:
[P]reclude a Member State from adopting a law or regulation which
approves, on the basis of a draft produced by a professional body of
members of the Bar, a tariff fixing minimum and maximum fees for
members of the profession, where that State measure forms part of a
procedure such as that laid down in the Italian legislation. 1'
Because Wouters and Arduino were decided shortly before the
European Commission launched its liberal services stocktaking and because
they have been cited regularly since then, these cases are an important part
of the context of the EU Initiative. 1 5 Since Wouters and Arduino, there
have been other European Court of Justice competition cases involving the
legal profession. Although analysis of these later cases is beyond the scope
of this article, one such case found that Italy's fee schedule rules were
contrary to EU lawyers' freedom to provide services.
116
II. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION STOCKTAKING EXERCISE FOR
THE "LIBERAL PROFESSIONS"
A. Post-Wouters Developments-The Commission's Initial Response
A few months after the 2002 European Court of Justice's Wouters and
Arduino decisions, the European Commission called together high-level
national competition authorities. The meeting was called to discuss policy
issues related to competition law and the liberal professions and to "reach a
common view on the interpretation of the Wouters and Arduino judgments"
112 Arduino, supra note 77, para. 43.
113 Id.
114 Id. para. 44. In many respects, Arduino is comparable to the "state action" defense in
U.S. antitrust law.
115 In a subsequent Italian case involving legal fees, the Commission urged the ECJ to
reverse Arduino. See Joined Cases C-94/04 & C-202/04 Cipolla v. Fazari, n~e Portolese and
Macrino, Capodarte v. Meloni, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11421, 4 C.M.L.R. 8, at para. 27 (2006)
[hereinafter Cipolla and Meloni]. The Court declined to do so and concluded that Italian
rules that set forth a minimum fee schedule did not violate the EC Treaty's competition
provisions, but did violate non-Italian EU lawyers' freedom to provide services, and that it
was up to the national courts to determine whether the restrictions were warranted.
116 See, e.g., Case C-250/03, Mauri v. Ministero della Glustizia, 2005 E.C.R. 1-01267
(ECJ rejected petitioner's competition and establishment challenges to Italy's rule that
prohibited him from sitting for the oral portion of the bar exam after failing the written
portion); see also Cipolla and Meloni, supra note 115.
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and to "avoid uneven implementation of ECJ case law at national level."" 7
While the Wouters and Arduino cases were pending, DG Competition had
issued an "invitation to tender" a study of the liberal professions;18 the
resulting contract was awarded to the Institutfir Hdhere Studien (IHS).119
By early July 2002, IHS had circulated a questionnaire to European bar
associations, among others, and had requested their responses by July 28,
2002.120 After receiving the IHS questionnaire, the Council of Bars and
Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), among others, protested the short
117 See Competition: Study on the Economic Impact of Member States' Regulation in the
Field of Liberal Professions, 4 CCBE INFO 4, 5 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/nO4-enpdfl-I 180966023.pdf.
118 See Report on the Economic Impact of the Regulation of Liberal Professionals in
Different Member States, Invitation to Tender, Open Procedure, 2001 O.J. (S.191-130731),
COMP/D/0 1/1 1 (Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with author).
119 See IAIN PATERSON ET. AL., RESEARCH REPORT: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATION IN
THE FIELD OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES: REGULATION OF
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: STUDY FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG COMPETITION: FINAL REPORT-PART ]-MAIN REPORT 9 n. 1
(2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/liberalization/conference
/prof services-ihspart.l.pdf [hereinafter IHS REPORT, PART 1]:
The Institute of Advanced Studies (IHS) carried out a study in 2002 for the
European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, into the regulatory
structure and economic impact of various Professional Services / Liberal
Professions. The professions covered at present are all those belonging to Legal
Services, Accountancy Services, Technical Services, and Pharmacy Services.
citing Contract No. COMP/2002/D3/S12.334490. Institut ffir Hohere Studien (Institute for
Advanced Studies) (IHS) is a sixty year old private non-profit institution based in Vienna,
Austria. IHS consists of three research departments (Economics & Finance, Political
Science and Sociology) and receives approximately one-third of its budget from
commissioned studies such as the study on professional services that it prepared for the
Commission on profession. See Institut fir Hohere Studien: Institute for Advanced Studies,
About IHS, http://www.ihs.ac.at/index.php3?id=120 (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (According
to its website, IHS employs approximately sixty "scientific" employees and offers
postgraduate course programs that currently enroll approximately fifty students. IHS was
founded by two prominent Austrians living in exile, the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and
the economist Oskar Morgenstern, with the financial help of the Ford Foundation, the
Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, and the City of Vienna. It was founded on the
principle that scientific enterprise, scientific co-operation and scientific problem solutions
offer a platform for critical discussions, a possibility for consensus formation, and an open
and interdisciplinary place for scientific research and critical scientific expertise).
120 See European Commission Study on the Economic Impact of Member States'
Regulation in the Field of Liberal Professions, 3 CCBE INFO 3 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument/n_03_enpdfl_ 180966126.pdf
(On July 9, 2002, the Austrian Institutfur Hohere Studien circulated a questionnaire to the
liberal professions concerned in the prior study with the intention of gathering information
about each profession's structure, background, and regulatory framework).
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response time and the format of the questions.
The IHS questionnaire was in English and contained fifteen pages of
questions, divided into three sections, with an additional three pages of
notes that mostly consisted of definitions of the terms used. 122 Each of the
three sections of the questionnaire included twelve sets of questions. 123 For
many of these questions, the respondents were requested to simply check
the appropriate box; for other questions, respondents were asked to provide
narrative information. 124  Respondents were encouraged to file their
questionnaire responses electronically and were told not to worry about
changes in the questionnaire format. 125 The narrative boxes in the first
section of the form, dealing with regulation, were quite small and consisted
of one single spaced line. For some of the questions about regulation, there
was no opportunity to provide narrative information. 26 Other questions
121 Id. (The CCBE did not answer the questionnaire it received. The CCBE did, however,
write a letter to the European Commission as well as to the Institute suggesting that the
deadline was "too short given the complexity of the questions."). For additional information
on the CCBE, see infra notes 383-388.
122 IAIN PATERSON ET. AL., RESEARCH REPORT: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATION IN THE
FIELD OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES: REGULATION OF
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: STUDY FOR THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG COMPETITION: FINAL REPORT-PART 3-REFERENCES AND
ANNEXES, at Annex ES (Jan. 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition
/liberalization/conference/prof services-ihspart_- 3.pdf [hereinafter IHS REPORT, PART 3].
123 Id. Part 1 of the Questionnaire was entitled "Information On Professional
Regulations" and included five sets of questions: (I) General Information; (2) Organizational
Characteristics of the Profession, including how regulations are created, implemented and
enforced; (3) Market Entry Regulations; (4) Regulations on Market Behavior; (5) Other
Instruments for Quality Control. Part II of the Questionnaire was entitled "Background to
the Regulatory Framework" and included questions about: (1) Changes, Reforms and
Innovations in Regulations; (2) Regulations Currently Being Reviewed; (3) Reasons for
Regulation/Liberalization. Part III of the Questionnaire was entitled "Structure and
Dynamics of the Profession" and included four additional questions: (1) Data Source-Year;
(2) Membership of the Professional Body; (3) Stages in access to the profession; and (4)
Questions about the profession as a whole, including figures for total employment, size,
number and nationality of firms, market concentration, turnover, and other topics. Id.
124 Id. at Annex E3, p. 1 (Data sheets were completed "electronically" and contained two
question formats: (1) "yes" or "no" questions requiring the participant to click a square box;
and, (2) questions requiring a word or sentence answer to by typed into a rectangular box).
125 Id. at Annex E3, p. 17 (stating that an electronic version was preferred and that "on
filling out this document electronically it may increase in length and lose its original 'shape'.
This is not important: just send the filled-in version without regard to appearance.").
126 Id. at p.7. For example, Questions 4.7 and 4.8 asked whether there were special
regulations on interprofessional co-operation and if so, to check off one of five boxes to
explain whether it is completely forbidden or the context in which it is partially forbidden;
these questions did not ask the respondent for any narrative comment other than to describe
their regulation if the boxes were inaccurate. The questions did not ask respondents to
provide any reasons for the regulation.
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about regulation provided the opportunity for narrative explanation.127 In
no case, however, were the respondents asked for any explanation of, or
justification for, their regulations.
The narrative boxes in the second section consisted of 1 x 3 inch
squares, although respondents were invited to indicate if they wanted to
include a longer exposition, report, or study results. (This section of the
questionnaire asked for information about areas in which regulation had
changed in the last ten years, information about regulations currently under
review, and information about regulations in other counties and the reasons
for their liberalization or regulations.) The third section called for
numerical data of various sorts.
In November 2002, after it had sent a letter to the Commission and
IHS expressing concerns about the IHS questionnaire and study, the CCBE
met with Commission representatives to discuss these issues. 121 The CCBE
expressed four concerns during this meeting: (1) that the questionnaire did
not fit the legal profession; (2) that the terminology used was unclear or
imprecise on several points; (3) that the questionnaire did not ask why
certain regulations were in place; and (4) that in light of the tight time
schedule, the CCBE had concerns about the quality of the study.
1 29
According to the CCBE, the Commission responded, inter alia, by stating
that there was "no per se query of professional rules for the moment." 
1 30
The IHS Study is dated January 2003131 but was made public in March
127 Id. at p. 8. Question 5.1, which asked whether there "was special information or
benchmarking systems for the profession, where information about the quality of services of
individual firms is given?" If so, respondents were directed to "please describe briefly and
give a short overview of the experience with these instruments."
128 See Competition: Study on the Economic Impact of Member States' Regulation in the
Field of Liberal Professions, supra note 117, at 4 (On November 6, 2002 the CCBE met
with the Directorate General Competition of the European Commission to discuss concerns
raised by the July 2002 study conducted by the Austrian Institute for Advanced Studies.
These concerns were also communicated in a letter sent by the CCBE to the Austrian
Institute and the Commission prior to the meeting).
12 9 Id. at 4-5.
130 Id. at 5:
At the meeting, the Commission noted that the primary objective of the study was
fact finding in the field of liberal professions, but that there was no plan to date for
what it would do with the information received. Further, it was indicated that there
was no per se query of professional rules for the moment.
The CCBE was informed that the final report of the Austrian Institute would be
made available to the public at the beginning of 2003.
131 See European Commission: DG Competition: Professional Services: Studies,
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professional-services/studies/studies.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (includes separate links to the three parts of the report; Part 1 is
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2003 in conjunction with European Commissioner Monti's launch of the
stocktaking Stocktaking Exercise.1 32  Commission representatives have
indicated that the IHS Study was the first of its kind. 13' The sections that
follow discuss the IHS Study and this Stocktaking Exercise.
B. The March 2003 Launch of the European Commission's Stocktaking
Exercise
1. Berlin Speech by Commissioner Monti
The European Commission launched its liberal professions
Stocktaking Exercise on March 21, 2003 in Berlin in a speech by EC
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti to the German
Bundesanwaltskammer (BRAK). 134  The BRAK (which is referred to in
English as the German Federal Bar) is an umbrella organization for
entitled "Economic impact of regulation in the field of liberal professions in different
Member States Regulation of Professional Services, Study for the European Commission,
DG Competition by Institut ftir Hohere Studien (IHS), Wien, January 2003."). For the
general Commission webpage on professional services, see European Commission: DG
Competition: Professional Services: Overview http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors
/professional services/overview_en.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter European
Commission, DG Competition].
132 Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer [Chamber of Government Attorneys] (BRAK): Altere
Meldungen [Senior Reports]: Wettbewerb und Freie Berufe [Competition and the Liberal
Professions]/ Europaische Konferenz der BRAK [BRAK European Conference],
http://www.brak.de/seiten/05-01.php#euro (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) ("Auf der Konferenz
nahm Wettbewerbskommissar Monti erstmalig Stellung zu den Ergebnissen des Institutes fir
Hbhere Studien in Wien." [At the conference, Competition Commissioner Monti for the first
time adopted the position espoused by the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna.)
[hereinafter BRAK, Wettbewerb].
133 See, e.g., Anne-Margrete Wachtmeister, Head of Unit: Liberal Professions Team: DG
Competition, Overview of the Commission's Stocktaking Exercise (Part I), Address Before
the Liberal Professions Conference (Oct. 28, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Remarks of Wachtmeister at the October 2003 Conference] (a transcript of the speech was
previously available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professionalservices
/conferences/20031028/index.html):
[T]he [IHS] study is, to our knowledge, the first of its kind, as an economic
overview of the professions in the EU. This fact should be considered in any
assessment of its methodology and findings. Part of our recent work has therefore
been to review the significant body of academic research on the economic effects
of regulation in the professions.
134 Mario Monti, Comm'r for Competition: European Comm'n, Competition in
Professional Services: New Light and New Challenges, For Bundesanwaltskammer Berlin
(Mar. 21, 2003) available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/liberalization
/conference/speeches/mmonti berlin_032003_en.pdf [hereinafter Monti Berlin 2003
speech].
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Germany's official lawyer regulatory entities. 135 Commissioner Monti had
been invited to address a three-day BRAK conference that focused on the
meaning of the Wouters and Arduino cases. 36  During his speech,
Commissioner Monti announced that the European Commission would
initiate a Stocktaking Exercise that focused on the liberal professions and
that it was important to examine whether the existing regulations were
necessary. 137  He explained the purpose of the Stocktaking Exercise as
follows:
The present level of rules and regulation of liberal professions owe
some debt to historical convention. How many are still needed in the
modem world? Do they hinder or favour the development of the
sector? Let me be provocative: Do they protect the consumers or the
professionals? I propose to assess whether existing rules and
regulations, which, remember, were devised and enacted in a very
13' Dierk Mattik, Regulation of the Lawyer Profession and the Duties and Functions of
the Lawyer Organisations in Germany, DEITSCHERANWALTVEREIN [GERMAN BAR
ASSOCIATION] at 2, 4, available at http://www.anwaltverein.de/downloads
/regulation.rtfPHPSESSID=fd3e57eef7ec9343b401e0436046332d. The DAV, which is the
German voluntary bar, offers the following English explanation of the BRAK:
[I]n consideration of the tradition established in German law, the implementation
and application of the law affecting lawyers has been transferred [by the German
legislature] to a particular authority (Rechtsanwaltskammer; regional bar), which
are staffed by members of the profession.
The 28 regional bars themselves are amalgamated at the federal level into the
German Federal Bar (Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer; "BRAK") in the form of
compulsory membership. The BRAK is also a public law corporation. The BRAK
must fulfill the tasks allocated to it by law. These include, among others, in
particular:
* in questions that affect all of the regional bars, ascertaining the opinions
of the individual bars and establishing the majority opinion through
common discussion;
" in all matters that affect all of the regional bars, presenting the opinion of
the German Federal Bar to the competent authorities, courts, and
organisations and to represent all regional bars to these institutions.
136 BRAK, Wettbewerb, supra note 132 ("Vom 20.3. bis 22.3.2003 fand die vierte
Europiische Konferenz der BRAK in Berlin statt .... Thema der Konferenz waren die
Auswirkungen der Kartellrechtsprechung des EuGH, insbesondere der Urteile vom
19.2.2002 ("Wouters" und "Arduino") auf das nationale Berufsrecht." [From March 20 to
March 23, 2003, BRAK's fourth European conference took place in Berlin .... The
conference's theme was the effects of the ECJ's cartel jurisdiction, especially the effects of
the judgments of February 19, 2002 (Wouters and Arduino) on national labor law.]).
137 Monti Berlin 2003 speech, supra note 134, at 10-12.
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different economic context to that which exists today, continue to
serve the legitimate purposes of the protection of the public interest.
I would also like to assess whether they are the most efficient
mechanisms available in the current market situation.
It is clear that across the [European Union] there are different
regulatory mixes. As the study shows, different regulatory choices
produce different outcomes in the market and it is possible that some
regulatory mixes have more beneficial market outcomes than others.
It should be difficult to argue against those that have the least
distorting effect on the workings of the market, while delivering the
same, or even higher, turnover.
This speech signaled the launch of the Stocktaking Exercise.
2. Simultaneous Publication of the IHS Study
During his March 2003 speech to the BRAK, Commissioner Monti
also announced the results of the IHS Study.139 Following Commissioner
Monti's speech, the European Commission posted the IHS Study on its
website.1
4
138 Id. at 11. Mr. Monti's additional comments about the stocktaking exercise included
the following paragraph which appeared before the quoted paragraphs:
In the light of the outlined market trends, current regulatory trends and case-law
developments, I believe the time is right to take stock. My services and myself are
increasingly asked for our views on various types of rules and regulations in the
sector of professional services. It is the Commission's role as the guardian of the
Treaty continuously to monitor markets, to ensure that competition in the internal
market is not distorted and to propose action where necessary and justified. In this
my colleague in charge of the Internal Market, Mr. Bolkenstein and myself, are
working together in parallel.
Our aim will be to better understand and evaluate the present market situation. To
evaluate to what degree the consumer is satisfied, whether there are artificial
barriers to the optimal use of resources as well as whether improvements to the
existing rules and regulations are possible. To do this, further informed input is
needed in the first place from those directly concerned, such as users of services,
service providers and those responsible for the regulations.
Id. at 10-11. Mr. Monti also commented that he hoped the exercise could serve as a
stimulus for rethinking public regulation. He encouraged countries to learn how things are
done in other countries and to keep their minds open to new solutions. Id. at 11-13.
39 Id. at 8-10.
140 European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 131:
At the time of Commissioner Monti's speech, DG Competition published an
independent study on regulation in the professions carried out by the Institute for
European Commission Project: Competition in Professional Services
29:1 (2009)
The study, entitled Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of
Liberal Professions in Different EU Member States, consisted of three
lengthy sections: Part 1 was the main report, 14 1 Part 2 was entitled "Case
Studies," 142 and Part 3 was entitled "References and Annexes." 143 The final
paragraph of the Report's Executive Summary stated the IHS's views that
there was too much professional services' regulation in some EU Member
States. It stated in part: "We are led by this study to the overall conclusion
that the lower regulation strategies which work in one Member State might
be made to work in another, without decreasing the quality of professional
services, and for the ultimate benefit of the consumer." 
144
The European Commission's own summary of the IHS Study echoed
the conclusion that that there appeared to be too much professional services
regulation in some countries since the countries with higher levels of
regulation did not appear to have fewer complaints than countries with
lower levels of regulation:
In order to gather structured information on different regulatory
regimes affecting liberal professions and on their economic effects,
the Competition Directorate-General commissioned in 2002 an
independent study on the economic impact of regulation in the field
of liberal professions in the different Member States. The report was
finalised in March 2003 and is available on the Competition
Directorate-General's Internet [website]....
The study develops 'regulation indices' for comparisons among the
professions covered by the study, these being legal services (lawyers
Advanced Studies in Vienna, Austria. In order to obtain an overall understanding
of the regulation of liberal professions DG Competition also invited interested
parties to comment on the justification for and effects of restrictive rules and
regulations in the professions.
See also Commission XYXIIlrd Report on Competition Policy 2003 (Published in
Conjunction with the General Report on the Activities of the European Union-2003), ISSN
0259-3157 (2004) at 60, para. 189, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition
/annual-reports/2003/en.pdf [hereinafter EU 2003 Competition Report] ("An independent
study carried out for the Commission by the Vienna-based Institute for Advanced Studies
(IHS) was made accessible to the public by the Competition DG in order to stimulate the
debate.").
141 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119 (141 pages).
142 IAIN PATERSON ET. AL., RESEARCH REPORT: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATION IN THE
FIELD OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES: REGULATION OF
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG COMPETITION: FINAL
REPORT-PART 3-CASE STUDIES: GERMANY, FRANCE, at Annex ES (Jan. 2003), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/comn/competition/liberalization/conference/prof servicesihspart_
2.pdf [hereinafter IHS REPORT, PART 2] (277 pages).
143 IHS REPORT, PART 3, supra, note 122 (forty-nine pages).
144 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 6.
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and notaries), accountancy services (accountants, auditors and tax
advisers), technical services (architects and consulting engineers) as
well as pharmacy services (pharmacists in retail business), and
across countries. There is one index for regulation of market entry,
one for regulation of conduct and an overall index. Countries with
most regulations for all professions are Austria, Italy, Luxembourg
and (with one exception) Germany, and possibly Greece. Belgium,
France, Portugal and Spain appear to be in the medium field,
whereas the [United Kingdom], Sweden and Denmark (with the
exception of pharmacists), the Netherlands, Ireland and Finland
show rather liberal regulatory regimes from a comparative point of
view.
The study goes on to point out that there are no apparent signs of
problems in those countries where there is less regulation. The study
data also seem to indicate that low regulation is not a hindrance but
rather a spur to overall wealth creation, because in countries with
low degrees of regulation there are relatively lower revenues per
professional, but a proportionally higher number of practising
professionals generating a relatively higher overall turnover. 145
Because the consequences of the EU Initiative are so significant and
because the European Commission and others continue to rely heavily on
the IHS Study, it is worthwhile to examine this study in more detail. Many
summaries of the IHS Study, including its own Executive Summary,
include the chart shown below which listed the level of regulation for five
professions in fifteen countries, with larger numbers and darker colors
indicating a higher level of regulation: 146
14' EU 2003 Competition Report, supra note 140, at pp. 305-06.
146 Id.; IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 3.
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Total IHS Regulation indices for different professions














Sweden .4 0 0
UK 4. 0 0
In addition to this table, which assigns a number value to the
regulation of five professions in fifteen countries, Part 1 of the IHS Study
included a number of additional tables and charts with data related to the
legal profession. These charts and tables, which are reproduced in the
Appendix to this article, included five tables that summarized the responses
that the IHS had received to the multiple-choice questions contained in its
questionnaire. 147 In each of these tables, the authors provided a color-coded
summary of the data showing which countries had high levels of regulation
and which did not. 148 Following these tables, there was an unlabeled table
entitled "Legal services (Lawyers): IHS Regulation Indices." For each of
the fifteen countries, it listed a regulation index for entry requirements and
conduct requirements, a total regulation index and then ranked the countries
from 1-15 according to their total regulation index, with rank 1 indicating
the heaviest regulation: 
149
147 See Appendix 1, infra (reproduces Table 3-5 Legal Services (Lawyers) General
(summarizing subparts of question 2); Table 3-6 Legal Services (Lawyers): Qualification
Requirements (summarizing questions 3.4-3.7); Table 3-7 Legal Services (Lawyers): Scope
of Activities; Table 3-8 Legal Services (Lawyers): Conduct; Table 5-1 Overview-Legal
Services 2000.
148 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 28 (explaining color-coding ) and 45-47
(showing color coding in Tables 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7). See also id. at 83 (contains a color coded
summary of market entry regulations/ for all professions and all countries).
141 Id. at 50.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:1 (2009)
Legal Services (Lawyers): IHS regulation indices
,Geee ! 3.5 6.0 9.5 1
Aua ia 4.1 3.3 7.3 2
France, 3.9 2.7 6.6 3
ux uemiiburg 3.8 2.8 6.6 3
3.7 2.8 6.5 4
Spain 3.4 3.1 6.5 4
1 t ih!ey 2.6 3.9 6.4 5
Portugal 3.5 2.2 5.7 6
BalgMiu 2.5 2.1 4.6 7
i eiand 2.4 2.1 4.5 8
Fngland&W'ales 2.9 1.2 4.0 9
rthrad 2.1 1.8 3.9 10
Denmark 2.1 0.9 3.0 11
SSwedei 2.0 0.4 2.4 12
F i 0.0 0.3 0.3 13
Although the determination of whether a country had a high level of
regulation was based on point values the study authors assigned to their
multiple-choice questions, for the most part, the study simply articulates the
point values assigned and compares these values to a prior study, without
discussing how the authors decided on the particular weighting system and
why alternative weightings were rejected. 0 With respect to the market
entry regulation index the authors developed, 40% of a country's score was
based on its responses regarding "licensing," with different points assigned
depending on the number of exclusive tasks and shared tasks that a
respondent listed. 151 There was no analysis of the nature of the reserved
tasks-points were simply assigned for the number of reserved tasks listed.
The market entry regulation index allocated 20% to the issue of whether
there were quotas or economic needs test. 152 The remaining 40% weighting
was based on overall education requirements, including the duration of
university education, the duration of compulsory practice, the number of
professional exams, and the number of entry routes to the profession. 
153
In setting each country's "score" for the "conduct regulation index,"
25% of the score was based on a country's responses regarding price and
fee regulations; 15% was based on a country's responses regarding
150 Id. at 30-33. The authors used the same methodology to calculate the market entry
regulation index for each of the five professions.
151 Id. at 30.
152 Id. This was an "all-or-nothing" analysis with countries receiving zero points if the
answer was "no" and six points if the answer was "yes."
5 id.
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advertising; 15% was based on a country's responses regarding whether
there were limitations on location, with countries receiving an all-or-
nothing set of point values here; 20% was based on a country's responses
regarding diversification, which included rules about the conditions for
opening branch offices; and 25% was based on combining the score for a
country's regulations regarding inter-professional relationships, meaning
MDPs, and a country's rules regarding acceptable partnership and corporate
forms. 154 The overall index was based on the sum of the market entry and
conduct regulation indices. 1
55
In addition to this summary table, there were a number of additional
charts and tables that were relevant to legal services. It is difficult to
convey the technical nature of these charts without seeing them;
accordingly, they are reproduced in the Appendix at the conclusion of this
article. These charts were contained in different sections of the study,
including sections entitled "Hypotheses Derived from the Analysis,' 5 6
"Findings Revisited Using GAP-Analysis,' ' 157 and "Excursus: Scope for
Liberalisation by Comparison with Peers."1
58
Although Part 1 of the IHS Study was lengthy and some of it was
technical, 159 its conclusions are relatively straightforward. The authors
concluded that some countries regulate more heavily than other
countries, 60 that the countries with less regulation did not appear to have
more consumer complaints,' 6' and that professional services in the
countries with more regulation appeared to be less efficient and
154 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at p. 32.
115 Id. at p. 33.
156 See Appendix 1, infra (includes Table 5-5 Output measures and degree of regulation
(including legal) Chart 5-1 Distribution of Key Ratios in EU Member States-Legal
Services (which includes information on Professional Density (per Mio. of Population);
Volume per capita in EUR; Volume per person employed in 1,000 EUR).
157 See Appendix 1, infra (Table 5-9 GAP Analysis Table (Including legal services);
Chart 5-5 Productivity vs. Regulation Index-Legal Services; Chart 5-8 Productivity vs.
Regulation index (legal + accountancy + technical); Chart 5-10 Volume per firm in 1000
EUR vs. Regulation Index-Legal Services).
158 See Appendix 1, infra (Chart 5-12 Scope for Reducing Regulation-Assuming
Constant Returns-to-Scales (Legal Services, Illustrative); and Chart 5-13 Scope for Reducing
Regulation-Assuming Decreasing Returns-to-Scales (Legal Services, Illustrative)).
159 IHS REPORT, PART I, supra note 119.
160 See, e.g., IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 82-83 (Chart: Summary Market
Entry Regulations/Color Coding and Overview: Total IHS Regulation Indices for Different
Professions) (reproduced in Appendix 1, infra).
161 See, e.g., EU 2003 Competition Report, supra note 140, at 305-06, 60 para. 189
("This study revealed significantly different levels of regulation between Member States and
between different professions. It found that there was no proof of malfunctioning of markets
in relatively less regulated countries. On the contrary, more freedom in the professions
would, it concluded, allow more overall wealth creation.").
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profitable. 62  Therefore it appeared that countries with higher levels of
regulation could reduce that regulation without adverse affects.' 63 The last
section of Part 1 stated:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that none of
the markets for professional services has experienced the dire
consequences of market breakdown predicted by theories based on
the presence of conditions known as 'market failure.' Indeed, since
the economic outcomes of professional services in those member
states where they are subject to lower degrees of regulation are
comparable with professional services in more highly regulated
member states, the predictions of public interest theory seem wide of
the mark, and that, on the contrary, regulation could be reduced-at
least to the level of their peers in other member states of the
[European Union]. 164
Part 2 of the IHS Study contained analyses of the five professions in
selected countries, focusing on le6al services in Denmark, Germany, Italy,
England and Wales, and France. Similar to Part 1, this section of the
report contained a number of charts and tables to support its analysis. 1
66
Part 3 of the IHS Study was approximately forty pages long and
contained four pages of references; the remaining pages included additional
charts and tables that included information on the data used in the study,
including the sources IHS used for various information, information about
the numbers of professionals in each country, IHS's synthesis of the
questionnaire answers, and a copy of the questionnaire itself. 1
67
The IHS Study has been heavily criticized on both economic and non-
economic grounds by many in the European legal profession; a number of
these critiques are discussed in greater detail infra in Section IV. They
include critiques directed to Part 1 and critiques directed to the case studies
162 See, e.g., IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 119 (reproduced in Appendix 1,
infra: Chart 5-8 Productivity vs. Regulation Index (legal + accountancy + technical,
excluding Belgium)); see also id. at 127.
163 See, e.g., IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 124:
By similar reasoning we can surmise that the degree of regulation in any other
member state can still be reduced by any 'leftwards' and/or 'upwards' movement
up to a point on a 'boundary' delimited by the peers. Thus it may be supposed that
a reduction in the degree of regulation in other countries can still result in an equal
performance in productivity as exists at present, at least, once again based on
comparison with the situation of 'peers'.
'64 Id. at 127.
165 IHS REPORT, PART 2, supra note 142, Table of Contents.
166 Id.
167 IHS REPORT, PART 3, supra note 122.
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that appear in Part 2.168 To my knowledge, neither IHS nor the
Commission has responded publicly to these critiques. Despite the
unanswered critiques, the Commission has relied heavily upon the IHS
Study since it was issued and continues to cite it with approval without
responding to the critiques directed towards it.
3. March 2003 Publication of the Stocktaking Questionnaire-Invitation to
Comment
Less than one week after Commissioner Monti's speech in Berlin, the
European Commission began its Stocktaking Exercise with a document
entitled "Invitation to Comment."'' 69  The Invitation to Comment was a
sixteen page document that consisted of two parts: the first part explained
the rationale for the Stocktaking Exercise and the second part was a
questionnaire that asked many of the questions that had not been included
in the IHS questionnaire. 170 The questions in this second part were divided
into three sections, with some questions addressed primarily to users of
professional services, other questions addressed primarily to service
providers and regulators, and a third section that sought comparative
data. 171
The explanatory section of the Invitation to Comment was almost as
long as the questionnaire itself. In the first section, which set forth the
168 Several commentators have critiqued the case studies aspect of the IHS Report,
arguing that IHS misunderstood some information, omitted key information, and made poor
choices about the jurisdictions selected for the legal services case study. See MARTIN
HENSSLER & MATTHIAS KILIAN, POSITION PAPER ON THE STUDY CARRIED OUT BY THE
INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, VIENNA, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REGULATION IN THE FIELD
OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES, (Sept. 2003) available at
http://www.anwaltverein.de/downloads/praxis/Positionspapier-Henssier-Kilian-Englisch-
Endversion.pdf. (This paper is also available in its original language, German, at
http://www.brak.de/seiten/pdf/aktuelles/ihs.pdf.); see also OECD Legal Professions, supra
note 7, at 26-27 (concluding that the IHS study may have overstated its conclusions because:
(1) its assumption that higher turnover equals higher profit could be incorrect; (2) it does not
use a regression analysis to fully control the risk of spurious correlation; and (3) it presents
only a very broad picture of regulation and does not sufficiently take account of different
effects of different forms of regulation in different professions across different Member
States, each of which has its own peculiarities); RBB ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
REGULATION IN LIBERAL PROFESSIONS: A CRITIQUE OF THE IHS REPORT (Sept. 9, 2003)
available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument/rbb ihs-critique-enl
_1 83706206.pdf. [hereinafter RBB ECONOMICS] (RBB Economics is a commercial
company that provides competition expertise to its clients. See infra note 345 and
accompanying text for more information on RBB Economics).
169 Commission Services Working Document, Regulation in Liberal Professions and its
Effects, Invitation to Comment (Mar. 27, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter EU
Invitation to Comment].
170 Id.
171 Id. at 9.
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rationale for its Stocktaking Exercise, the Commission referred to the
Lisbon Strategy.17 2  The Commission explained that a key part of the
Lisbon Strategy was developing an internal market strategy for services that
had as its goal a fully functioning, borderless market for EU services and
that the existing and pending directives were designed to facilitate such
seamless service. 173  It further explained that the primary victims of a
dysfunctional internal services market were small and medium sized
enterprises. 174 In the next part of the introductory section, the Commission
provided a brief review of regulation of the "liberal professions." It noted
that there had been recent regulatory reforms in some EU Member States, in
the Commission's own initiatives, and in the OECD initiatives cited
earlier. 175  The Commission cited with approval the principles of high-
quality regulation that emerged from the OECD and provided the following
abbreviated summary of these regulatory principles:
* exclusive rights and restrictions of the freedom to determine
competitive action should be limited to the strict minimum;
* entrance requirements to a profession should clearly relate to
the core tasks of the profession and be determined by public
authorities; and
" whereas small or one-off consumers may in certain respects
need special protection, the same is unlikely to apply to
business to business transactions. 176
The next section of the introduction was entitled "Competition Policy and
Liberal Professions." In this section, the Commission stated its views about
the appropriate overall goal of professional regulation, focusing on cost and
choice:
The Commission's established policy is to fully apply the
competition rules to this sector, whilst recognising its specificities
and acknowledging the liberal professions' special status in the
economies of the Member States and in society in general. The
overall goal must be to improve welfare for all users of professional
services and for consumers in particular: better choice and better
value for money. 177
172 Id. at 2, para. 1. See Lisbon Strategy, supra note 59, for a discussion of the Lisbon
Strategy.
173 Id. at 2-3, para. 2-4 (citing the e-Commerce Directive and the pending directive on
recognition of professional qualifications).
174 Id.
175 EU Invitation to Comment, supra note 169, at 3-6.
176 Id. at 4, para. 8 (citing six much lengthier principles).
177 Id. at 5, para. 10.
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Referring indirectly to the Wouters and Arduino cases, 178 the Commission
noted that professions have certain inherent characteristics which they may
be allowed to retain, even if they are anticompetitive. 1
79
After providing this introduction to the issues, the Commission
explained its Stocktaking Exercise. The Commission cited the IHS results
and noted that the study pointed out that there were no apparent signs of
problems in countries where there is less regulation and that low regulation
is a spur to wealth creation, rather than a hindrance. 180 It then noted that
this was an opportunity for regulators to re-evaluate and possibly reform
regimes put in place years ago. 81 The Commission explained that it had
instituted the stocktaking because it wanted to:
[U]nderstand and evaluate the present market situation, the degree of
user satisfaction, whether there are artificial barriers to the optimal
use of resources as well as whether improvements to the existing
rules and regulations are possible. To do this, further informed input
is needed in the first place from those directly concerned, such as
users of services, service providers and those responsible for the
regulations. It must be remembered that the above-mentioned study
represents one input, of economic nature, to the debate which is now
launched and where all points of view will be considered. 1
82
The Commission gave respondents approximately two months to
respond. 1
8 3
178 See supra notes 77-158 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
179 EU Invitation to Comment, supra note 169, at 5, para. 12:
It is also clear from the above-mentioned recent case-law and from the
Commission's practice that some types of rules and regulations must be considered
as inherent to the profession in question and therefore in principle will not be
caught by the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, decisions and practices.
Indeed, were they prohibited, the profession as such would be deprived of its
essential characters. Without such genuine 'deontological' rules the profession
could not function as a body of professionals providing a particular range of
professional services and there could hence be no potential for competition
between providers of services. The application of the competition rules clearly
must not produce such results.
1"0 Id. at 6-7.
181 Id. at 7, para. 19.
182 Id. at 7, para. 20.
183 The EU Invitation to Comment is dated March 27, 2003; Respondents were asked to
submit comments by May 31, 2003. EU Invitation to Comment, supra note 169, at 8. The
Commission's summary of responses, however, said that respondents had until June 15,
2003 to respond. Commission, DG Competition, Invitation to Comment, Regulation in
Liberal Professions and its Effects, Summary of Responses (Oct. 2003), available at
http ://ec .europa.eu/comm/competition/liberalization/conference/summary-of consultation_r
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Because the consequences of the EU Initiative are so significant and
because the European Commission has relied, and continues to rely, very
heavily on its stocktaking exercise, as well as on the IHS Study, it is
worthwhile to examine the data collected and questions asked. Unlike the
IHS questionnaire, the Commission's stocktaking questionnaire asked
open-ended questions that called for narrative responses. Some of the
questions they asked consumers included the following:
* Please name any reasons that have discouraged you from
making use of the services of this profession.
a Would you like to indicate which, in your view, are the
essential rules that a professional must comply with?
* In your view, to what extent do the users of the services of this
profession need protection through regulation of access to
entry to the profession? Your reply may consider separately
businesses, continuous consumers, sophisticated buyers and
small, one-off consumers.
* In your view, to what extent do the users of the services of this
profession need protection through regulation of professional
conduct? Your reply may consider separately businesses,
continuous consumers, sophisticated buyers and small, one-off
consumers?
* In your view, is the market for the services of this profession a
competitive one? Do you feel you have enough choice both as
far as the provider of services is concerned and in the services
you purchase?
The "providers" section of the questionnaire began with three general
questions. X4 The questionnaire then listed eleven categories of rules and
asked respondents to use a five point scale to indicate "[t]o what extent do
sponses.pdf [hereinafter Summary ofResponses].
184 Id. at 13-14. Question 15 stated:
Would you like to indicate which, in your view, are the essential rules that a
professional must comply with? You may wish to take into account that the e-
commerce Directive lists the examples of independence, professional secrecy and
fairness towards clients and other members of the profession, as professional rules
to be complied with.
Question 16 stated: "The e-commerce Directive also mentions 'the dignity and honour of the
profession'. What exactly do you understand by 'dignity and honour of the profession'? To
what extent do you think this is an important factor for the proper practice of the
profession?" Id. Question 17 consisted of a chart listing eleven categories of rules such as
fee scales, advertising restrictions, MDP bans and territorial restrictions on scope of activity.
For each of these eleven categories, the Invitation to Comment asked respondents to indicate
on a chart, on a scale from -2 to 2 whether the rule in question "act[s] in or against your
interests as a provider of the services?" Id.
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you feel that the following rules act in or against your interests as a
provider of the services?" 1 85 The next section listed these same eleven
categories of rules and invited (but did not require) respondents to address
the questions listed below with respect to one or more of these rules:
* In your opinion, what is the goal of the rule or regulation you
are considering? If you know the source of the rule or
regulation in question, please indicate it (law, code of conduct,
other).
* In your view, could this rule or regulation be justified as a
measure to protect consumers? In particular, to what extent do
you think it protects the small, one-off consumer?
* In your opinion, would businesses, continuous consumers,
sophisticated buyers, need such protection?
" In your view, does this rule or regulation promote or hinder
competition in the market? Why?
* In your view, what is the role of this profession in
safeguarding the public interest? What exactly do you
understand by 'public interest' (for example: the correct
administration of justice, public health, public safety,
protection of the environment)?
* To what extent could the same purposes be attained by less
restrictive measures?
* What is the effect of such rule or regulation on the market?
* In your view, to what extent does this rule or regulation limit
the possibilities for cross border services or affect the
possibilities of professionals to enter new markets?
* Finally, are there any other remarks you would like to
make? 186
The final section of the Invitation to Comment asked respondents whether
the availability, cost, and quality of services differed within Europe and the
relationship of cost to quality. '8
C. The October 2003 Events
There were three significant events that took place in October 2003:
(1) DG Competition's publication of the summary of the responses it
received from the Invitation to Comment; (2) DG Competition's publication
of a document entitled "Overview of Regulation in the EU Member States;"
and (3) a conference on liberal professions hosted by DG Competition.
Each of these three developments is discussed below.
185 Id. at 14, question 17.
186 Id. at 15-16.
"' Id. at 16-17.
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1. Publication of the "Summary of Responses" to the Stocktaking Exercise
In October 2003, approximately one week before the Commission's
October 28, 2003 Conference on Regulation in Professional Services,18 8 the
Commission published a summary of the responses it had received to its
March 2003 Invitation to Comment. 1 89 The Commission received a total of
246 comments, 33 of which addressed the issue of the regulation of the
legal profession.1 90 Eighteen of these responses came from professional
bodies, whereas the other responses came from business users, practitioners
and one consumer association. 9
The summary included an introductory section, followed by comments
that were organized by profession. The introductory section included three
legal services-specific paragraphs. 192 The document also included four and
one half pages of additional comments about legal services, many of which
offered justifications for regulations in the five areas being examined by the
Commission. 193  Those commenting included the CCBE and Cologne
professors Dr. Martin Henssler and Dr. Matthias Kilian, who had prepared a
report commissioned by the German Hans-Soldan Stiftung. Their
188 See European Commission, Competition, Professional Services, Conferences,
Conference on the Regulation of Professional Services, Oct. 28, 2003,
http://ec.europa.eu/commcompetition/sectors/professional-services/conferences/20031028/i
ndex.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter October 2003 Conference] (papers and
videos from this conference are available on this webpage); Remarks of Wachtmeister at the
October 2003 Conference, supra note 133, at 1 ("The second step in the Commission's
investigation was the invitation for interested parties to comment on restrictive professional
rules. We received 246 responses and published a summary of them last week.").
189 See Summary of Responses, supra note 183.
190 See id. at 1, para. 1 (noting 246 responses); id. para. 51 (thirty-three responses for the
legal profession).
191 Id. para. 51.
192 Id. paras. 11-13:
11. A large majority of respondents considered price regulation to be
inappropriate for legal services. A number of professional bodies argued that fixed
and recommended prices were not in the interests of consumers.
12. A significant number of respondents were in favour of some regulation of
advertising of legal services. However, most believed that lawyers ought to be
able to advertise their services. Only a small minority was in favour of highly
restrictive rules.
13. A large number of respondents were in favour of regulation of co-operation
between lawyers and other groups. However, some suggested that current rules
are overly restrictive and that they are hindering the development of
multidisciplinary practices.
193 Id. at 9-13, paras. 51-81.
European Commission Project: Competition in Professional Services
29:1 (2009)
comments are discussed in Section IV, infra.
2. The Commission's October 2003 Overview of Regulation in the EU
Member States
At approximately the same time it issued its Summary of Responses
document, DG Competition issued a document entitled "Overview of
Regulation in the EU Member States."1 94 This twenty page document is no
longer linked from the Commission's Professional Services sector
webpage; it was-in essence-a draft of the Commission's February 2004
Report. This Overview included an introductory section, in which DG
Competition identified the professions that were the most and least
regulated,1 95 and the countries with the most and least regulation. 196 This
section also included a chart summarizing the level of regulation for five
professions in thirteen EU Member States that was later reproduced in the
February 2004 Report. 
197
The next section of the overview identified the "key restrictions" for
each profession. This section was primarily descriptive of the existing
regulations in various EU Member States. The legal services portion
included three paragraphs devoted to summarizing the existing restrictions
regarding entry and exclusive rights for legal services;1 98 two paragraphs on
price restrictions; 199 three paragraphs on contingency fees;2° ° four
paragraphs on advertising; 20' five paragraphs on business structures; 202 and
three paragraphs on inter-professional cooperation. 0 3  In 2004, the
Commission issued a document that provided a similar stocktaking
overview for the Eastern European countries that had recently joined the
194 Commission, DG Competition, Stocktaking Exercise on Regulation of Professional




%20intemazionale;L=2 [hereinafter Stocktaking Exercise].
195 Id. paras. 6, 8. The most highly regulated professions were notaries and pharmacists
and the least highly regulated were architects and engineers. Id. paras. 6, 8. Lawyers and
accountants were described as "relatively highly regulated." Id. para. 7.
196 Id. para. 4. The countries with the most regulation were Austria, Germany, Greece,
Italy and Luxembourg. Id. The countries with the least regulation were Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Id. para. 5.
197 Id. at 1-2. See infra note 230 for this chart.
198 Id. paras. 54-56.
199 Id. paras. 57-58.
200 Stocktaking Exercise, supra note 194, paras. 59-61.
201 Id. paras. 62-65.
202 Id. paras. 66-70.
203 Id. paras. 71-73.
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European Union.20 4 The 2004 document included an updated table that
included the "regulation index" number for most of the new EU Member
States.205
3. Commission Conference on Professional Services
The third important development in October 2003 was a conference on
professional services sponsored by the European Commission.20 6 This
conference began with presentations by four EU officials. The first speaker
was the Deputy Director of DG Competition, who gave the opening
remarks. 20 7  The second speaker was Anne-Margrete Wachtmeister, the
head of the Services unit of DG Competition who reviewed the results of
the IHS Study and the Stocktaking Exercise.20 8 The third presentation was
by Professor Niels Phlipsen, a University of Maastricht professor who had
been visiting the European Union and in charge of the liberal professions
regulatory project. 2°9  He briefly summarized the economic research
regarding price regulation, advertising restrictions, entry regulation and the
effect of deregulation in the professions (primarily through loosening the
exclusive tasks reserved to the profession). His remarks also briefly
touched on regulating for quality.2 r° After his summary of the literature, he
204 Commission, DG Competition, Stocktaking Exercise on Regulation of Professional
Services: Overview of Regulation in the New EU Member States, COMP/D3/MK/D(2004),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/liberalization/conference/overview of
regulation in the eu professions.pdf. There were three pages devoted to legal services
restrictions. See id. paras. 37-60.
205 Id. at 20, Annex.
206 October 2003 Conference, supra note 188.
207 Gianfranco Rocca, Deputy Director General: DG Competition, Opening Remarks,
Conference on the Regulation of Professional Services (Oct. 28, 2003) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/liberalization/conference/speeches/gianfranco-rocca.p
df [hereinafter Remarks of Gianfranco Rocca].
208 See Remarks of Wachtmeister at the October 2003 Conference, supra note 133. Ms.
Wachtmeister's six-page powerpoint is available with the conference materials. See
Overview of the DG Competition's Stocktaking Exercise on Professional Rules:
Wachtmeister and Philipsen Powerpoint, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition
/liberalization/conference/speeches/amwachtmeisterand-n-philipsen-powerpoint.pdf
[hereinafter October 2003 Wachtmeister Conference Powerpoint].
209 Niels Philipsen, Professional Services Team: DG Competition, Overview of the
Commission's Stocktaking Exercise (Part II), Conference on the Regulation of Professional
Services (Oct. 28, 2003) available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/liberalization
/conference/speeches/nielsphilipsen.pdf.
210 Id. at 1:
One can conclude that, although quality regulation may often be needed to some
extent in professional markets, it is doubtful whether price regulation leads to any
benefits for consumers. As early as 1970, the UK's Monopolies and Mergers
Commission argued that 'price competition in the supply of a professional service
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endorsed the IHS Study, stating:
The IHS report on the professions reached the conclusion that
excessive levels of regulation appear to be linked with higher prices.
A small number of correspondents have questioned this finding, in
particular the authors' reliance on turnover figures as an indication of
profits in a given profession. This could be a valid point. However,
as I have shown with my examples, the IHS conclusions are broadly
in line with other empirical and academic work. I would therefore
like to conclude by saying that most academic studies on individual
professions point to similar links between excessive regulation and
economic inefficiency.
2 1 1
The fourth presentation was by the head of a different EU division-
the DG Internal Market-who discussed other EU initiatives that were
under consideration in order to reduce barriers and facilitate an internal
market in services.2 2 Although the audience was invited to ask questions
in the later sessions, they were not invited to do so during these first four
sets of remarks.21 3
Following these introductory remarks and a coffee break, the
conference began with the first of its three substantive sessions. The title of
the first panel session, which focused heavily on the issue of MDPs, was:
"Regulation and Business Development: Focusing on Rules that Impact on
Business Development, Including Inter-Professional Co-operation, Business
Structure, New Entry and Innovation., 214  This session included seven
speakers, four of whom represented organizations 2 15 and three of whom
is likely to be the most effective single stimulant to greater efficiency and to
innovation and variety of service.'
211 Id. at 3.
212 Jonathon Stoodley, Head of Unit: DG Internal Market, Presentation of DG Internal
Markets Projects for Professional Services, Conference on the Regulation of Professional
Services (Oct. 28, 2003) (A transcript of Mr. Stoodley's remarks do not appear on the
conference website, but he is listed as presenting at http://ec.europa.eu/comm
/competition/sectors/professionalservices/conferences/20031028/index).
213 See Remarks of Gianfranco Rocca, supra note 207, at 2 ("It is during these three
sessions [after the coffee break] that we invite you to ask questions of our panelists and
speakers.").
214 See October 2003 Conference, supra note 188.
215 See id. The speakers in this session representing organizations were: (1) Helge Jakob
Kolrud, President, Council of the Bars and Law Societies of Europe, on Professional Rules
and Business Development; (2) Luis Matias, Pharmaceutical Group of the European Union,
PGEU Presentation [protect health]; (3) Fredrik Higglund, ICA F6rbundet Invest AB,
Sweden [representing the Swedish Grocers' Federation], Why the Swedish Consumers
Would be the Winners; (4) David Devlin, European Federation of Accountants, Speaking
Notes.
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presented their personal views.216 Some of these speakers urged the
Commission to reduce regulation,217  whereas three of the speakers
representing organizations were much more cautious or even disapproving
of the Commission's initiatives.218
The second panel session was entitled "Regulation and Consumer
Protection: Focusing on Price Regulation, Recommended Prices,
Advertising Restrictions and Other Professional Rules Justified as in the
Consumer Interest. ' 219 Five of the six speakers in this session represented
organizations.22 °  Once again, some of the speakers urged caution,221
whereas other speakers urged the Commission to continue their efforts to
reduce unnecessary regulation.222
The third session was entitled "Reform in the EU Professions:
Focusing on Recent Deregulation in Certain Member States and Whether
216 See id. The speakers in this session, who presented their own views, were: (1) Maitre
Hans Gilliams, Attorney for ECJ plaintiff Jos Wouters, who spoke personally and offered
introductory observations; (2) Maitre Jacques Verges, Avocat la Cour (Barreau de Paris),
Intervention de Maitre Jacques Verges; (3) Jeremy Jennings OBE, Ernst & Young, who is
Ernst & Young's Global Director of Regulatory & Government Relations.
217 See October 2003 Conference, supra note 188, Remarks of Gilliams, Remarks of
Hagglund, Remarks of Devlin (Mr. Gillimans expressed his belief that consumers could
benefit from self-regulation and noted that self-regulation can often be implemented with out
conflicting with competition rules. Additionally, Mr. Gillimans commented that, in a
democratic system, the public authorities should be able to define "what constitutes the
'public interest' and that the inquiry into whether or not rules are consistent with the pubic
interest should be conducted on a "case by case basis." Finally, Mr. Gillmans noted that
where there is consensus as to what "core values of the profession are," and where public
policy "allows the relevant profession to implement these core values," then regardless of
restrictive effects, these values are compatible with competition rules. "However, the
'exemption' from the competition rules only applies to rules that are demonstrably necessary
for the relevant core values and provided those values can not be protected in alternative,
less restrictive ways." It is the responsibility of the "author of the restrictive practice,"
however, to show that there is a necessity for this practice).
218 See id., Remarks of Kolrud, Remarks of Devlin, Remarks of Matias.
219 See October 2003 Conference, supra note 188.
220 Id. The organizational speakers were: (1) Jim Murray, European Consumers'
Organisation, Speaking Notes; (2) Amo Metzler, Federal Association for Liberal
Professions, Germany, Regulierung der Freien Berufe und Verbraucherschutz; (3) Dorothea
Herzele, Federal Chamber of Labour, Austria, Regulierung der Freien Berufe:Dient sie auch
dem Woht der Konsumentinnen und der ArbeitnehmerInnen? Presentation; (4) Katarina
Nilsson, Architects' Council of Europe, Regulation of Professional Services and Consumer
Protection; (5) Phil Evans, Consumers' Association, United Kingdom, Speaking Notes. The
speaker who did not represent an organization was Professor Harald Herrmann, Friedrich-
Alexander University, Germany, Normstrukturen des europaweiten De-Regulierungstrend
und Kartellrecht, Presentation.
221 See, e.g., October 2003 Conference, supra note 188, Remarks of Katarina Nilsson.
222 See, e.g., id., Remarks of Jim Murray, Remarks of Dorothea Herzele, Remarks of Phil
Evans.
European Commission Project: Competition in Professional Services
29:1 (2009)
Similar Reforms Could be Applied Elsewhere in the European Union.,
223
This session included five representatives, followed by comments and
concluding remarks by Commissioner Monti.224  The speakers included
government representatives from Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Ireland, and one academic.225
1II. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORTS
A. The February 2004 EU Commission Report on Competition in
Professional Services
In February 2004, several months after the October 2003 events
described above, the European Commission issued its Report on
Competition in Professional Services (Report). 226  This twenty-four page
report addressed competition principles with respect to different kinds of
professionals, including: (1) accountancy/audit; (2) tax consultants; (3)
architects; (4) engineers; (5) lawyers; (6) notaries; and (7) pharmacists.
The Report focused on five areas of concern: (1) price fixing; (2)
recommended prices; (3) advertising regulations; (4) entry requirements and
reserved rights [i.e., monopoly rights]; and (5) regulations governing
business structure and multi-disciplinary practices.
The Report built on the documents that had been previously circulated.
The first section of the Report provided background and contextual
information, including information about the importance of the services
market to the EU economy.228 The next section of the Report summarized
the Commission's actions in the field of competition for professional
services, identifying the IHS Study, the Stocktaking Exercise, the
Commission's coordination with the National Competition authorities and
223 See October 2003 Wachtmeister Conference Powerpoint, supra note 208.
224 October 2003 Conference, supra note 188.
225 Id. Talks included: (1) Regulation of Professional Services, Giuseppe Tesauro,
Competition Authority, Italy; (2) Reform in the EU Professions, Dr. Kurt Franz, Ministry of
Justice, Germany; (3) The Case for Agnosticism and Diversity in the Regulation of
Professions, Benito Arrufiada, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona; (4) Mark Hameleers,
Ministry of Economic Affairs, The Netherlands (presentation not available); (5) Dr John
Fingleton, Competition Authority, Ireland. Presentation in English and French.
226 See Commission Report, supra note 8; see also Europa, Summaries of Legislation,
Competition in Professional Services, Summary of Commission Communication of 9
February 2004 Entitled "Report on Competition in Professional Services,"
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/123015.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter
Commission Description] (summary of the Report and Follow-Up Report prepared for
information only and not designed to interpret or replace the reference document, which
remains the only binding legal text).
227 See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 8, paras. 1, 16.
228 Id. paras. 5-7.
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the Commission's complaint against the Belgian architects for their
minimum fee schedule system.129  This section of the Report also
reproduced Figure 1 from the IHS Study, which listed the level of
regulation in thirteen countries for five professions:
230
Figure 1:Index of level of regulation in EU Member States
a35







Note: Greece and Portugal are not included because of a lack of data on certain professions.
After summarizing the Commission's activities, the Report continued
with a section entitled "Restrictive Regulation in the Liberal Professions"
that presented the Commission's views that the five categories of
restrictions "may eliminate or limit competition between service providers
and thus reduce the incentives for professionals to work cost-efficiently, to
lower prices, to increase quality or to offer innovative services. 231 Citing
the OECD study discussed earlier, the Commission stated that:
[A] significant body of empirical research shows the negative effects
that excessive regulation may have for consumers. That research
suggests that excessive regulation of advertising and licensing has, in
certain cases, led to lower quality and higher prices in professional
services markets. Conversely, the loosening of anti-competitive
restrictions has had positive effects on prices and quality.
232
The Commission opined that there are "essentially three reasons why some
regulation of professional services may be necessary:"
(1) the concept of "asymmetry of information" between customers
and service providers and that professional services are
229 Id. paras. 7-9. Each of these was described in the prior section of this article.
230 Id. para. 16, Figure 1.
231 Id. para. 22.
232 Id. para. 23.
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"credence goods" the quality of which cannot easily be judged
either by prior observation or, in some markets, by
consumption or use;
(2) the concept of "externalities" because in certain markets, the
provision of a service may have an impact on third parties as
well as the purchaser of the service and there is a danger that
the providers and purchasers of these services fail to take
proper account of these external effects; and
(3) the concept that certain professional services are deemed to
produce public goods that are of value for society in general,
such as the correct administration of justice and there is a
danger that without regulation some professional services
markets might undersupply or inadequately supply public
goods.2 33
The Report noted that these three problems "may lead to market failure
such as under-supply, over-supply or the provision of poor quality services.
Restrictive regulations have therefore been justified as being designed to
maintain the quality of professional services and to protect consumers from
malpractice."23 4  The Commission then cited the European Parliament's
December 2003 resolution concluding that:
[F]rom a general point of view rules are necessary in the specific
context of each profession, in particular those relating to the
organisation, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision,
liability, impartiality and competence of the members of the
profession or designed to prevent conflicts of interest and misleading
advertising, provided that they give end users the assurance that they
are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity
and experience, and do not constitute restrictions on competition. 35
This section concluded by stating that the Report would continue by
considering individually each of the five areas of concern and would
provide a "brief overview" of arguments for and against the category in
question and give indications about the possible scope for relaxing existing
rules.2
36
The Commission's Report devoted approximately two pages to each of
the five issues and within those two pages, the Report addressed the
approaches used by all five professions being examined. These sections
relied heavily on the IHS findings and the first three topics-price fixing,
233 Commission Report, supra note 8, paras. 9-10.
234 Id. para. 10.
235 Id. para. 29 (citing the December 2003 European Parliament Resolution on Market
Fegulations and Competition Rules for the Liberal Professions, discussed infra at note 313).
236 Id. para. 30.
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recommended prices and advertising-included tables based on the IHS
Study.237
With respect to fixed fees, the Report observed that the "legal,
accountancy, engineering and architectural professions now function
effectively without fixed prices in most Member States. This suggests that
price controls are not an essential regulatory instrument for these
professions and that other less restrictive mechanisms might provide an
effective means of maintaining high standards." 23 It further concluded
that "it is possible that maximum prices might protect consumers from
excessive charges in markets with high entry barriers and a lack of effective
competition. However, this does not appear to be true for the majority of
the EU professions. 239
On the issues of recommended fees and the legal profession, the
Report found that recommended prices may have a significant negative
effect on competition because they may facilitate the coordination of prices
between service providers and can mislead consumers about reasonable
price levels. 240 The Commission was skeptical of professional associations'
arguments that recommended prices can provide consumers with useful
information about the average costs of services, reduce the costs of setting
fees, serve as a guide for practitioners who lack experience in determining
fees, or reduce the transaction costs of negotiating prices for complex
* 241
services. It pointed out that there are alternative methods of providing
price information, that it was unlikely that professionals would need to rely
on recommended prices in order to set fees, and that a number of
jurisdictions and professions had eliminated recommended fees. 242
With respect to advertising regulations, the Commission summarized
the benefits of advertising,243 rejected the argument that restrictions were
needed to protect consumers from misleading or manipulative claims, and
observed that:
[R]esearch suggests that advertising restrictions may under certain
237 Id. para. 36, Table 1; para. 41, Table 2; para. 46, Table 3.
238 Id. para. 34.
239 Commission Report, supra note 8, para. 35.
240 Id. para. 37.
241 Id. para. 38.
242 Id. paras. 39-41.
243 Id. para. 43 (stating that advertising can facilitate competition by informing
consumers about different products and allowing them to make better informed purchasing
decisions and that it can be a crucial competitive tool for new firms entering the market and
for existing firms to launch new products, and that in contrast, advertising restrictions reduce
competition by increasing the costs of gaining information about different products, making
it more difficult for consumers to search for the quality and price that best meets their
needs).
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circumstances increase the fees for professional services without
having a positive effect on the quality of those services. The
implication of these findings is that advertising restrictions as such
do not, necessarily, provide an appropriate response to asymmetry of
information in professional services. Conversely, truthful and
objective advertising may actually help consumers to overcome the
asymmetry and to make more informed purchasing decisions.
244
It also noted that a number of professions in a number of EU Member
States had removed advertising restrictions.24 5
The next topic the Commission addressed was "entry requirements and
reserved rights," the latter of which referred to the monopoly rights of the
profession. The Commission began by summarizing some of the qualitative
entry restrictions, including minimum periods of education, professional
examinations, and minimum periods of professional experience, observing
that "[q]ualitative entry restrictions, combined with reserved rights, ensure
that only practitioners with appropriate qualifications and competence can
carry out certain tasks. They may thus make an important contribution for
ensuring the quality of professional services. 24 6 It continued by observing
that "excessive licensing regulation is likely to reduce the supply of service
providers, with negative consequences for competition and quality of
service. Empirical research has shown that, in some cases, excessive
licensing restrictions have led to higher prices without ensuring higher
quality. 24 7 The Commission cited the experiences in the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and Australia, in which shrinking the lawyers' and real
estate agents' reserved work had led to lower prices.2 48 The Commission
also cited a 1990 U.S. Federal Trade Commission report that had found that
while "a few studies indicated that higher quality might result from business
practice restrictions, a majority of studies found quality to be unaffected by
licensing or business practice restrictions associated with licensing. In
some circumstances, licensing restrictions even had a negative effect on
quality. ' 249 The Commission concluded: "these experiences suggest that
licensing regulations might, in some cases, be excessively restrictive and
that consumers might benefit from a relaxation of the existing rules. 25 °
The Commission then provided suggestions to Member States about
ways in which the entry restrictions for the professions might be reduced.
244 Id. para. 45.
245 Commission Report, supra note 8, paras. 46-47.
246 Id. paras. 48-49.
247 Id. para. 50.
248 Id. para. 51.
249 Id. para. 50 (citing Carolyn Cox & Susan Foster, The Costs and Benefits of
Occupational Regulation, available at http://www.ramblemuse.com/articles/cox foster.pdf).
250 Id. para. 52.
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The Commission suggested that it might be possible to lower the entry or
monopoly requirements if: (1) the requirements appear to be
disproportionate to the complexity of the profession's tasks; (2) highly
qualified professions hold monopoly rights to perform less complex
services (such as conveyancing), in addition to their core activities; and (3)
if there could be less restrictive mechanisms to guarantee quality, for
example, through independent accreditation or quality controls.25' The
Commission also discussed quantitative controls.25
The final issue the Commission turned to was alternative business
structures restrictions, which it described as including rules that restrict the
ownership structure of professional services companies, the scope for
collaboration with other professions, or the opening of branches, franchises
or chains.253 The Commission offered an argument against these types of
restrictions, stating:
Business structure regulations may have a negative economic impact
if they inhibit providers from developing new services or cost-
efficient business models. For example, these regulations might
inhibit lawyers and accountants from providing integrated legal and
accountancy advice for tax issues or prevent the development of one-
stop shops for professional services in rural areas. Certain ownership
regulations such as prohibition of incorporation can also reduce
access to capital in professional services markets, hindering new
entry and expansion.
The Commission then summarized two arguments offered in support of
such restrictions: (1) they may be necessary to ensure practitioners'
personal responsibility and liability towards clients and avoid conflicts of
interest and (2) they may be necessary to ensure practitioners' independence
because if professional service companies were controlled or influenced by
non-professionals, this might compromise practitioners' judgement or
respect for professional values.255
After this summary, the Commission opined that in its view, business
structure restrictions appear to be less justifiable when they restrict the
scope for collaboration between members of the same profession or when
there is no overriding need to protect practitioners' independence.2 56  On
the other hand, it opined that such restrictions would be more justifiable in
markets where there is a strong need to protect practitioners' independence
251 Commission Report, supra note 8, paras. 53-55.
252 Id. paras. 56-58.
253 Id. para. 59.
254 Id. para. 60.
255 Id. para. 61.
256 Id. paras. 62-63.
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or personal liability, although there might be alternative mechanisms for
protecting independence and ethical standards which are less restrictive of
competition.2 57 It concluded this section by stating that in "some markets,
stringent ownership restrictions might therefore be replaced or partially
replaced by less restrictive rules. 25 8
Following its analysis of these issues, the Commission discussed the
possible application of the EC Treaty competition provisions to them. This
section of the Report was divided into nine sections with the following
conclusions:
(1) Members of the professions who are not employees are
undertakings as defined in Treaty Article 81;
(2) Self-regulation can constitute an association of undertakings,
but a body regulating professional conduct is not an
association of undertakings if it is composed of a majority of
representatives of public authorities and it is required to
observe pre-defined public interest criteria. Further, rules
adopted by a professional body can only be regarded as State
measures if the State has defined the public-interest criteria
and the essential principles with which the rules must comply
and if the State retains its power to adopt decisions in the last
resort;
(3) Some of the rules of other professions reviewed in the report,
including fee and advertising restrictions, were a restriction of
competition;
(4) Professional regulations are liable to have an appreciable effect
on trade between EU Member States;
(5) A Wouters exception exists, whereby certain professional
regulations that restrict competition are permitted;229
257 Commission Report, supra note 8, para. 64.
258 Id. para. 65.
259 Id. paras. 74-75. According to the Commission, such excepted regulations must be:
[C]onnected with the need to make rules relating to organisation, qualifications,
professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure that the ultimate
consumers of professional services and a specific public interest purpose are
provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and experience. It
has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of
competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives and if they are therefore
necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of the profession, as it is organised
in the Member State concerned. The effects restrictive of competition must not go
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(6) The state compulsion defense applies only if the State requires
certain behavior and does not apply if a national law merely
allows, encourages or makes it easier for undertakings to
engage in anti-competitive conduct;
(7) There is an Article 81(3) exception in addition to the Wouters
exception;
(8) Both the Commission and the Member States have the power
under Article 81 (1) to enjoin conduct or fine the actors; and
(9) Member States can themselves be liable because the Treaty
requires them not to "introduce or maintain in force measures,
even of a legislative or regulatory nature, which may render
ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings."
The Commission stated its view that "State measures
delegating regulatory powers which do not clearly define the
public interest objectives to be pursued by the regulation
and/or by which the State effectively waives its power to take
the decisions of last resort or to control implementation" can
be challenged. The Commission also said that "rubber stamp"
approvals did not count nor did "all or nothing" approvals in
which the authorities of a Member State had to accept or reject
the proposals of the professional bodies but could not alter
their content or substitute their own decisions for these
proposals. A proportionality test is appropriate to assess the
extent to which an anti-competitive professional regulation
truly serves the public interest. 1
60
After this discussion of its views about the application of the EC
Treaty competition provisions to professional services, the Commission
commented on the "steps towards modernization" that could be taken,
including having regulators review the existing rules and the Commission's
intent to coordinate with the members of the ECN.261  In the "Final
Remarks" section of the Report, the Commission noted that it would report
back in 2005, asked Member States to notify it of new regulations, and
stated:
The Commission concludes by repeating that the efforts of all
concerned parties are needed to improve the regulatory environment
in which providers of professional services operate in Europe. An
environment in which quality and ethical behaviour are guaranteed
through more pro-competitive mechanisms will allow the liberal
professions to innovate and to increase the quality and choice of their
services. More efficient and competitive professional services will
260 Id. paras. 17-22.
261 Id. paras. 23-24.
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benefit consumers directly and, as key inputs for other businesses
they will also bring greater productivity to the economy as a whole,
thus contributing to the Lisbon agenda of makinA Europe the most
dynamic knowledge based economy 
in the world.2E 
The Commission concluded its Report by inviting "[r]egulatory
authorities in the Member States and professional bodies... to review
existing rules taking into consideration whether those rules are necessary
for the public interest, whether they are proportionate and whether they are
justified.,
263
B. The September 2005 Commission Follow-Up Report and Staff
Summary Report
In 2005, as promised, the Commission issued a Follow-Up Report
entitled "Professional Services-Scope for More Reform" (Follow-Up
Report). 264  The Follow-Up Report was accompanied by a document
prepared by the Commission staff entitled "Progress by Member States in
Reviewing and Eliminating Restrictions to Competition in the Area of
Professional Services" (Staff Progress Report). 265 Because the Follow-Up
Report and Staff Progress Report were prepared after the European Union
enlargement, they included data from twenty-five EU Member States, in
contrast to the Commission's original report, which had presented data for
thirteen of the then-fifteen EU Member States.
2 66
The September 2005 Follow-Up Report was eleven pages long and
divided into seven sections.26 7 The Commission reviewed the importance
262 Id. paras. 103-04.
263 Commission Report, supra note 8, para. 5.
264 See Follow-Up Report, supra note 2.
265 Commission Staff Working Document, Progress by Member States in Reviewing and
Eliminating Restrictions to Competition in the Area of Professional Services, SEC(2005)
1064 (Sept. 5, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comnu/competition/sectors
/professional-services/reports/annex.pdf [hereinafter Staff Progress Report].
266 See Follow-Up Report, supra note 2. The European Free Trade Area (EFTA)
countries of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway prepared their own report on professional
services regulation. See EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY, REPORT ON REGULATION OF
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES IN THE EFTA STATES, Case No. 477716, Event. No. 307279 (July
15, 2007), available at http://www.eftasurv.int/information/reportsdocuments/competition
reports/dbaFile7459.pdf. This report used a similar structure and approach and concluded
that lawyers in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway were subject to a medium level of
regulation, with Iceland receiving a "score" of 2.8, Liechtenstein receiving a 4.1 and Norway
receiving a 4.0 on the IHS scale. Id. at 22.
267 Follow-Up Report, supra note 2. The seven sections were: (1) Background; (2) Better
defining the public interest; (3) Activities by the Commission and national competition
authorities; (4) Progress by Member States; (5) Application of the EC competition rules; (6)
Conclusions; and (7) Way Forward.
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of professional services, its prior work in the area, and the justifications for
regulating professional services.268  After noting that it had undertaken
analysis of the markets (which was contained in the annexed Staff Progress
Report), it summarized its findings as follows:
The key finding is that one-off users, who are generally individual
customers and households, may need some carefully targeted
protection. On the other hand, the main users of professional
services-businesses and the public sector-may not need, or have
only very limited need of, regulatory protection given they are better
equipped to choose providers that best suit their needs. The picture
is not entirely clear with respect to small business and further
analysis is needed to assess more fully their needs for regulatory
protection. Moreover, there is little margin for new, innovative and
demand-driven services to emerge in the current regulatory set-up.
This in turn can create costs for business. The differing interests of
these groups should therefore be paramount in reviewing existing
regulation and rules.
2 6 9
After offering this conclusion, the Commission summarized the activities of
the Commission and national competition authorities since 2004, discussed
the progress that had been made by Member States, and again summarized
the Commission's views about the competition laws. 2 70 The "Progress by
Member States" section of the Follow-Up Report included three charts: the
first summarized the level of regulatory reform activity during 2004 and
2005, the second summarized the level of regulation in all countries for all
five professions, and the third combined the data in the first two tables so
that the Commission could compare whether the most reform had occurred
in the jurisdictions with the highest level of regulation.2 7' The first two of
these charts are reproduced below.
Table 1: Level of Member State activity during 2004/5 to reform legislation and
professional rules and regulations in the professional services sector
Level of activity Member States
No activity Czech Republic, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Malta,
Spain, Sweden
Minor reforms Austria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia,
Portugal
268 Id. at 3-5. The Commission identified the same three justifications for regulation that
it had set forth in its 2004 Report. See Commission Report, supra note 8.
269 Follow-Up Report, supra note 2, para. 13.
270 Id. paras. 6-9.
271 Id. paras. 7-8.
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Level of activity Member States
Analytical work in progress Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland
Both minor reforms and France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia
analytical work
Substantial structural reform Denmark, Netherlands, UK
Note: This does not take account of activity in this sector by national competition
authorities. Source: Follow-Up Report, supra note 2, para. 19.
Figure 1: Index of level of regulation in Member States
Source: Follow-Up Report, supra note 2, para. 19.
The "Conclusions" section of the Follow-Up Report included three
paragraphs, in which the Commission expressed its impatience with the
pace of reform and observed that "[t]he weight of tradition should not be
underestimated as affecting the pace of change, and in many countries
regulators fail to see how things can be done differently. ' 72 In the seven
272 Id. paras. 24-26. The Commission stated:
24. The key conclusion is that more urgency by the majority of Member States to
bring about systematic pro-competitive reform in this sector would bring about
significant economic and consumer benefits. In practical terms, this means
Member States taking 'political ownership' of this work at national level to drive
forward the reform process. This has been recognised more generally in the
Lisbon agenda mid-term review, and in the European Council Conclusions
mentioned above, which re-launched the Lisbon agenda refocusing on growth and
employment, and agreed that Member States should present national reform
IE UK DK F1 NL SW SI PL HU SK BE EE FR LV LT CZ ES PT CY DE LU AT r EL
I Pharmiacists m Lawyers [ Accountants + auditors ci Architects m Engineers]
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paragraphs of the "Way Forward" section, the Commission announced that
it remained "fully committed to bringing about wide scale reform to this
sector.',273 It urged the Member States to take the initiative for reform. It
stated that as a first step, Member States should begin work to identify
restrictions that could be removed quickly without further analysis, such as
fixed and recommended priced restrictions and certain advertising
restrictions, while simultaneously performing a more substantial structural
analysis of regulatory structures "to assess the need and open the way for
wider reforms. 274  The Commission announced that it would act as a
facilitator, help spread best practices, publicize its findings, consider
appropriate enforcement actions, and "continue and improve its relations
with national regulatory authorities by organising a more structured debate
and raising the profile of this work with them. 2 75  The "Way Forward"
section also repeated the Commission's conclusions that there were
problems in the professional services sector, stating:
The Commission's further refinement of its economic analysis of the
different markets for professional services, leads the Commission to
the conclusion that consumers and one-off users may have a greater
need of some carefully targeted regulatory protection. However, the
main users of professional services-business and the public
sector-may have no, or only very limited, need of regulatory
protection. The position with respect to small business users is not
entirely clear and further work is required to assess their specific
programmes for supporting growth and employment at national level, and appoint
a Lisbon national coordinator.
25. The weight of tradition should not be underestimated as affecting the pace of
change, and in many countries regulators fail to see how things can be done
differently. Moreover, the professions themselves have in general not been
actively promoting it. The current picture could also indicate that some countries
have relatively weak regulatory oversight of the professions. This could be caused
by the economic phenomenon of regulatory capture which is not uncommon
especially in areas subject to self-regulation.
26. The Commission recognises that it is the Member States' prerogative to
determine to what extent they want to regulate the professions directly by State
regulation, or to leave the matter to self-regulation by professional bodies.
However, good governance would require that Member States oversee the impact
of national self-regulation to guard against it becoming overly restrictive and
detrimental to customers' interests.
Id.
273 Id. para. 27.
274 Id. paras. 28-29.
275 Follow-Up Report, supra note 2, paras. 31-33.
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needs. The current regulatory set-up is unsatisfactory for these two
latter groups given its lack of flexibility and hinders the development
of innovative and demand-driven services.
276
As explained in greater detail in Section IV, infra, the Commission's
conclusions and key assumptions have been controversial.2 77
The Staff Progress Report was much longer than the Follow-Up
Report and included much of the data that was the basis for the Follow-Up
Report's conclusions.278 Following the introduction was a section that set
forth the Commission's methodology. After a summary of the
Commission's analysis, this section concluded by stating that "a further
differentiation of the markets of professional services would allow a better
identification of the public interest involved and of the degree of regulation
indispensable to protect this. 279 This section contained the basis for the
conclusion that one-off users-generally individual customers and
households-may have a greater need for carefully targeted protection than
the main users of business services, namely business and the public sector,
who may have little or no need for such regulation given that they are better
equipped to choose providers who best suit their needs.28 °
The next section of the Staff Progress Report summarized the activities
of the Commission and the Member States related to professional services
and competition law.281  The Staff Progress Report continued by
summarizing the reforms that had occurred. 28  This section was organized
according to five focus issues, with each section listing the reforms that had
taken place in various countries in the targeted professions with respect to
the identified issue.2 83 The next section of the report discussed court cases
that had been filed, including the Commission's Belgian Architects' Fee
case and a number of cases filed by the national competition authorities.
284
276 Id. para. 30.
277 See infra Part IV. The CCBE, for example, has challenged the conclusion that the
main users of legal services are businesses and the public sector as well as the conclusion
that there is little or no need for regulatory protection when lawyers represent these clients.
See CCBE, COMMENTS ON COMMISSION PROGRESS REPORT ON COMPETITION IN
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, Nov. 19, 2005, at 3-5, available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin
/user_upload/NTCdocument/CCBEjresponsefollow 1_1182254403.pdf
278 Compare Follow-Up Report, supra note 2 (eleven pages) with Staff Progress Report,
supra note 265 (thirty-eight pages).
279 Staff Progress Report, supra note 265, para. 21.
280 Id.
281 Id. paras. 22-31.
282 Id. paras. 32-88.
283 Id. The Staff Progress Report focused on the issues of (1) Entry restrictions and
reserved tasks; (2) Business structure regulation; (3) Fixed prices; (4) Recommended prices;
and (5) Advertising restrictions.
284 Id. paras. 89-94.
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In its final narrative section, the Staff Progress Report concluded:
There has been some substantive progress in refining and eliminating
disproportionate restrictions to competition in legislation and in the
rules and regulations of professional bodies during 2004/05....
Some promising work is underway in a number of countries
(Denmark, [the] Netherlands, Poland and UK) which could lead to
significant change in the structure of the legal professions,....
Most progress is being made in those countries where there is a
structured programme of pro-competitive or regulatory reform in
place .... [I]n these countries there is a close partnership between
government and national competition authorities. In other countries,
the reform process had not yet gotten underway, or can best be
described as haphazard.285
After this narrative material, the Staff Progress Report continued with
fourteen pages of tables that summarized the material previously
covered.28  These tables presented the information on existing regulations
and reform efforts in several ways, including by issue, by country and by
profession. Appendix 1 to this article reproduces the legal profession
excerpts from the Staff Progress Report. These tables demonstrate that a
number of EU Member States not only accepted the Commission's
February 2004 invitation "to review existing rules taking into consideration
whether those rules are necessary for the public interest, whether they are
proportionate and whether they are justified[J" but a number decided to
change their rules.287
C. Activity Occurring After the September 2005 Follow-Up Report
Although the pace of the Commission's activities regarding
professional services slowed down after its September 2005 Follow-Up
Report and accompanying Staff Progress Report, professional services
continued to be an area of Commission interest. For example, "Professional
Services" is one of only twelve "sectors" listed in the "sectors" menu of the
homepage of the European Commission's "Competition" Department.288
Moreover, even though the pace of the Commission's activities slowed
285 Staff Progress Report, supra note 265, paras. 95-97.
286 Id. paras. 25-38.
287 Commission Report, supra note 8, at 4. See also Appendix 2 to this article, infra.
288 European Commission, Competition, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index-
en.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). The sectors listed are: (1) agriculture; (2) consumer
goods; (3) energy; (4) financial services; (5) information and communication technologies;
(6) media; (7) motor vehicles; (8) pharmaceuticals; (9) postal services; (10) professional
services; (11) sports; and (12) telecommunications.
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down after 2005, its efforts helped instigate significant ongoing activity in
the EU Member States. It is beyond the scope of this article to review all
the initiatives directed toward legal services, but a brief review of some of
the post-2005 EU Member State activity demonstrates the impact of the EU
Initiative. For example, after a Danish Commission recommended major
changes to the organization of the Danish Bar and Law Society and to the
way complaints against lawyers are handled, the Bar agreed to give up its
representative functions and operate solely as a regulator. 289 This action
followed the European Court of Human Rights decision in Sorensen and
Rasmussen which addressed mandatory bar membership. 290 The Polish
government initiated efforts to adopt legislation to revise its lawyer
discipline system.291 The Polish Constitutional Tribunal found
unconstitutional a number of provisions that addressed lawyer admission
and training; the efforts to develop a replacement law have been very
controversial. 92  In October 2006, the Dutch National Competition
Authority launched a public consultation on the legal services market in the
Netherlands seeking input on such issues as outside investment in law
firms; it has now issued a report to which the Government has responded.293
In December 2006, the Irish Competition Authority released its final report
on legal services finding, inter alia, "that the market for legal services is
permeated with unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions on
competition and is in need of substantial reform" and recommended thirty-
nine reforms; other developments are underway because of publicized
solicitor fraud.294  Different conclusions are found in the November 2006
289 Competition: National Competition and Regulatory Developments, 17 CCBE INFO 4,
4-5 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument
/n_1 7_enpdfll 179229661 .pdf [hereinafter National Developments, 17 CCBE] (in October
2006, the Lawyers' Commission published its report on the Danish legal services market and
recommended that the Danish Bar and Law Society become a public institution); Email from
Jonathan Goldsmith, CCBE Secretary General, to Laurel Terry (Dec. 2, 2007) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Goldsmith Email].
290 Competition: National Developments, 15 CCBE INFO 4, 4 (May 2006), available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/n 15-enpdfll 180964538.pdf
[hereinafter CCBE INFO No. 15].
291 National Developments, 17 CCBE, supra note 289, at 5.
292 Poland, 19 CCBE INFO 4, 5 (Oct. 2007) available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin
/user.upload!NTCdocument/newsletter 19enpdfll193300073.pdf [hereinafter Poland]
(noting that the IBA and the CCBE have sent a delegation to meet with representatives of the
Courts, Parliament and the legal profession, in order to share their concerns and that in
September 2007, the CCBE organized a roundtable entitled "Defending the rule of law in
Poland"); Goldsmith Email, supra note 289.
293 Poland, supra note 292, at 5-6; Goldsmith Email, supra note 289.
294 National Developments, 17 CCBE, supra note 289, at 3-5; THE COMPETITION
AUTHORITY, COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: SOLICITORS AND BARRISTERS (Dec.
2006) available at http://www.tca.ie/controls/getimage.ashx?imageid=1627; Goldsmith
Email, supra note 289.
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report of the Northern Ireland Legal Services Review Group, which
concluded that external ownership of law firms could carry with it
unwanted problems and therefore the existing restrictions should be
retained.295 The Law Society of Scotland, on the other hand, voted in May
2008 to allow alternative business structures and is working with the
government to develop legislation; this vote followed in the wake of a
government consultation launched in 2007 after a 'super complaint' filed by
consumer group "Which?".296 Two notable reforms were also adopted in
Spain: (1) a 2006 Royal Decree on the employment relationship of lawyers
providing services as employees in a law firm, and (2) a 2007 law
permitting multidisciplinary services between lawyers and non-lawyers and
permitting non-lawyers to be shareholders.
2 97
The most high-profile review of the legal profession was undoubtedly
the United Kingdom's "Clementi Report" and resulting legislation.298
Although the U.K. initiative was instituted in response to the 2001 report by
the U.K. Office of Fair Trading and other events, including problems with
the lawyer complaint system, there is a significant overlap between the
issues in the U.K. review and the EU Initiative. Among other things, the
Legal Services Act of 2007300 changes the regulatory structure for solicitors
and barristers in England and Wales by creating a Legal Services Board and
an Office for Legal Complaints, both of which require a majority of
members to be non-lawyers. 30 1 The Legal Services Act also allows the new
295 See National Developments, 17 CCBE, supra note 289, at 5.
296 See The Law Society of Scotland, Alternative Business Structures,
http://www.lawscot.org.uk/MembersInformation/membersinformation/ (last visited Oct.
31, 2008).
297 See Email from Sieglinde Gamsjdiger, Senior Legal Advisor, CCBE to author (Oct. 13,
2008) (on file with author).
298 See generally Sydney M. Cone III, International Legal Practice Involving England
and New York Following Adoption of the United Kingdom Legal Services Act 2007, 28 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 415 (2008); Jonathan Goldsmith, The Core Values Of The Legal
Profession For Lawyers Today And Tomorrow, 28 Nw J. INT'L L. & Bus. 441 (2008).
299 See DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING, COMPETITION IN THE PROFESSIONS-A
REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING, OFT 325 (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/reports/professional-bodies/oft328.pdf [hereinafter FAIR
TRADING]; Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations, Self-Regulation And Consumer Protection:
Whither Thou Goest?, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 53 (discussing failures in the lawyer complaint
system that provided some of the impetus for the reforms).
300 Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 38. See also U.K. Ministry of Justice, Home,
Publications, Legislation, Legal Services Act 2007, http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications
/legalservicesbill.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (including links to the bill and explanatory
notes, the latter of which includes links to the Clementi Report and other important
background information). The Clementi Report was not, however, instituted in response to
the EU Competition Report or Stocktaking, but in response to the 2001 U.K. Office of Fair
Trading Report. See FAIR TRADING, supra note 299.
301 See Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 38, at art. 2 and sched. 1 (The Legal Services
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Legal Services Board to adopt rules that would permit legal services to be
provided by firms organized under new business models, including
multidisciplinary practice and outside equity investment.30 2  Although the
U.K. developments were largely independent of the EU Initiative, many of
them were occurring simultaneously and thus the EU Initiative was part of
the context and background in which the U.K. legislation was adopted. As
this very brief discussion shows, the EU developments, along with
developments in the OECD and the United Kingdom, have triggered an
avalanche of responses by EU Member States.
In addition to triggering activity by EU Member States, the
Commission's interest in professional services has triggered activity on the
part of other EU institutions. For example, in November 2005, the U.K.
Presidency of the European Council organized a conference entitled "Better
Regulation of Professional Services. ' 3  This one-day conference included
a number of different papers and presentations on the subject of regulating
professional services. In December 2006, the European Council Finnish
Board); id. at art. 114 and sched. 15 (Office for Legal Complaints); see also Legal Services
Bill, supra note 39, para. 36.
302 Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 38, at Part B, Alternative Business Structures.
The Solicitors Regulatory Authority (SRA), the front-line regulator for solicitors, has
published regulations, currently scheduled to take effect in March 2009, that would allow
legal disciplinary practices. The SRA has stated that it does not expect full ABS rules to be
in place until at least late 2011. See Solicitors Regulatory Authority, Legal Services Act
FAQs, http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/legal-services-act/lsa-questions-faqs.page (last visited Oct.
31, 2008).
303 European Commission, Competition, Professional Services: Conferences, Better
Regulation of Professional Services, (Brussels, Nov. 21, 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/comm
/competition/sectors/professional_services/conferences/2005 112 1/index.html (last visited
Oct. 31, 2008) (organized by the U.K. Presidency of the Council) [hereinafter U.K.
Presidency Conference]. This conference was a follow-up to a conference that had been
organized several months previously by the Luxembourg Presidency of the European
Council. European Competition Day, Programme (Luxembourg, May 3, 2005),
http://www.eco.public.lu/salle-de-presse/evenements/2005/05/03-joumee-conc/program-e
n.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
304 U.K. Presidency Conference, supra note 303. The first session consisted of
presentations by competition authorities from the European Commission, Ireland, and
Finland, who addressed the meaning of better regulation and considered the practical
experience of Member States promoting better professional regulation. The second session,
which was entitled "Promoting Reform-The Analytical Process," included presentations by
competition authorities from Portugal, Denmark, Poland, and Spanish academic Benito
Arrunada whose two papers focused on the analytical processes associated with reform in
the professions. The third session was entitled "Promoting Reform-How to Tackle Reform
in Practice" and included presentations by government representatives from the United
Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands that focused on "practical examples of reforms
undertaken by Member States and the obstacles they encountered along the way." In
addition to these three sessions, the heads of the European Union and the U.K. Competition
divisions gave introductory remarks, along with Baroness Ashton, who was the U.K.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Department for Constitutional Affairs. Closing
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Presidency organized a conference entitled "The Economic Case for
Professional Services Reform" in order "to discuss recently published
economic studies that had examined the case for reform in the area of
professional services. 3 °5 (These conferences built on the work done in the
October 2003 Conference discussed earlier and a May 2005 conference held
in Luxembourg.) 30 6  The European Parliament has also been active on
issues related to professional services; these activities are discussed in
Section IV (A), infra.
In sum, as this brief discussion has shown, although the Commission
has been relatively inactive since its September 2005 Follow-Up Report, its
impact has been wide-spread. There continues to be significant activity and
reforms related to the EU Initiative.
IV. STAKEHOLDER CRITIQUES OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK
As the prior sections noted, the IHS Study and Commission documents
were highly controversial within Europe. The sections that follow
summarize the positions asserted by some of the leading stakeholder groups
that criticized aspects of the Commission's work.307
A. European Parliament
The European Parliament is the only directly-elected body of the
European Union.30 8 As the directly elected representatives of EU citizens,
it should not be surprising that the Parliament has taken an interest in the
Remarks were given by representatives of EU and the U.K. Competition departments. Id.
305 European Commission, Competition, Professional Services, Conferences: The
Economic Case for Professional Services Reform (Brussels, Dec. 13, 2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professional-services/conferences/20061230/i
ndex.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Finnish Conference]. This one-day
conference included the first public discussion on the preliminary findings of an external
study commissioned by the EU competition department that examined the impact of
professional services regulation on the functioning of the European Union conveyancing
services market. A second session looked at the Finnish experience of professional services
in a low regulatory environment as well as Italy's efforts to reform its professional services.
Although the Commission's narrative description of the Conference did not refer to it, this
Conference also included a discussion of a study by Leuven University on the deregulation
of pharmacies in Belgium and a Copenhagen Economics study of the Legal Profession. As is
discussed infra notes 370-382, the Copenhagen Economics study conflicted with the IHS
Study in some significant respects.
306 See supra notes 206-225 and 303.
307 This section does not purport to present all of the arguments offered. For additional
information about the thirty-three comments the Commission received about legal services,
see supra note 190.
308 Hans-Gert P6ttering, President of European Parliament, Welcome Message to the
European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament.do?language=EN
(last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
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legal profession. The EU Parliament has a Legal Affairs Committee, which
has adopted several resolutions regarding the legal profession. One of the
earliest Parliament resolutions on these issues is a 2001 carefully-worded
three page resolution about the use of mandatory fees. 309 On the one hand,
this resolution called on the Commission "to keep a close eye on the rules
adopted and the decisions taken by Associations of members of liberal
professions which make it difficult for nationals of other Member States to
provide services freely" 310 and urged the Commission "to dismantle
persistent barriers to the cross-border provision of services. 3 11  On the
other hand, the resolution recognized "the importance attached in some
Member States to compulsory tariffs with a view to providing high-quality
services to citizens and to creating a trustful relationship between liberal
professions and their clients" and called upon the Commission to "follow
strictly the interpretation of the Court of Justice in the application of
competition rules to the compulsory tariffs of liberal professions. 31 2
Reading this resolution, one senses the competing constituencies that had
appealed to the Parliament.
This sense of competing interests and constituencies is evident in some
of the other Parliament resolutions. For example, in December 2003,
following the launch of the stocktaking and the October 2003
developments, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that addressed
the EU Initiative.31 3 This resolution has been characterized as "favorable"
to the liberal professions.31 4 It was developed in response to a set of
questions from the Group of the European People's Party (Christian
Democrats) and European Democrats to Commissioner Monti at the
European Parliament Plenary Session on October 8, 2003.315
309 See European Parliament Resolution on Scale Fees and Compulsory Tariffs for
Certain Liberal Professions, in Particular Lawyers, and on the Particular Role and Position of
the Liberal Professions in Modem Society, 2001 O.J. (C 21E) 364, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2002/ce021/ceO2120020124en03640366.pdf
[hereinafter Resolution, Scale Fees]. The European Parliament, in 1994, adopted a
resolution about notaries. This article focuses on lawyers, so it is not addressed here. See
1994 O.J. (C 44) 36.
3 10 Resolution, Scale Fees, supra note 309, para. 6.
311 Id. para. 13.312 Id. para. 7.
313 See European Parliament Resolution on Market Regulations and Competition Rules
for the Liberal Professions, 2004 O.J. (C 91E) 126, available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/ceO91/ceO9120040415enO1260128.pdf [hereinafter 2003
Parliament Resolution].
314 See Competition: European Parliament Activities, 8 CCBE Info 7 (Apr. 2004),
available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/n_08_enpdfl_11809
65637.pdf [hereinafter European Parliament Activities].
315 Id. at 7. See Competition: European Commission/European Parliament Activities:
European Parliament, 7 CCBE Info 2 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter EC/European Parliament
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Among other things, the December 2003 EU Parliament resolution
states that the "liberal professions are the expression of a fundamental
democratic order based on law and, more particularly, are an essential
element of European societies." 316 It further noted that "that the goal of
promoting competition in the professions must, in each individual case, be
reconciled with the objective of maintaining purely ethical rules specific to
the profession and that the pursuit of this goal must res ect the public
interest tasks with which liberal professions are entrusted." 17 The CCBE
appears to have lobbied in favor of this resolution.31 8
The CCBE may not, however, have been the only entity to lobby
Parliament. One month after the adoption of its December 2003 resolution,
the European Parliament adopted a resolution that endorsed much of the
Commission's competition policy and included language that was quite
negative about professional services' regulation. 319  For example, this
resolution includes the statement that "professional bodies too often, in
some Member States, use their self-regulatory powers to benefit the
interests of their own members, more than those of the consumers. 32 °
Later, however, the Parliament seemed to swing back in the other
direction. In November 2005, Commissioner Kroes was asked to meet with
the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs in order to discuss
Activities]:
The European Parliament is considering putting forward a resolution on liberal
professions. The various political groups within the Parliament are currently
considering such a resolution. This follows an oral question of the Group of the
European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats put to
Commissioner Monti at the European Parliament Plenary Session on 8 October
with regard to DG Competition activities in the field of liberal professions. The
question was: "MEPs want to know if the Commission can confirm that rules
which are necessary, in the specific context of each profession, in order to ensure
the impartiality, competence, integrity and responsibility of the members of that
profession or to prevent conflicts of interest and misleading advertising, and
which, in addition, do not represent obstacles to the free movement of services, are
not held to be restrictions of competition."
316 2003 Parliament Resolution, supra note 313, para. 1.
317 Id. para. 9.
318 EC/European Parliament Activities, supra note 315, at 8 ("The CCBE has actively
followed the making of the resolutions and expressed its views.").
319 European Parliament Resolution on Competition Policy, P5_TA(2004)0053 (Jan. 29,
2004), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef-//EP//TEXT
+TA+P5-TA-2004-0053+0+DOC+XML+VO//EN [hereinafter January 2004 Resolution].
See also European Parliament Activities, supra note 314, at 9 (citing the Jan. 24, 2004
resolution).
320 January 2004 Resolution, supra note 319, para. 15.
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the Commission's reform efforts for the legal profession. 32' Thereafter, in
March 2006, the European Parliament issued a lengthy and substantive
resolution about the legal profession; 322 this resolution refers explicitly to
the Commission's Follow-Up Report and expressed concerns about the EU
323 h acInitiative. The March 2006 Resolution includes the following cautionary
remarks, in which Parliament:
* recognized the crucial role played by the legal professions in a
democratic society to guarantee respect for fundamental rights,
the rule of law and security in the application of the law, both
when lawyers represent and defend clients in court and when
they are giving their clients legal advice;
" invited the Commission not to apply EU competition law to
matters that, under the EU constitutional framework, are left to
the jurisdiction of the Member States, such as access to justice,
which includes issues such as the fee schedules to be applied
by courts to liquidate lawyers' fees;
* invited the Commission to apply the competition rules, where
applicable, in compliance with the case law of the Court of
Justice;
* reminded the Commission that the aims of the rules governing
legal services are the protection of the general public, the
guaranteeing of the right of defence and access to justice, and
security in the application of the law, and that for these reasons
they cannot be tailored to the degree of sophistication of the
client;
* reaffirmed the importance of rules which are necessary to
ensure the independence, competence, integrity and
responsibility of members of the legal professions so as to
guarantee the quality of their services, to the benefit of their
clients and society in general, and in order to safeguard the
321 Neelie Kroes, Comm'r, Eur. Comm'n on Competition, Opening Speech to the EP Juri
Committee (Nov. 29, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches
/text/sp2005_022_en.pdf.
322 See European Parliament Resolution on The Legal Professions and the General
Interest in the Functioning of Legal Systems, P6_TA(2006)0108, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-0108&
language=EN (the Resolution included twenty paragraphs in addition to the "whereas"
paragraphs and the paragraphs that cited, inter alia, both of the Commission's Reports, the
UN's Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, the Council of Europe's Recommendation on
free exercise of the role of the lawyers, the Commission's 2001 and 2003 resolutions, and
many of the EU directives applicable to lawyers).
323 See, e.g., CCBE INFO No. 15, supra note 290 ("The European Parliament has been
following very closely the activities of DG Competition concerning the liberal professions
over the past months. Further to an initiative of the Legal Affairs Committee, the European
Parliament adopted on 23 March 2006 a resolution in support of the legal professions.").
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public interest;
* noted the high qualifications required for access to the legal
professions, the need to protect those qualifications that
characterize the legal professions, in the interests of European
citizens, and the need to establish a specific relationship based
on trust between members of the legal professions and their
clients;
* asserted that fee scales and compulsory tariffs did not violate
the competition provisions in the Treaty provided that their
adoption was justified by the pursuit of a legitimate public
interest and that Member States actively supervise the decision
making; provided their adoption; and
* called on the Commission to consider carefully the principles
and concerns expressed in the resolution when analyzing the
rules governing the exercise of the legal professions in the
Member States.324
Although the CCBE and others may have been relieved to see this
resolution, Parliament adopted another resolution six months later and the
tone of the October 2006 resolution was quite different than the March
2006 resolution.325 The Commission includes a link to this October 2006
resolution on its website,326 but does not include a link to the prior
resolutions.
Like the previous resolutions, the October 2006 resolution cited a
number of documents and included many "whereas" clauses. Instead of
citing documents that focused on the legal profession, however, it focused
on documents related to the Lisbon Strategy and the EU Initiative including
the IHS Study. Among other things, this later resolution calls on all those
involved in the reform process to engage in a constructive manner.327 This
resolution also expressed hostility towards mandatory and minimum fees,
328
324 Id. at 3-4.
325 European Parliament Resolution on Follow-Up to the Report on Competition in
Professional Services, P6 TA(2006)0418 (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://www.europarl.
curopa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-20060418+0+DOC+XML+
V0//EN&language=EN [hereinafter October 2006 Resolution].
326 See European Commission, DG Competition, supra note 131.
327 October 2006 Resolution, supra note 325, para. 4.
328 Id. para. 5, indicating that:
[T]he mandatory nature of fixed or minimum rates and the ban on negotiating fees
based on the result achieved might be detrimental to the quality of service to the
public and to competition; calls on the Member States to overcome these
constraints with measures which are less restrictive and more likely to comply with
the principles of non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality, by setting up
mechanisms to consult all the interested parties.
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32930
advertising restrictions, and MDP bans.33 °  It called upon the
Commission to ensure that treaty provisions on the protection of
competition and the internal market were properly observed in the liberal
profession sectors. 331 The October 2006 resolution expressed the view that
it was important to improve ethical standards and consumer protection in
the field of professional services and that the adoption of codes of conduct
by professional service providers should be drawn up with the involvement
of all relevant stakeholders.332 This resolution called on the Commission to
show the extent of new jobs and additional growth that can be expected
from a systematic pro-competitive reform of the sector.333 Finally, it urged
the Commission to examine more carefully the differences in the extent to
which the various professional categories in each Member State have
opened up the market and the expected impact of the full removal of
unnecessary obstacles to competition, including an assessment of the
expected impact on professional sectors that have limited resources or that
are restricted to certain regions.
334
As these examples show, the European Parliament has been a
relatively active stakeholder in the debate, but it has sent the Commission
329 Id. para. 9 (stating that it was "necessary, in order to strengthen small and medium-
sized enterprises and increase the capacity for innovation and competitiveness of
professional services, that restrictions on the scope for cooperation be eliminated and the
setting up of inter-professional service providers be facilitated.").
330 Id. para. 11 further indicating that:
[S]pecial regulations in the field of advertising can be largely dispensed with, that
the continuity of such regulations should be limited to duly justified exceptional
cases, and that the reduction of regulation should be aimed at enabling
professionals to inform users of the services they offer via advertising, providing
consumers with information on their professional qualifications and
specialisations, and on the nature and cost of the services offered.
331 Id. para. 6.
332 Id. para. 10.
333 October 2006 Resolution, supra note 325, para. 10.
334 Id. paras. 3-4. This Resolution also:
[A]cknowledge[d] the right to issue regulations based on traditional, geographic
and demographic specificities; emphasize[d] ... that rules should be chosen which
restrict competition as little as possible and that, within the existing system,
substantive reform processes must be pursued in order to help attain the Lisbon
targets; encouraged Member States constructively to examine the practical
experience of other Member States in the process of reforming professional
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and the legal profession mixed signals about its views on the EU Initiative.
B. Other Commentators
In addition to the papers and analyses presented at the EU Presidential
Conferences, 335 the studies by national competition authorities,336 and the
resolutions of the European Parliament, several other sources have
monitored and commented on the IHS Study and the Commission's work
regarding professional services. These include the papers presented at the
European University Institute's 2004 annual competition conference,
337
which was devoted to the topic of "The Relationship between Competition
Law and the (Liberal) Professions." The papers from the conference were
posted on the Conference webpage and later published.338
While a number of commentators have supported the IHS Study and
the Commission's analysis, especially those who were consulted by the
national competition authorities or who have spoken at the Presidential
conferences, several commentators have criticized-in whole or in part-
the IHS Study and the Commission's work. For example, after noting the
Commission's request that professional services' regulation be reviewed,
academic economists Roger Van den Bergh and Yves Montangie accepted
that invitation and examined the Latin notary market. 339 They concluded
335 See supra notes 188, 303, and 305.
336 See supra notes 291-301.
337 EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW 2004: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW
AND (LIBERAL) PROFESSIONS (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu, eds., Hart
Publishing 2006).
338 Id. The original conference papers are available at European University Institute,
Ninth EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research
/Competition/2004(papers).shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
339 See, e.g., Roger Van den Bergh & Yves Montangie, Competition in Professional
Services Markets: Are Latin Notaries Different?, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 189 (2006);
Roger Van den Bergh & Yves Montangie, Theory and Evidence on the Regulation of the
Latin Notary Profession: A Law and Economics Approach, ECRi-report 0604 (June 2006), at
15, available at http://media.ecri.nl/publications/theory-and-evidence-regulation-latin-
notary-profes.pdf [hereinafter Van den Bergh & Montangie Notary Profession]. Professors
Van den Bergh and Montangie are affiliated with the Erasmus Competition and Regulation
institute (ECRi) at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Id. at 1. In their report,
they state that they:
[Alpplaud any scientific discussion on the benefits and disadvantages of
professional regulation. In our view, only thorough scientific research based on
sound theory and supported by empirical evidence can be a solid basis for any
policy change in this regard. Therefore, the Commission's initiative is most
welcome as it may urge both the community of professionals and scientists to shed
light on some issues of regulation that have not been (thoroughly) researched so
far.
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that the Commission had relied "too heavily on the results of the IHS Study
and other limited empirical evidence that suggests that regulation mainly
has negative effects." 340 Citing several of the studies discussed in greater
detail below, they concluded that in light of the criticisms of the IHS Study,
that study "should not form the basis for specific policy conclusions. 341
After setting forth the theoretical economic arguments that could be offered
in support of, and in opposition to, several common types of regulation,
they pointed out that none of the arguments have been unequivocally
confirmed by empirical evidence.342 They concluded that in the absence of
data, the Commission's broad-brush approach was inappropriate, stating:
This report does not contain a plea in favour or against specific
forms of regulation of any profession. But in our view, it does show
that there are no miracle formulas to decide if and to what extent
regulation of a certain profession is necessary of justified. Such
decisions can only be made on a case-by-case basis. We believe that
this report shows that policy decisions regarding the regulation of
professions should not focus on the limited amount of existing
evidence but should be based on careful, well balanced and thorough
theoretical and empirical analysis for each type of regulation and for
each profession.
34
They proceeded to outline the type of research that would be helpful with
respect to notaries and indicated that in the absence of that research, it
would be premature to alter certain restrictions. 34
Several commentators have addressed the legal profession specifically.
For example, shortly after the IHS Study was issued, the CCBE
Id. at 15.
340 Van den Bergh & Montangie Notary Profession, supra note 339, at 76.
341 Id. at 77.
342 Id. at 76
143 Id. at 80.
344 Id. For example, their Report stated:
In sum, empirical research could show that from a cost-benefit perspective,
mandatory intervention by a Latin notary is superior to a registration system
entrusted to civil servants. This could support the conclusion that the organisation
of the Latin notary profession decreases transaction costs and ensures the provision
of public goods without causing disproportionate restrictions of competition.
Consequently, reserved tasks of notaries could be qualified as restrictions of
competition that do not go further than necessary to guarantee the provision of
public goods by increasing legal certainty. Again, as long as reliable empirical
work is lacking, any policy conclusion on the desirability of reserved tasks in the
field of conveyancing is premature.
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commissioned a study from RBB Economics. 345 RBB Economics prepared
a twenty-one page report that was highly critical of the IHS Study with
respect to both its methodology and its conclusions, finding that the "study
has major weaknesses, which make it inappropriate as a foundation for
policy measures. 34 6  RBB Economics elaborated upon its conclusion as
follows:
First, the [IHS] paper lacks any real theoretical framework-it is not
clear at the outset what relationships the authors expect to find, and
how to interpret any relationships they do find. The theoretical
discussion is also biased in that it presupposes that there will always
be too much regulation-the question of why there might be too
little regulation is not addressed. Secondly, the analysis which has
been carried out has major methodological flaws. In particular, by
using only simple correlation techniques, and separately examining a
number of related variables, the authors are highly likely to have
produced "spurious" correlations. Both the significance and the sign
of the correlations are likely to be misleading. Thirdly, the report
presents only a selection of the results, leaving it open to the
accusation of "publication bias". The results presented tend to
support the "contra-regulation" theories although the evidence that is
presented seems weak.
Furthermore, given the objective nature of the index, the results
should have been more thoroughly tested for their sensitivity to the
assumptions embodied in the index. Finally, the interpretation the
authors put on the results is highly questionable, and is particularly
ambiguous given the lack of any clear theoretical framework. With
no data on quality, the result that higher fees are associated with
more regulation could be equally supportive of both pro- and contra-
regulation theories. Moreover, the interpretation of "volume" per
employee as productivity is highly questionable. Indeed, in the
absence of any correlation analysis on the volume of output per
professional, the relationship could be interpreted as implying lower
fees where there is higher regulation. Finally, given the lack of
causality in the report, it is not possible to make any policy
recommendations on the basis of the results.
347
Professor Martin Henssler and Dr. Matthias Kilian prepared a second
paper that challenged aspects of the IHS Study from the perspective of the
345 RBB ECONOMICS, supra note 168. See RBB Economics, About RBB Economics,
Experience, http://www.rbbecon.com/about/experience.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
346 Id. at 20.
341 Id. See also supra note 168 (summarizing the critiques of the IHS Study found in
OECD Legal Professions, supra note 7).
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legal profession.34 8 Their report, which was commissioned by the German
Hans-Soldan Institute, challenged both the methodology and the
conclusions in the IHS Study. They found that the data was:
[P]artly obsolete or it is interpreted wrongly because of a lack of
detailed knowledge of the market situation. There is no way of
assessing, however, if and in how far the Case Study data and the
evaluations have influenced the benchmarking and the establishment
of the index at all, since the Study does not reveal the respective
bases that were used.349
Henssler and Kilian provided several examples to support their point
that the IHS Study was flawed. For example, they argued that it was more
appropriate to view per capita profits, rather than per capita turnover as the
measure of economic productivity. They also noted that the IHS Study
improperly identified the objectives of regulation since it ignored the
interests of the public. Additionally, they criticized the IHS Study for its
lack of comparative data on important variables, and they criticized IHS for
failing to supply data to support its assumption that there has not been
market failure in markets with a low degree of regulation. The Henssler-
Kilian report was particularly critical of the IHS's failure to add Finland as
one of its case studies in light of the IHS Study's conclusion that the
Finnish legal services market was an ideal market. 350 The Henssler-Kilian
report also criticized the information sources that formed the basis of the
IHS Study, noting that not all of the professional organizations returned the
questionnaires, that such questionnaires were only partly useful, and that it
is "generally necessary to substantiate the results through independent
interpretation of primary and secondary sources. ' ' 35 1 With respect to such
secondary sources, Henssler-Kilian indicated that there were a large number
of reference works that had not been evaluated, including comprehensive
studies of the legal profession in Sweden, Finland, Norway, France,
England and Wales, Ireland, Spain, and Denmark, along with subject-
specific studies; Henssler and Kilian found that the secondary sources
selected were "chosen for incomprehensible reasons."
352
In addition to these general critiques regarding methodology, Henssler
and Kilian challenged the accuracy and context of some of the data
contained in the German legal services case study in the IHS Study. For
348 See, e.g., HENSSLER & KILIAN, supra note 168.
341 Id. at 11.
350 Id. at 3. In addition to the criticism regarding the lack of analysis for Finland,
Henssler and Kilian criticized the four countries selected for the legal profession case
studies.
"' Id. at 9.
352 Id.
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example, they pointed out that the "per capita turnover" rate for Germany
was calculated without taking into account the relatively high number of in-
house lawyers in Germany, which made the data misleading.353 They also
noted that the calculations for Germany were misleading because a number
of lawyers retain their admission status in the interest of the profession's
pension scheme, but without significant income.354 Further, they criticized
the "staleness" of some of the data, noting that more than 70% of law
students become lawyers, not the 45% figure used in the IHS Study as an
indicator to show market access barriers for lawyers.355 They asserted that
the report inaccurately summarized the main tasks of German lawyers.356
In addition, they criticized the IHS Study for failing to point out that one
reason why German lawyers adhere to the fee scale is because of the market
power of the insurance companies offering legal expense insurance.
357
They also noted that the German system of "Selbstverwaltung" (self-
administration) through "Kammern" (bars), which is instituted by public
law, is fundamentally different from the meaning of the English term "self-
regulation" as used in the IHS Study.
358
The Henssler-Kilian report also challenged the validity of the IHS data
and IHS's interpretation of that data regarding market entry regulations. As
one example, they pointed out that the IHS Study indicated that Germany
had a high level of regulation on this issue and Finland had a score of zero,
meaning no regulatory barriers. But they noted that if one assumes that
legal training is fundamental and indispensable for legal professionals, then
Germany should score better than Finland because in the past, Germany has
made legal education and qualification spots available to 100% of those
who were interested and who were in possession of the certificate proving
they had satisfied the requirements for entrance to the university, whereas
Finland gave only 11.2% this opportunity. 359  They also noted that
Germany was rated as having a high level of regulation because of its
system of two exams and a practical training period. They pointed out that
the IHS Study did not account for the fact that in Germany, graduates were
guaranteed the necessary practical training, whereas in other countries this
was not true. 360  They also challenged the 70% weight assigned to the
311 Id. at 10.
354 HENSSLER & KILIAN, supra note 168, at 10.
315 Id. at 11.
356 Id. at 12. They argued that the IHS Study omitted the case-law on reserved tasks and
improperly relied upon the German Code of Conduct.
357 Id. at 12.
358 Id. at 13.
151 Id. at 17.
360 HENSSLER & KILIAN, supra note 168, at 17, noting that:
In other legal systems, University graduates have to fight for a limited number of
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"duration of education" factor, noting that in Spain, the short education time
had proved to have anti-competitive effects. 
361
The Henssler-Kilian report criticized the IHS Study's analysis of fees
because it did not look at the effects of the regulation on the market price of
legal services. Hennsler and Kilian argued that the underlying assumption
of the study seemed to be that the regulation of fees existed in order to serve
the profession's interest in a decent wage.362 They criticized the IHS Study
for not considering the effect of a fee scale on cross-subsidization, in which
the fees in high value cases subsidize the fees in low-value cases, providing
greater access to justice.363 They also criticized the IHS Study for failing to
raise or address the issue of the value of fixed fees in ensuring a market for
consumer-friendly legal expense insurance. 364  They pointed out that
Germany had the highest density of legal expense insurance in Europe, with
44% of the population carrying such insurance. 365 As a result, Germany
was able to maintain a less elaborate legal aid system than was present in
some of the deregulated countries, which meant a lower burden for German
taxpayers. 366 They also explained why-in the deregulated legal markets
cited favorably in the IHS Study-the climate for legal expense insurance
training contracts without the guarantee of ever obtaining one (England and
Wales), are themselves directly responsible for finding a 'stagiaire' position-an
endeavour with an uncertain outcome (Netherlands), or they are forced to pass a
highly competitive selection procedure for a law academy (France). In Germany,
by contrast, every young lawyer who succeeds University education has a
guaranteed training position. 97.12% ofjurists pass the ensuing final examination
which gives access to the legal services market without any additional professional
preconditions....
361 Id. at 17:
Nor is the criterion 'duration of education', ERED1/2, with a weighting of 70%,
very helpful. The conditions in Spain, in particular, which is the only European
country where a one-step (University) education is sufficient for access to the legal
profession, demonstrate that a starting position which prima facie appears to be
rather conducive to competition, has in fact the opposite effect: A much deplored
Spanish grievance is, for example, the fact that-due to the lack of a structured
qualification system-Spanish University graduates are forced to work in law
firms for no or very little money in order to get practical training. Only this
practical training will enable them to act on the market with any prospects of
success.




366 HENSSLER & KILIAN, supra note 168, at 20.
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was poor.367 Finally, they argued that the IHS Study had not clearly
indicated the degree to which Germany's fee system is optional.368
Henssler and Kilian concluded their report by noting that in light of its
methodology deficits, fragmentary evaluation of sources, the failure to take
into account the effects of certain regulations at a national level, and the
often unconvincing interpretation of the information obtained, as the effects
of certain regulations:
[T]he Study cannot be used as a basis for further legislation.
Massive intervention in the administration of justice of the individual
Member States cannot be based on a Study which admittedly had to
work on an unsatisfactory empirical foundation and numerous
unverifiable hypotheses. Even more importantly, a purely economic
evaluation, as chosen by the Study, has to be complemented by an
appreciation of the objectives pursued by professional rules and
regulations. Insofar as provisions aim at enhancing access to justice,
strengthening consumer rights and guaranteeing high-quality
lawyers' services, these important concerns in the public interest
cannot be sacrificed for deregulation which would then become
deregulation merely for its own sake.36q
Copenhagen Economics prepared a third study that examined the issue
of competition in the legal profession. Although this report does not
directly critique either the Commission reports or the IHS Study, it is
interesting because of the difference in approach. Copenhagen Economics
is an international consulting company that provides private and public
decision makers with economic analyses; it previously had been retained by
the Commission to prepare a report about the economic effects of the
Commission's proposed Internal Market Services Directive. 
370
In 2006, Copenhagen Economics produced for the Danish Bar and
Law Society a report that focused on the economic effects of legal services
regulation. 371 This report, which was seventy-two pages long, addressed
many of the same points covered in the IHS Study and used some of the
367 Id. at 20-21.
368 id.
369 Id. at 22.
370 COPENHAGEN ECON., ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE BARRIERS TO THE INTERNAL
MARKET FOR SERVICES: FINAL REPORT (Jan. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu
/intemalmarket/services/docs/services-dir/studies/2005-01-cph-study-en.pdf. This Report
found that the proposed directive would "yield significant economic gains to all Member
States. European consumers, businesses and governments will benefit from enhanced
productivity, higher employment, increased wages and lower prices." Id. at 7.
371 COPENHAGEN ECON., THE LEGAL PROFESSION: COMPETITION AND LIBERALISATION
(Jan. 2006), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument
/Thejlegal-profession 1_ 1195120689.pdf [hereinafter COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS].
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IHS data.37 2 Like the IHS Study, this report included technical antitrust and
economic information that was not easily accessible to the non-expert.373
However, it also included much information that was not technical or
inaccessible.
The Copenhagen Economics report began by outlining the arguments
generally offered in support of regulation (market failure either because of
asymmetric information or externalities) and in favor of liberalization
(regulation can result in weaker competition and higher prices).374 It then
analyzed the market for legal services in Denmark and the existing
regulations and quasi regulations.37 5  In essence, the Copenhagen
Economics report adopted a cost-benefit approach, in which it
recommended that regulations with high costs and low benefits be removed,
regulations with low costs and high benefits be retained and the other
regulations be considered and possibly modified.3 76
After reviewing Denmark's existing lawyer regulations (and quasi
regulations, such as the Code of Conduct), Copenhagen Economics offered
the following conclusions and evaluations:
Firstly, "the law on legal services, and debt collection and detective
undertakings" should be abolished. "The law on legal services, and
debt collection and detective undertakings" prevents anybody-apart
from lawyers-from marketing legal services and thus create entry
barriers for other advisers. However, we argue that it will be
necessary to give consumers a possibility for complaining, e.g. to the
Consumer Ombudsman, to ensure the quality of the legal services
from advisers who are not lawyers.
Secondly, education requirements, lawyers' monopoly of
representing a client in a court of law, and ownership requirements
should be modified. The education requirements create a bottleneck
for entry to the legal profession, and a modification of the
requirements would probably mean more lawyers and more
competition.
Modification of lawyers' monopoly of representing a client in a
372 See, e.g., id. at 38.
373 See, e.g., id. at 28 (For example, Box 2.3 is the Herfindahl-Hischman Index which
shows the degree of concentration in a business area).
314 Id. at 8-10.
371 Id. at 11-37.
376 Id. See also Dr. Henrik Ballebye Olesen, Senior Economist, Copenhagen Economics,
The Legal Profession-Competition and Liberalisation, at the Economic Case for
Professional Services Reform (Brussels, Dec. 13, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professionalservices/conferences/20061230/0
1_henrik.ballebyeolesen.pdf (powerpoint presentation at the Finnish Conference, which is
cited supra note 305).
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court of law will probably create more competition in the less
complicated legal cases. Furthermore, the number of legal cases will
probably increase if other advisers with lower prices can represent
clients in court. However, the effects on competition are modest
because a modification of the monopoly only affects a minor part of
the market. It will be important to tailor the modifications so they do
not result in major decreases in quality.
We conclude that there will not be significant gains by modifying the
ownership requirements because it is unlikely that other owners can
own and operate the law firms more efficiently than lawyers.
However, modifications can be implemented if these do not
jeopardize the independence of the lawyers and do not undermine
lawyers' client confidentiality obligation. In turn we conclude that
the following elements of present regulation in all significance
should be kept. A modification or removal of this part of the
regulation will in all likelihood not be beneficial for the society.
The rules for code of conduct (ethical rules for lawyers) should be
preserved. The legal profession should continue to regulate the code
of conduct because this ensures the lawyer's independence from the
state and because lawyers themselves are best qualified to assess the
quality of legal services. There are no signs that the rules for code of
conduct are abused to restrict competition.
The mandatory membership of the Danish Bar and Law Society
should be kept because it is a condition for the current regulation of
lawyers' conduct and because the membership does not introduce
any significant competition limitations.
377
Copenhagen Economics provided principles that could be extended
beyond the Danish legal market. It concluded that liberalization is most
likely to be beneficial if the profession is heavily regulated, if competition
is weak, and if consumers respond to price competition.37 s On the other
hand, it noted that liberalization had the potential to damage consumers and
society. The Copenhagen Economics report observed that it was already
difficult for the clients to assess the quality of their legal services. 379 The
report concluded that if liberalization reduced the requirements for legal
advisers, it could affect the quality of legal services. It noted that this
problem might be more acute for private clients and small enterprises
171 COPENHAGEN EcONOMICS, supra note 371, at 5 (emphasis in original).
... Id. at 4.
379 Id. In applying these principles, it concluded that the Danish legal profession was not
heavily regulated, and that there was no indication of weak competition in the legal
profession in Denmark because Danish lawyers compete against other types of advisers and
foreign lawyers and that consumers were more concerned with quality than with price. Id.
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because large business clients had better opportunities for assessing the
quality of the lawyer's work.380 This section of the report also noted that
liberalization could have "damaging consequences if it decreases the
independence of the lawyers or the quality of their court work. The
citizen's access to independent lawyers is a prerequisite for ensuring access
to justice and the lawyers' work in court contributes to define 'case law' to
the benefit of the whole society. '381 Its final conclusion was that "there
probably are gains to be made by liberalising the legal profession in a way
which does not lead to damaging consequences that could risk being greater
than the potential gains."
' 382
In my view, the Copenhagen Economics report did a better job than
the IHS Study in considering the specific context of the particular legal
market in question and the specific justifications offered in support of
various regulations and in evaluating both the cost and benefit of such
regulations. This article cannot provide a comprehensive summary of this
report, but it is worth consulting because of its deliberate and well-balanced
approach. While one may disagree with some of the conclusions, the
Copenhagen Economics report is framed in terms that allow a principled
debate about the important policy issues at stake.
C. The CCBE
The CCBE is another important stakeholder in the debate about the
legal services. The CCBE is the officially recognized representative
organization for the legal profession in the European Union, representing
over 700,000 lawyers.. Its members are nominated by regulatory bodies
of the Bar and Law Societies in the EU Member States and from
Switzerland and the three member countries of the European Economic
Area; it also has representatives from several Observer States.384
The CCBE has a Competition Committee that monitors the activities
of the Commission and the Member States. 385 It reports regularly on the
legal profession-related competition developments throughout the European




383 CCBE, Introduction, http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=2&L=0 (last visited Oct. 31,
2008).
384 Id.
311 See CCBE, CCBE Committees and Working Groups, Committee: Competition:
Members, http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=94&idcomite=4&L=0 (last visited Oct. 31,
2008).
386 See, e.g., Poland, supra note 292; National Developments, 17 CCBE, supra note 289;
CCBE Info No. 15, supra note 290. The CCBE Info documents are available at CCBE,
Newsletter: CCBE-Info, http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=27&L=0 (last visited Oct. 31,
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reported in this article.387 Moreover, the CCBE appears to have actively
lobbied the European Parliament with respect to some of the resolutions
described earlier.
388
The CCBE has remained steadfastly opposed to much of the EU
Initiative, even though its methods of presenting its objections have varied
over time. It has prepared eight different documents that are relevant to the
EU Initiative, five of which have gone directly to the Commission and three
of which are available for consultation by its Member Bars. 389 The CCBE's
first intervention in the EU Initiative was the response it filed to the
Commission's questionnaire. 390 This was a seventeen page document that
responded to the Commission's original Invitation to Comment. This
response cited the Wouters case extensively to explain the provisions in the
CCBE Code of Conduct; it also challenged the methodology used in the
IHS Study.3 91
Several months later, in September 2003, the CCBE sent the
Commission the RBB Economics study discussed earlier in this article. 392
Unlike the CCBE's first submission, this submission provided technical,
economic critiques of the IHS Study.393
The CCBE's third submission challenged portions of the legal analysis
contained in the Commission's February 2004 Report.394  Among other
2008).
387 CCBE Representatives spoke at the October 2003 Commission conference and the
2006 Finnish Presidency Conference. See Helge Jakob Kolrud, Council of the Bars and Law
Societies of Europe, Professional Rules and Business Development, Conference on the
Regulation of Professional Services (Brussels, Oct. 28, 2003) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professional-services/conferences/20031028/h
elge_.jakob kolrud.pdf; Giuseppe Scassellati-Sforzolini, Chair of the CCBE Competition
Committee, The Economic Case for Professional Services Reform (Brussels, Dec. 13, 2006),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professional-services/conferences
/20061230/02_scassellatsforzolini.pdf. See supra notes 188 and 305 (citing the 2003 and
2006 Conferences). The CCBE did not participate in the May 2005 European Competition
Day or the November 2005 UK Presidency Conference. See supra note 303.
388 See supra notes 313-334.
389 All of these documents are available on the webpage of the CCBE Competition
Committee, supra note 385.
390 See CCBE Response to the European Commission Competition Questionnaire on
Regulation in Liberal Professions and its Effects (May 28, 2003), http://www.ccbe.eu
/fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/ccbe-response_28050311183706306.pdf (last visited
Oct. 31, 2008); supra notes 120-130 for information about this questionnaire.
391 Id.
392 RBB ECONOMICS, supra note 168.
393 See, e.g., id. at 7 (citing the missing volume variable, critiques the use of GAP
adjustment, cites spurious correlation and critiques the pooling of variables).
394 CCBE, Comments on the Commission's Legal Analysis in its Report on Competition
in Professional Services, (June 30, 2004), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/
userupload/NTCdocument/competition legal-crl-l 183705984.pdf [hereinafter CCBE Legal
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things, it criticized the Commission for failing to address EC Treaty Article
86(2), asserted that the Commission had misapplied the Wouters and
Arduino cases, and questioned whether current law provided a
proportionality test.
395
The CCBE's fourth submission was issued in response to the
Commission's September 2005 Follow-Up Report.396 This document was
the shortest of the CCBE's responses, but one of the most focused and
pointed. After noting that the profession was open to reforms, it noted that
reforms should be subject to the protection of lawyers' core values and the
necessities of the judicial system.397 It cited the Commission's own
observation that reforms were best carried out at a national level.39 8 It
argued that the scope of the Commission's exercise aimed to reshape the
regulatory framework in Member States went beyond the application of EC
and national competition rules. 399  The CCBE further argued that the
principle of "less regulation is better regulation," without any understanding
of how the specific market actually operated, was not required by the EC
Treaty or appropriate. 400  The CCBE also critiqued the Commission for
failing to respond to the errors in the IHS Study and initial report.40 ' In this
document, the CCBE also criticized the Commission's Follow-Up Report
for failing to provide a traditional competition law analysis, for failing to
address Article 86(6), and for drawing a distinction between categories of
users. 402 On this latter point, the CCBE noted that the goal of regulation
was not simply to protect the consumer, who might be sophisticated, but
also to protect the public interest, such as the shareholders of Enron and
Worldcom. 40 3 The CCBE argued that it was not appropriate to draw a
distinction based on the size (and presumed sophistication) of the client.40 4
It also noted that there had been other economic studies that had concluded
that "further deregulation may not in all respects have economic advantages




396 CCBE, CCBE Comments on Commission Progress Report on Competition in
Professional Services (Nov. 19, 2005), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin
/userupload/NTCdocument/CCBEjresponsefollowl_1182254403.pdf [hereinafter CCBE
Comments on Progress Report].
317 Id. at 2.
398 Id.
391 Id. at 3.
400 id.
401 Id. at 4.
402 CCBE Comments on Progress Report, supra note 396, at 5-6.
403 Id. at 5.
404 Id.
405 Id. at 6.
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The CCBE's most recent and final submission to the Commission was
its March 2006 Economic Submission.40 6 This eleven page paper relied on
the Copenhagen Economics analysis and attempted to address the
Commission on more of the Commission's own terms.40 7
In addition to these submissions which went to the Commission, the
CCBE prepared three position papers that could be cited by its Member• " 408
Bars with respect to the national competition developments. These June
2005 position papers were not country or reform proposal specific, but
instead addressed issues that have been raised in many of the competition
inquiries. One noteworthy point about these CCBE position papers is the
topics that are, and are not, addressed in these position papers. These
position papers address the topics of non-lawyer owned firms, 40 9 multi-
disciplinary partnerships, 410 and the regulatory and representative functions
of bars.411  The CCBE has not issued any position papers on the topic of
lawyers' fees and fee schedules nor has it issued any papers regarding
lawyer advertising, reserved tasks, or qualification issues.4 2 The CCBE
position papers rely most heavily on the ECJ's Wouters case, rather than
Arduino,413 and are similar to the 2004 position paper the CCBE prepared
in response to the Clementi Final Report.414
406 CCBE, Economic Submission to Commission Progress Report on Competition in
Professional Services, (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user
upload/NTCdocument/ccbeeconomicsubmis1_1182239202.pdf [hereinafter CCBE
Economic Submission].
407 Id. See also Goldsmith, supra note 298.
408 See, CCBE, CCBE Position on Non-Lawyer Owned Firms, (June 2005), available at
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument/ccbe position on-nonl-l 182254
612.pdf [hereinafter CCBE Position Paper 1]; CCBE, CCBE Position on Multi-Disciplinary
Partnerships (MDPs), (June 2005), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin
/userupload/NTCdocument/ccbe-position-on-mdpl_1182254536.pdf [hereinafter CCBE
Position Paper 2]; CCBE, CCBE Position on Regulatory and Representative Functions of
Bars, (June 2005), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user-upload/NTCdocument
/ccbe-position.onjreg 1_ 182254709.pdf [hereinafter CCBE Position Paper 3].
409 CCBE Position Paper 1, supra note 408.
410 CCBE Position Paper 2, supra note 408.
411 CCBE Position Paper 3, supra note 408.
412 See CCBE Position Paper 1, supra note 408; CCBE Position Paper 2, supra note
408; CCBE Position Paper 3, supra note 408.
413 See CCBE Position Paper 1, supra note 408; CCBE Position Paper 2, supra note
408; CCBE Position Paper 3, supra note 408. The CCBE cites Wouters much more than it
cites Arduino, which was decided the same day as Wouters. In my view, the CCBE could be
more nuanced in its discussion of what Wouters and Arduino require in order to satisfy the
competition rules, but that is the topic for another article. See also CCBE, ANALYSIS OF THE
NOVA I JUDGEMENT AND GUIDANCE To BARS ON PROFESSIONAL RULES FOLLOWING THE
NOVA I DECISION, (May 2002), available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin
/userupload/NTCdocument/analysisguidanceenlI 1183706551.pdf.
414 CCBE, CCBE Response to the Clementi Consultation Document (June 4, 2004),
available at http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/userupload/NTCdocument/ccbe response_
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As this brief survey shows, the CCBE's critiques of the EU Initiative
have been multi-faceted but a number of themes are present through these
documents. The CCBE has steadfastly critiqued the Commission's
methodology for data collection and presentation.4' Second, the CCBE has
argued that the Commission has ignored or downplayed the non-economic
factors involved in lawyer regulation.416 The CCBE has argued that it was
important to "carefully evaluate any impact of (de-)regulation on both the
client-lawyer relationship and on society" and that it is important to strike
the right balance between economic and non-economic factors.4 17 Third,
the CCBE has challenged some of the economic conclusions contained in
the IHS Study regarding the legal profession. For example, IHS concluded
that there was a relatively low level of competition in legal services in a
number of countries, but the CCBE has cited the Copenhagen Economics
report in support of its conclusion that the legal services market in the
European Union is highly competitive.41 8 The CCBE also challenged other
aspects of the Commission's economic analysis. For example, the CCBE
cited as an example Copenhagen Economics' report on the Danish legal
market, which had concluded that the lack of price competition was due to
demand side dynamics (clients are more interested in quality than price)
rather than supply side dynamics (since Danish lawyers must compete with
other kinds of advisers and foreign lawyers for a large part of the
market).419
A related fourth argument that the CCBE has made is that "an
unregulated market for professional services may not produce efficient
outcomes. The CCBE has cited "a vast economic literature" and has
referred to the Copenhagen Economics conclusion that "there is a need for
some degree of regulation of the legal profession because a totally free
market will lead to serious market failures. 42' In support of its argument
that an unregulated market may not produce efficient outcomes, the CCBE
cited the asymmetric information between lawyers and clients and the fact
that there are externalities and that legal services may have an impact on
clemenl 1183706107.pdf. See supra note 37 for more information on the Clementi Report.
415 See CCBE Comments on Progress Report, supra note 396, at 3; see also CCBE Legal
Analysis, supra note 394, at 2.
416 See, e.g., CCBE Economic Submission, supra note 406, at 4.
417 Id.
418 Id. at 4 (noting that there are over 700,000 lawyers competing in large and small units,
that the number of lawyers is continuously growing, and that the European Union's lawyers
directives provided a "model" of a liberalized market for professional services in the
European Union).
419 Id. at 4.
420 Id. at 3.
421 Id.
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third parties.42 2
Finally, the CCBE has argued that the Commission's reports are
flawed because of the Commission's focus on client sophistication as the
benchmark for evaluating regulation. The CCBE asserted that the purpose
of regulation is much broader and cited in support the European Parliament
resolution on legal professions which had "reminded" the Commission "that
the aims of the rules governing legal services are the protection of the
general public, the guaranteeing of the right of defence and access to
justice, and security in the application of the law., 423 The CCBE also cited
"the recent financial scandals which shook the business world-Enron,
Worldcom, Parmalat" arguing that:
[T]he users of those professional services were very sophisticated
repeat purchasers of these services, but the victims of the crimes
committed were ordinary people, such as shareholders, employees,
and pensioners, often numbered in thousands. These victims
frequently suffered devastating financial losses. The lawyers in
important commercial cases are not regulated just so as to protect the
sophisticated business executives who use them (although they will
also need protection), but in the public interest, which will include
people who may have a direct or indirect stake in the outcome of the
transaction, even though they are not the actual clients. The CCBE
is concerned that the Commission's current approach does not reflect
this public interest. 424
In addition to these general points, the CCBE has provided its views
on each of the five issues addressed by the Commission. For example, on
the issue of education and qualification requirements, the CCBE concluded
that one should be very careful when discussing education and qualification
as a barrier to entry to the profession because any changes to educational
requirements could have detrimental consequences for the client.425
According to the CCBE, the Commission concluded that stricter
educational requirements resulted in fewer lawyers and less competition in
the legal services market.426 The CCBE characterized this argument as
"simplistic" and noted that the crucial point of education requirements is to
ensure that clients receive a high-quality service.427 The CCBE also
challenged the underlying assumption of the Commission's argument. 428 It
422 CCBE Economic Submission, supra note 406, at 3.
423 Id. at 10.
424 Id. at 9-10.
425 Id. at 4.
426 Id.
427 Id.
428 See, e.g., CCBE, Economic Submission, supra note 406, at 4.
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noted that if there is less education needed to become a lawyer, there would
be a larger number of lawyers, which means more competition, but warned
that such a general conclusion should be reached only after defining the
relevant market and conducting appropriate research about that market.4 29
The CCBE cited Copenhagen Economics' conclusion that the competitive
effects of modifying educational requirements would be relatively modest
in Denmark, causing only a modest rise in the number of lawyers.
430
On the issue of lawyers' "reserved tasks" and whether lawyers should
have the exclusive right to represent clients in court, the CCBE argued that
it was important to look at the purpose behind such reserved rights and
articulated the following:
Lawyers who are qualified to appear in court serve the interest of the
administration of justice best. They are qualified to deal efficiently
with the rules of procedure and representation, which are designed to
ensure a smooth functioning of the legal system. This will be of
benefit to consumers who are ensured qualified advice on a market
where the consumer finds it difficult to assess whether advice is good
(asymmetric information), and indeed to society as a whole if cases
are brought more efficiently and with a sound outcome.
43 1
The CCBE cited Copenhagen Economics' conclusion that in Denmark,
abolishing the court monopoly would have only a limited impact on
competition, but could induce economic losses by increasing the courts'
costs.432 The CCBE also cited the Henssler-Kilian report, which had
criticized the IHS Study for its failure to analyze the deregulated Finnish
market and whether it operated as a predictor for the absence of market
failure; it then noted that that Finland was considering changing its
legislation to exclusive rights for lawyers in courts.433 Finally, the CCBE
noted competition among lawyers in litigation and the absence of signs of
market failure.434
The CCBE has also addressed non-lawyer ownership of firms (whether
publicly traded or privately held) and has expressed the view that non-
lawyer ownership of firms presents the potential for conflicts between the
lawyer and non-lawyer owners.435  It has also cited Copenhagen
Economics' conclusion that "investor ownership will not likely entail





434 CCBE Economic Submission, supra note 406, at 5.
431 Id. at 6. The CCBE referred to its position paper and cited a number of examples of
such conflicts.
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significant efficiency gains for the law firms. This is because law firms are
not heavily capital dependent and because the general advantages of
investor owned companies are not fully applicable to the legal law firms...
[and would] probably entail motivation and control problems. 436 It also
pointed to Copenhagen Economics' conclusion that while outside
ownership of a law firm, such as by a bank, would provide advantages to a
consumer because it would be easier to find a lawyer, it could result in
certain disadvantages, including compromises to the quality of the advice if
the lawyer is not independent and possible increased prices.
437
The CCBE has also addressed the topic of self-regulation. It has
observed that no EU country has total and unrestricted self-regulation of the
legal profession, but a number of EU Member States have a significant
amount of self-regulation. The CCBE argued that self-regulation promotes
the collective independence of the members of the legal profession and
provides a structural defense for the independence of the individual
lawyer.438 The CCBE has also cited Copenhagen Economics' arguments in
favor of self-regulation. 439
With respect to the issue of mandatory bar membership, the CCBE has
stated that it "strongly believes that the abolition of mandatory bar
membership would have serious impacts not only on the structure of the
legal profession but on the entire administration of justice."' 4  It has cited
Copenhagen Economics' view that mandatory membership does not restrict
competition and that mandatory bar membership should be maintained.441
The rationale was that the conditions for becoming a lawyer are the same,
regardless of whether membership is mandatory. As such, the costs of the
436 Id. (citing Copenhagen Economics at 54).
437 Id. at 7.
438 id.
439 Id. The CCBE cited these arguments:
[L]awyers, given their special knowledge of the profession/business, are in the best
position to lay down the requirements for a lawyer's work. Lawyers will feel
greater responsibility for regulation if they are involved in the process of
regulation. It is also easier to change rules that are adopted via self-regulation than
modifying rules via legislation. The results of this are: lower administration costs
for professional associations/authorities, greater acceptance of the rules (since they
come from within the profession), better compliance and lower compliance costs
for the firms. Lawyers are also in the best position both to observe and evaluate
professional misconduct and assist the profession in sanctioning it. Lawyers will
have an interest in maintaining a good reputation of the profession, and therefore
will strive to ensure that lawyers live up to the requirements of the code of
conduct.
440 CCBE Economic Submission, supra note 406, at 7.
441 Id. (citing Copenhagen Economics at 62).
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membership are not significant barriers to entry, and there are societal
disadvantages to eliminating the mandatory membership.4 42
The CCBE has taken the position that "cross-disciplinary companies
that offer both legal services and other professional services" could cause
problems in maintaining the lawyers' client confidentiality obligations and
independence.44 3 The CCBE has cited Copenhagen Economics' conclusion
that currently there does not seem to be a great demand for
multidisciplinary advice and there are only a few law firms with co-
operation agreements with other non-legal advisers.444  It also notes that
concerns about conflicts of interest in the wake of the Enron and other
financial scandals appear to have caused a marked decline in the demand
for and supply of bundled services.445
The CCBE's position with respect to fees is more nuanced than its
position on some of the other issues the Commission has raised. As noted
earlier, the CCBE has not prepared a position paper on this issue. In its
Economic Submission, the CCBE stated: "The CCBE does not have a
position on the desirability of price regulation. However, it notes that the
Commission does not seem to have proven its point. 446 It pointed to the
weaknesses of the Commission's analysis on this point:
[N]either the Commission reports nor the IHS study on which they
were based contain any traditional competition law and economic
empirical analysis, but rather base their conclusion on the need for
complete price deregulation on the mere assumption that, since there
is no indication of market failures in those countr[ies] where pricing
is less regulated, if not regulated at all, price controls are not an
essential regulatory instrument for liberal professions.
In this regard, it may be noted that, where an economic empirical
analysis has been actually carried out, this has shown that, in some
countries, the abolishing of price regulation has resulted in higher
and less predictable litigation costs.
44 "
This section of the CCBE Submission cited the Henssler-Kilian study
in support of the point that regulated lawyers' fees are consumer-friendly
because "they allow the development of a functioning and effective
insurance market, where consumers can obtain insurance at a reasonable
442 Id. at 8.
443 Id. See also CCBE Position Paper 2, supra note 408.
4" CCBE Economic Submission, supra note 406, at 8 (citing Copenhagen Economics at
51).
44' Id. at 9.
446 Id.
44' Id. at 10.
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price against the risk of having to pay legal expenses." 4 8
The CCBE has also taken a nuanced view with respect to the
Commission's findings on advertising. The CCBE has noted that the data
about advertising restrictions may be misleading because there has been no
effort to "verify on a case by case basis whether in legal systems with a
fairly low regulation index regarding professional rules on advertising,
lawyers really have largely unrestricted advertising possibilities, or,
whether regulation is effected through unfair competition law or case
law., 4 49 It also asserted that the positive effects of completely unrestricted
liberalization would not be significant enough to justify the risk of
endangering the consumers of the professional services and the integrity of
the profession. 450  The CCBE also argued that a "careful analysis of
advertising regulations (where they exist) will show that those restrictions
that exist are targeted at protecting potential users who may be deceived
because of information asymmetries. '' 451 On the other hand, it did argue
that the goals of advertising restrictions include protecting the consumers
from misleading claims, preventing unfair competition between
practitioners, and preserving professional integrity and independence.452
In summary, although the CCBE has provided extensive comments on
the EU Initiative, it is not at all clear what impact, if any, these
interventions have had. Moreover, in my view, the CCBE has diluted the
impact of some of its most significant arguments by relying on other
arguments that will be dismissed as "protectionist." For example, I think it
is regrettable that the CCBE offers as an acceptable justification for
448 Id. See also How to Germany, Insurance: It's the Law, http://www.howto
germany.com/pages/insurance.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008):
Legal Insurance (Rechtschutzversicherung) covers any legal costs you encounter,
up to E150,000. And, if you want to countersue, it will pay as long as there is a
reasonable chance of winning. Legal insurance can be purchased for the entire
family, for the job (Arbeitsrechtschutz) and for traffic infractions
(Verkehrsrechtschutz). If you're renting your apartment or house, it's a good idea
to have Mietrechtschutz insurance, which can cost up to €60 per year.
See also Francis Regan, Whatever Happened to Legal Expense Insurance? Recent Successes
and Failures of Legal Insurance Schemes in Australia and Overseas 26 ALTERNATIVE L. J.
293 (2001) (finding that legal expense insurance has been a qualified success in ensuring
access to justice and that it has fared best in the societies with civil law traditions but that the
picture is more ambiguous in the common law societies); U.K. Ministry of Justice, The
Market for BTE Legal Insurance (July 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/market-bte-legal-expenses-insurance.pdf.
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advertising restrictions "preventing unfair competition between
practitioners" because this is the type of statement that likely will be viewed
as protecting lawyers' interests, rather than the interests of clients or the
public. In my view, the CCBE has raised some valid points and they
deserve to become part of the public policy debate about the proper scope
of lawyer regulation to a greater degree than they have to date. But if the
CCBE issues statements that can easily be dismissed or discounted, there is
an increased likelihood that the Commission and others will ignore valid
points made by the CCBE. Thus, stakeholders, regulators, and policy-
makers may find it useful to examine the CCBE responses to better learn
the most effective way to participate in the debate about appropriate lawyer
regulation.
V. U.S. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Although it would require a separate article to fully address the
implications of the EU Initiative on the United States, a few observations
are in order. The EU Initiative has contributed to profound changes in the
regulation of lawyers in the European Union. Could it lead to the same
result in the United States? Many U.S. lawyers may be tempted to say no.
They may think that the EU Initiative is irrelevant to the United States
because the United States already has liberal advertising and fee rules, as a
result of U.S. antitrust decisions, 53 or because we in the United States have
"been there, done that" with respect to the debate about alternative business
structures and multi-disciplinary practice rules,454 or because the U.S. legal
profession received a relatively favorable ranking in the OECD's 2003
index of regulatory indicators.45
I am much less sanguine, however. Because the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the U.S, Department of Justice (DOJ) actively
monitor some aspects of lawyer regulation, it is clear that the issue of
lawyer regulation is-at least partially-on their radar screens. 456
453 See supra note 21 and 22 (Goldfarb and Bates).
454 See, e.g., American Bar Association (ABA), Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/home.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
411 See OECD Regulatory Indicators, supra note 7; see also OECD, Economics
Department, Indicators of Regulatory Conditions in Professional Services Sectors,
http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,en-2649_34323_358587761_1_1 1 ,00.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2008).
456 See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n and U.S. Dep't of Justice, Comments on the
American Bar Association's Proposed Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20,
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/ftc.pdf, see also U.S. Department
of Justice Antitrust Division, Comments, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments
/comments.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (collecting letters to the following states about
UPL issues: Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
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Moreover, in reading the comments of U.S. representatives at the OECD
Roundtable Sessions, I do not sense an appreciable difference in tone
between the U.S. representatives and the non-U.S. OECD
representatives.457 Furthermore, as noted elsewhere, the U.S. federal
government may be increasinqly willing to exercise oversight over certain
aspects of lawyer regulation. Thus, I can imagine the U.S. antitrust
authorities deciding to launch their own professional services stocktaking
exercise, especially when countries "close to home," such as Canada,
459
have done so and when antitrust reforms have occurred in countries, such as
the United Kingdom, that also have relatively low regulatory indicators for
the legal profession.46 ° Such a stocktaking seems even more likely when
one takes into account the fact that OECD members have agreed on
Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance,461 that the
OECD issued in 2008 a Report on Competition in Legal Services, and that
the OECD has included the United States in its 2003 indicators of
regulatory conditions in professional services. 462 Thus, I recommend that
457 See supra note 15 (citing U.S. contributions to the OECD 2000 Roundtable); OECD
Legal Services, supra note 7, at 287-294 (U.S. submission cited the U.S. Supreme Court's
Bates and Goldfarb cases, the FTC's actions to limit states' ability to use UPL rules to insist
on lawyer participation in real estate matters, described advocacy efforts related to
restrictions on attorney advertising, and described an enforcement action against the
American Bar Association, including a June 2006 court decision that found the ABA had
violated multiple provisions of the 1996 antitrust consent decree).
458 See Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of
Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 559 (2005); Laurel Terry, The Future Regulation of
the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as "Service Providers,"
2008 J. PROF. LAW. 179; ABA, Center for Professional Responsibility, Materials about the
GATS and Other International Agreements, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/gats /home.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2008). But see ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES #201A (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org
/cpr/mjp/20 1 a.pdf (affirming state judicial regulation of the legal profession).
459 See, e.g., CANADA COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 1; see also Mario Monti,
Comm'r for Competition: European Comm'n, Comments and Concluding Remarks,
Conference on Regulation of Professional Services, at 1 (Brussels, Oct. 28, 2003), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/comi/competition/speeches/text/sp2003-028-en.pdf [hereinafter
Monti's Concluding Remarks] ("In fact I just came back from Washington where I discussed
the topic of the Regulation of Professional Services with my colleagues at the US antitrust
agencies (the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission).").
460 See Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 38; OECD Regulatory Indicators, supra note
7 (the "overall" 2003 indicators of 1.8 for the U.S. and 2.1 for the UK were among the
lowest).
461 OECD, Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance 3 (2005),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/51/37318586.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2008). This
document recommended, inter alia, that all regulation "have a sound legal and empirical
basis." See also OECD Regulatory Indicators, supra note 7.
462 See, e.g., OECD Legal Professions, supra note 7, at 26, 39; OECD Regulatory
Indicators, supra note 7.
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U.S. stakeholders begin preparing now for the issues and discussions that
will occur if U.S. antitrust officials were to launch their own stocktaking
exercise of professional services. Those who are interested in U.S. lawyer
regulation should anticipate how they would respond to the types of issues
and arguments that have arisen in the EU Initiative.
If an EU-type competition initiative were to be launched in the United
States, what lessons could one learn from the EU experience? Let me begin
by stating that I support the type of inquiry that the EU Initiative
encouraged. I find myself in agreement with most of Commissioner
Monti's concluding remarks at the October 2003 launch of the stocktaking
exercise.46 3  In my view, it is appropriate to encourage regulatory
463 See Monti's Concluding Remarks, supra note 459, at 11- 16:
I would now like to raise the question of who is best placed to consider if the
traditional rules are outdated and make the change happen where necessary. First
of all, in line with what some speakers have said earlier today, I wish liberal
professions would stop defending a blanket exception to all their rules and would
seize the opportunity to look at each rule separately and justify it explicitly.
Self-regulatory reform would be most welcome. I would encourage that
professional associations revisit their rules on their own initiative, in the interest of
their own professions. They should modernise the rules they are alone responsible
for. In parallel they should propose changes to the legislator for regulations that
are incorporated in legislative instruments. This ought to be done not only when it
is a legal obligation, but it should be seen as a political and economic
opportunity....
I can tell you today that I have instructed my services to start preparing a Report
on competition in the professions. I would like this Report to begin by outlining
the economic rationale to reform some of the rules and regulations affecting
competition in professional services. I would also like to outline the requirements
of EC competition rules with respect to State and self-regulation of professional
services, having regard in particular to the Arduino and Wouters judgments of the
European Court. There may be room to suggest possible course of action for the
Member States and for the professions, with reference to specific rules and
regulations as the case may be. It might also be useful to explore the possibility of
defining a timetable and a monitoring mechanism of progress.
We are just about to round up the stocktaking. We now have to reflect on what has
been said in the written submissions and here today orally. My plan is that the
Commission's Report will be released in the beginning of next year. I have
already encouraged the professions to revisit their rules. I would be pleased if also
the competent regulators used the next few months to reflect how to make a
contribution to improving the conditions of competition to the benefit of
consumers and professionals alike.
I have one more remark to make. As I have already made clear to the European
Parliament, my intention is not that the current regulatory framework should be
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authorities and professional bodies "to review existing rules taking into
consideration whether those rules are necessary for the public interest,
whether they are proportionate and whether they are justified. '46 4 (I have
called upon U.S. policymakers to be similarly rigorous when developing
lawyer regulations.) 465  Lawyer regulators should be able to explain the
basis for each of their rules. Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight, we
know that it is sometimes appropriate to exercise skepticism towards lawyer
regulation because regulators have not always acted to protect clients or the
public interest.466 Thus, I agree with the European Union that regulators
should take stock of their existing regulations and consider whether any
adjustments are needed.
On the other hand, I have grave concerns about aspects of the EU
Initiative and the forces it has unleashed. Furthermore, I believe it is
changed overnight in a lump exercise. I am in favour of competition between legal
systems, as suggested by Professor Van Den Bergh. I am not aiming at
harmonisation of all regulations, nor at generalised deregulation. My intention is
to encourage and help the competent regulators to improve the conditions of
competition, while duly safeguarding the interests of consumers. Let's think
together who are the best placed to draw up codes of conduct for the various
professions. I tend to believe it is for the governmental experts of professional
regulation and the professional organisations together to revisit the rules in place
and to abolish any rules that produce anti-competitive effects without being
objectively necessary and the least restrictive means to guarantee the proper
practice of the profession in question. I would say, at this stage, that the
governments have a burden of proof to reassess the regulations, since they have
agreed the Lisbon agenda. I think the lack of consensus to support the existing
rules is sufficient for US to ask those who defend the status quo to justify their
position in today's context.
The Commission's Report on competition in professions would be there to help the
governments and the professions by providing some common criteria for their
assessment. Let me stress it once again: it is my firm belief that some
modernisation of rules affecting competition in professional services is of crucial
importance for the EU to meet the Lisbon goal of making the EU the most
competitive and dynamic economy in the world by 2010.
464 Commission Report, supra note 8, at 4.
465 See Terry, supra note 458; see also Laurel S. Terry, Testimony to the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Partnerships (Mar. 1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/terryremarks.html.
466 See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981); Ted
Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989), reprinted in LAWYER IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 95 (Robert L. Nelson,
David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992); Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary
Practice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1469 (2000).
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appropriate to ask whether the EU experience offers any lessons about how
things could or should be done differently if the United States were to
conduct its own professional services stocktaking. For example, I am
extremely troubled by the failure of the Commission to respond directly to
the critiques of the IHS Study and Commission analyses. When such
important policy issues are at stake and when so many stakeholders have
been left out of the debate because of a lack of technical expertise, there is
an added reason for the decision-makers to respond directly and explicitly
to the criticisms offered, rather than to allow the arguments to operate as
ships passing in the night. Thus, I would recommend that if a stocktaking
exercise were to take place in the United States, the appropriate authorities
should publicly respond to any critiques directed to its methodology. (I also
hope that at some point in the future, the IHS, the Commission, or both
respond to the arguments propounded in the RBB Economics report, in the
Henssler-Kilian report, in the OECD Report, and in the CCBE submissions,
among others.)
In my view, another important lesson to learn from the EU Initiative is
the difficulty, and the importance, of considering non-economic arguments.
I am troubled by the failure of the IHS Study or the Commission's reports
to consider in a more particularized way the traditional, non-economic
arguments offered in support of various lawyer regulation provisions. It is
certainly true that when looked at from one perspective, most, if not all
lawyer regulation is anti-competitive because it restricts choice and it may
increase costs. In analyzing whether lawyer regulations are appropriate,
however, it is important to include not only the individual client's interests
and abilities to protect themselves, as the Commission did, but the societal
interests at stake. I am not convinced that the IHS Study and the
Commission's reports have done so in a meaningful way. The recent
meltdown in the United States' and global financial markets suggests that it
may sometimes be easy-in the short-term-to minimize the need for
regulation and to overstate the market's ability to take care of itself. The
meltdown also suggests that it is not always easy to recover if the pendulum
swings too far. This may be particularly true when one is dealing with "rule
of law" issues. "Rule of law" is an easy and trendy term to throw around
and it is difficult to determine exactly when it is at risk. However, one
should remember how important it is and how fragile it might be. In my
view, we in the United States tend to take the rule of law for granted and
assume that it will always be there. But this is not necessarily a sound
assumption. Lawyer regulation is an integral part of the administration of
justice and a rule of law system. Thus, before a society makes substantial
and fundamental changes to its lawyer regulation system and system of
justice, it is necessary and appropriate to talk about the likely impact of
those changes on the justice system and rule of law. Although it likely will
be difficult to obtain empirical data on these non-economic issues, I do not
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:1 (2009)
believe that means that one should forgo the discussion and debate simply
because there is little empirical date on "rule of law" issues. Although
complete deference should not be given to lawyer regulators who defend
their rules, one must recognize that when speaking of a system of justice
and rule of law, one may not always be able to offer hard data or offer
quantifiable measures in support of the arguments. This does not make the
arguments any less important however. As the Commission recognized,
regulation is about more than lowering costs for individual clients. For
these reasons, I find the analysis conducted by Copenhagen Economics to
be preferable to the analysis conducted by IHS because it explicitly and
concretely confronts specific non-economic policy arguments offered in
favor of specific regulatory provisions and tries to balance the costs of such
regulations against the benefits of the regulation, taking into account non-
economic as well as economic benefits. While I may not agree with all of
its conclusions, that approach allows me to participate in the important
policy debates at stake and to understand where I might want experts to
confirm or challenge the economic portion of the cost-benefit analysis.467
Another important lesson to learn from the EU experience is the power
and the potential dangers of using a broad-brush approach such as that
found in the IHS Study. One might argue that it was unfair of this article in
the prior paragraph to compare the IHS and Copenhagen Economics studies
because the approaches were so different. The IHS Study made an effort to
analyze five to six professions in all EU Member States. Given this scope,
it was impossible for IHS to fully consider the arguments offered in support
of a particular regulation for a particular profession in a particular country.
While this point has merit, it is also true that it is easy for the IHS approach
and data to be misused in the future and substituted for the more
particularized approach that Commissioner Monti called for. A chart that
assigns regulation point values to five professions in thirteen, fifteen, or
twenty-five countries and makes the further link that more regulation tends
not to produce greater benefits can easily be misinterpreted as the end
analysis, rather than a launching point for discussion and a regulation-by-
regulation cost-benefit analysis. Numerical data and charts can appear
"objective" and can mask non-objective and "non-scientific" assumptions
about how the data is collected. The fact that the IHS conclusions have
been repeatedly cited, despite the unanswered criticisms of its methodology
by commentators that include the OECD,468 demonstrates the powerful (and
possibly dangerous) use of this type of broad-brush approach. Thus, if the
467 For example, it seems to me, at first blush, that if the lawyer's monopoly is reduced,
there is less justification for altering lawyer qualification rules. If clients have a choice about
whether to use a lawyer or a different kind of advisor, then high qualification requirements
for lawyers do not create an impediment to competition.
468 See supra note 7.
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United States considers launching a stock-taking exercise, it should
carefully assess whether a broad-brush study is appropriate or whether it
might be interpreted-inappropriately-as the end result, rather than as a
"launching point" for discussions.
In sum, the U.S. legal profession and U.S. lawyer regulators should
consider the possibility that in the future, there might be an EU-type
stocktaking in the United States. They should also consider whether there
are any lessons that can be learned from the EU experience. I hope that by
providing the details of the EU Initiative, this article helps the U.S. legal
profession consider proactively, rather than reactively, whether there are
any actions it should take in light of the EU developments.
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APPENDIX 1: TABLES AND CHARTS FROM THE IHS STUDY OF
COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
The tables and charts reproduced below appear in the IHS Study. The first
table in the study represented IHS's view of the level of regulation for five
different professions in twelve EU Member States:
469
Total IHS regulation indices for different professions




Denmark i.format 0 0
Finland 3,5 0.3 1.4 1.3France5.6. 1 310
Germany 616. .




Netherlands 4, . 0 1.5U
Portugal n. a. 2. .a.
Spain 3' .' 4 . .
Sweden 3, 2.4 0 0
U K 3.0 4.0 ° 0 04.




No such profession (in the form of fib. proft)
white + itaic oeouhifn'tn
fib, prof. = liberal profession
469 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 3.
470 Id. at 28.
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The overall index for a particular profession was determined by combining
the country's market entry index and its conduct index, with "0"
representing the least regulation, and "6" the most. 471  The IHS study
included the following chart to explain how it calculated the market entry
index:
472
Cat egoryNariables Coding Scale Weightingi Welghtlng2
ER Entry regulation (general) ERLC*O.40+ 0 to 6
ERED*0.40+
ERQTO.20
ERLC Licensing 0 = 0 0 to 6 40%
1=1.5Number of exclusive and 2 = 3
shared exclusive tasks 3 4.5
4 or more = 6
ERED Requirements in ERED1 *0.30+ Oto6 40%
education/does only apply in ERED2*0.40+
cases of licensing; if no ERED3*0.20+
licensing: 0" ERED4*0.10
EREDI Duration of special 0 to 6 years 0 to 6 30%
education/university or other
higher degree
ERED2 Duration compulsory practising 0 to L 6 years 0 to 6 40%
ERED3 Number of professional exams (0 to - 3)*2 0 to 6 20%
ERED4 Number of entry routes to (0 = 4 or more routes; 0 to 6 10%
profession (inv. scale) 1=3 routes;
2=2 routes;
3=1 route)*2
ERQT Quotas/economic needs test 0=no 0 or 6 20%
6- esI
411 Id. at 28.
472 Id. at 30.
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This section also showed how it calculated the conduct regulation index: 473
MCPR Regulations on prices and fees 0 = no regulations
1 = non binding reference prices on some services
2 = non binding reference prices on all services
3 = maximum prices on some services
4 = maximum prices on all services
5 = minimum prices on some services
6 = minimum onrices on all services
MCAD Regulations on advertising 0 = no spec. regulations 0 to 6 15%
2 = some forms forbidden (like comparative price
advertising, direct mailing etc.)
4 = most forms are forbidden (advertising only in
very narrow margins allowed)
6 = all forms of advertising are forbidden
MCLOC Regulations on location 0 = location not restricted - 0to 6 15%
6 = location restricted
MCDIV Regulations on diversification 0 = no specific regulations 0 to 6 20%
3 = diversification under specific preconditions
allowed (branch office head is a professional,
maximum number of branch offices etc.)
6 = diversification not allowed in any case
MCIC Regulations on fonn of MCC1 *0.5+ 0 to 6 25%
business and Interprofesslonal MCIC2'0.5
co-operation (general)
MCICI MCICI Regulations on font of 0 = all forms (incl. incorporation allowed in any 0 to 6 50%
business case)
2 = partnership allowed, incorporation only allowed
in specific cases (regulations on ownership etc.)
5 = incorporation forbidden in any case
6 = partnership and incorporation forbidden in any
case; only sote practitioners etc. allowed.
MCIC2 MCIC2 Regulations on 0 = all forms allowed 0 to 6 50%
Interprofessional co-operation 3= with all professions but no incorporation; or only
with comparable professions in all forms allowed
etc
4.5 = only with comparable professions and no
incorporation
6=generally forbidden
The tables and charts that followed included various legal services-specific
information, including the issues that were evaluated and the point
allocations allotted to each issue. These charts and tables are reproduced in
the following pages:
473 Id. at 32.
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Table 3-6 Legal Services (Lawyers): Qualification Requirements
(summarizing questions 3.4-3.7) :475
-~ -- - Ct - - - -r - V- r N
Za a
4± 




475 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 46.
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Table 3-7 Legal Services (Lawyers): Scope of Activities: 476
4.
* N->c.... ,c
I x x x
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x ,.-,, x Xx x x X x x x
, ~ ~ ,xl '' xx x x x × x x
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A___ 0 5 0 x x.- 0
I
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476 Id. at 47.
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Table 3-8 Legal Services (Lawyers): Conduct showed the results for each




47 Id. at 49.
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The study also included a summary of the regulation indexes for the
legal profession:
478
















The next set of tables in
professions. The first
Regulations/Color Coding:"
the study combined the results for different
was labeled "Summary Market Entry479
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471 Id. at 50.
479 Id. at 82.
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This section also included a table showing the "Overview: Total IHS
















The tables and charts that followed were included in a "benchmarking
section" and included information about the volume of legal services in
different countries:
481
480 Id. at 83.
481 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 95-98.
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Table 5-1 Overview-Legal Services 2000:482
-i II! 1
482 Id. at 97.
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Chart 5-1 Distribution of Key Ratios in EU Member States-Legal Services
(including charts on Professional Density (per Mio. of Population); Volume
per cap. in EUR; Volume per person employed in 1,000 EUR):
4 11
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48 Id. at 98.
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The next section of the study was entitled "Hypotheses derived from the
analysis. ' 4 The IHS Study concluded that for legal, accounting, and
technical services, there was "a negative correlation between regulation and
volume per employed person. '41 85  This section included the following
tables and charts in support:
486
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484 Id. at I 11.
485 id.
486 Id. at 111-17.
487 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at I 11.
488 Id. at 112.
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It also included Table 5-6 Productivity and Volume per capita growth in
Spain:4
89
iso~iss~ise ise ise i~ i~es isowthlp.dk Renge"1992 1993 1994 1996 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 crompund) p
Legal services
F in units 71802 79565 3,5 1996.9
Tin Mio BJR 3898 5041 8,019S99
E in units 119832 127812 2,2 19-99
Vel per cap. In WJR 154 190 7,2 18898
Vd per EIn 1000 EUR' 50 58 5,0 189.99
Accouidancy
Fin units 37064
Tin Mio EUR 2522 5041 12,2 19399
E in units 79408 128490 8,4 193-99
I per cep in eR' 96 190 12,0 89899
Vo per E In 100 ELW 47 58 3,6 193-O
Technicl services
Finunits 57634 61020 70841 77370 79679 4.1 482.2000
Tin Mio EUR 6644 7824 10457 11911 7,6 1992.2000
Einunits 124491 151195 170232 184682 5,1 1992-2000
Vd per cap. in EUFr 231 307 393 441 1,4 1992.200
Vl per E in 1000 ELR 72 80 91 94 3,4 192-2000
remat strt and er4 year; frwhh oornoondun gmvh app0es
S EUROSTAT, Instituo Nocional deE 'ad30z,IHS
The section entitled "Findings Revisited Using GAP-Analysis ' 490 included:
Table 5-9 GAP Analysis Table (including legal services): 491
Lsepi ser.(0411) 00.3 L.01 0 . 3s 3 ,3 NW So40,) 33Go 3 0 1 3 03 13 2 0W 0200 3., X030 37303 ,,
~~,J-33'0 0  3 0, 10 CC 0 30 4 X2 3003, Q30 2.0 '40 3 0 50 3 15
Z all 5" o r 13r I 0 3ei toZ; $03 03 3 I4 it t9 0 0 012 003 13% 42 l 4 03 30
lQ3n -elm 033 3 10 .00 a0 3 0 3329 030 I333 3 000 10033 S2 334 303 03. 333
E , 1-0 c3r030010101 I3SS32 002 2 23 0 ? or 1213 0 02 003 1 FO i0 3 to3 f 300 1 3723 303 M 05 v101 6 0
K0 - OTT ,P,, Ol 1030 04 03 0 33 2Z 0 3)5 33 W 3"4 2 3 50 2 33l
4890I1 1.3 3 5 33 04 23 4 2 333 3 0 30 3 S4 04930 I "1 0 0 0at 34 0
-14,5 IF0 34a 30 330 30" 333 3s O 33 02 430 '20 M420 00 33
.0 00P3 343. to03 335 3013 03 3233 400 3330 0a1 Ca 0 301 403 443 330
CUP-2'tr~st 03 40 001 3 11 0 3 303 3201 3 00. 0 3 0 32 0 5-3 4n0 300 33
03330300030 14. 300 11 77 .35 3033 0 3 3223 44c3l3030 001 4C 0503023 420 400 330 .7
fl03. 060 6.3 02 06 2 6 4303 10 *13 10 1.4 to to 206 11 006 43 IlaI10 1C -C33
4=63. ,0 2 3 M 03 ,1 36 6.360 3 1" 2M 30 4.36 240 60 6.3 M lo 332
60$20346 320 327 643 2.6111 340 13 0 &to $,a 13 C"03 0 2.1046
'corrolab30ls for1lagal somices excluding l~gium 'Coroilii Sglooood a th 333330 0 03333 Will3033(I41303
lb3303 o33 oxtraotto c~ o (su0 oo Port 2) Corrolation is 039333033513 d it 05 lovo3 (2'boaoitl
Som0130 EURM~AT. 3030333303363s0330.SH
419Id. at 114.
490 Id. at 115.
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The next section was labeled a check of previous findings.492 It included
several charts and tables, including a non-labeled chart on correlations:
493
When the data for legal, accountancy and technical services are grouped together, the
corresponding trend is corroborated (which is not an automatic result of grouping, but
instead a confirmation of the effect). A highly significant correlation between productivity and
regulation index of -0.5 exists for the totality of all 38 cases (see below), independent of the
affiliation to one of the three surveyed branches (and this correlation nses further, to -0.6 if
the outlier case of Belgium, legal services, is excluded).
regulationCorrelations index
volume per person Pearson Correlation -0.485
employed Sig. (2-tailed) 0002
(in 1000 euro) N 38
Nonparametric test
volume per person Spearman's rho -0.427
employed Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007
(in 1000 euro) N 38
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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The section of the report entitled "5.5 Excursus: Scope for liberalisation by
comparison with peers" included Chart 5-12 Scope for reducing
regulation-assuming constant returns-to-scales (legal services,
illustrative); 496




493 IHS REPORT, PART 1, supra note 119, at 118.
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and Chart 5-13 Scope for reducing regulation-assuming decreasing
returns-to-scales (legal services, illustrative):
497
APPENDIX 2: EXCERPTS FROM THE 2005 STAFF PROGRESS
REPORT
As was noted in the text, the Commission's 2005 Follow-Up Report was
accompanied by a Staff Progress Report. This Report included a number of
tables that summarized developments that had taken place since the prior
report. The legal services portions of these tables are reproduced below:
Staff Progress Report: Legal Profession Excerpt from Annex 1:498
Reforms to entry restrictions:
Cyprus: consideration being given to increasing the practical experience
requirement to 2 years from the current I year.
Italy: it is recognised that reform of the general framework for the professions
is long over due and proposals are before parliament. These include reviewing
access to the professions and business structure regulation.
Latvia: requirements have been relaxed with regard to the level of
professional experience required and the requirement to take the professional
entry examination has been removed for those with PhDs. This is designed to
facilitate entry.
411 Id. at 120.
496 Id. at 121.
491 Id. at 122.
498 See Staff Progress Report, supra note 265, at 28. These Annex 1 entries for the legal
profession show: reforms to entry restrictions; reforms to reserved tasks; and reforms to
business structure.
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Staff Progress Report: Legal Profession Excerpt from Annex 1 Continued:
Reforms to entry restrictions (continued):
Lithuania: entry criteria have been relaxed for those with significant
professional legal experience (of at least 5 years) so that they do not have to
take the professional entry examination. It is designed to facilitate access.
Poland: new law under discussion to promote greater access to the legal
profession (it creates a new ministry commission to oversee the entry
examinations thus providing more transparency and openness, and creates new
routes of entry to the legal profession).
Spain: reforms planned to increase entry requirements for lawyers by
introducing a professional entry examination.
UK - Scotland: entry requirements are under review by the Scottish Executive
Working Group on Legal Services (this is due to report by Summer 2005).
Reforms to reserved tasks:
Denmark: the governmental committee will also consider current business
structure regulation.
France: new d6cret in 2004 relaxed the ownership rules to allow the
constitution of legal firms where the capital/shares can be held by other legal
firms or natural persons in the legal profession (also see under notaries below).
Changes have also been made to the law to allow financial participation by
'soci6t~s in foreign legal firms.
Germany: project underway by the Ministry of Justice on a new law will also
consider relaxing the current business structure/ownership restrictions on
lawyers (lawyers can currently only co-operate/form partnerships etc. with
patent lawyers, tax advisers and accountants).
Italy: reform project provides for establishment of professional corporations
(currently incorporation is forbidden).
NL: the planned government commission to review the Law on Lawyers will
also consider regulatory structure, including handling complaints and
disciplinary issues, and permissible business structures.
UK-England and Wales: Clementi review has made proposals to relax
current restrictions on business structure.
UK-Scotland: business structure restrictions under review by the Scottish
Executive Working Group on Legal Services.
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Staff Progress Report: Legal Profession Excerpt from Annex 1 Continued:
Reforms to business structure
Denmark: the governmental committee will also consider current business
structure regulation.
France: new drcret in 2004 relaxed the ownership rules to allow the
constitution of legal firms where the capital/shares can be held by other legal
firms or natural persons in the legal profession (also see under notaries below).
Changes have also been made to the law to allow financial participation by
'socirtrs in foreign legal firms.
Germany: project underway by the Ministry of Justice on a new law will also
consider relaxing the current business structure/ownership restrictions on
lawyers (lawyers can currently only co-operate/form partnerships etc. with
patent lawyers, tax advisers and accountants).
Italy: reform project provides for establishment of professional corporations
(currently incorporation is forbidden).
NL: the planned government commission to review the Law on Lawyers will
also consider regulatory structure, including handling complaints and
disciplinary issues, and permissible business structures.
UK-England and Wales: Clementi review has made proposals to relax current
restrictions on business structure.
UK-Scotland: business structure restrictions under review by the Scottish
Executive Working Group on Legal Services.
Staff Progress Report: Legal Profession Excerpts from Annex 2:499
Fixed prices as [of] February 2004 Minimum Maximum
prices as [of] prices as [of]
February 2004 February 2004
Czech Republic Cyprus Italy
Estonia (for legal aid cases only) Germany
France (for technical and procedural Greece
aspects of court work only) Italy.
Ireland (for legal aid cases only)
Luxembourg (for legal aid cases only)
Poland (for court work only)
Slovenia
Spain (for the profession of
'procuradores' only)
499 Id. at 31. These Annex 2 entries for the legal profession show: fixed prices as of
February 2004; minimum prices as of February 2004; maximum prices as of February 2004;
and reforms made or planned since February 2004.
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Staff Progress Report: Legal Professions Excerpt from Annex 2 Continued:
Reforms made or planned since February 2004
France: work underway to legally reinforce the requirement on lawyers to inform
clients fully as to how services will be priced.
Germany: tariffs out of court work to be removed from 1/7/06.
Italy: on 8/4/04 revised tariffs were adopted.
Staff Progress Report: Legal Profession Excerpt from Annex 3:500
Recommended prices as [of] February 2004
Austria
Denmark (for legal aid cases only)
Greece (for legal consultancy services only)
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg (list of criteria that must be taken into account to calculate price)
Portugal (list of criteria that must be taken into account to calculate price)
Slovakia (for use when agreement cannot be reached independently on price)
Spain
UK-Scotland (for general business by solicitors)
Reforms made or planned since February 2004
Lithuania: recommended prices were abolished from 6/4/04 via an amendment
to the Law on the Bar.
Luxembourg: plans to link fees to results of work.
Slovakia: revised recommended tariffs were introduced in 2005 by the Ministry
of Justice.
U.K-Scotland: under review by the Scottish Executive Working Party on the
Legal Services Market in Scotland. As a result of the review, the Law Society of
Scotland has agreed to withdraw price recommendations and to consult the NCA
on a proposed alternative.
500 Id. at 33-34. These Annex 3 entries for the legal profession show: prices as of
February 2004 and reforms made or planned since February 2004.
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Staff Progress Report: Legal Profession Excerpt from Annex 4:501
Effective prohibition on Some advertising restrictions as









Reforms made or planned since February 2004
Denmark: work is underway on legislation to remove the advertising restrictions.
Estonia: consideration being given to amending the law to permit price lists to be
published.
France: project 'd~cret' underway to reform the ethical code so that lawyers will
not have to get ex-ante authorization from the professional body for the way they
propose to advertise. The d~cret' will also allow lawyers to publicise (provide
information) on their services to prospective clients via for example a mail shot,
but cold calling or canvassing will still not be allowed.
501 Id. at 35-36. These Annex 4 entries for the legal profession include effective
prohibition on advertising as of February 2004; selected advertising restrictions as of
February 2004; and reforms made or planned since February 2004.
